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Abstract
Today the plague of landmines represent one of the greatest curses of modern time,
killing and maiming innocent people every day. It is not easy to provide a global esti-
mate of the problem dimension, however, reported casualties describe that the majority
of the victims are civilians, with almost a half represented by children. Among all the
technologies that are currently employed for landmine clearance, Ground Penetrating
Radar (GPR) is one of those expected to increase the efficiency of operation, even if
its high-resolution imaging capability and the possibility of detecting also non-metallic
landmines are unfortunately balanced by the high sensor false alarm rate.
Most landmines may be considered as multiple layered dielectric cylinders that
interact with each other to produce multiple reflections, which will be not the case for
other common clutter objects. Considering that each scattering component has its own
angular radiation pattern, the research has evaluated the improvements that multistatic
configurations could bring to the collected information content.
Employing representative landmine models, a number of experimental campaigns
have confirmed that GPR is capable of detecting the internal reflections and that the
presence of such scattering components could be highlighted changing the antennas
offset. In particular, results show that the information that can be extracted relevantly
changes with the antenna separation, demonstrating that this approach can provide bet-
ter confidence in the discrimination and recognition process.
The proposed bistatic approach aims at exploiting possible presence of internal
structure beneath the target, which for landmines means the activation or detonation
assemblies and possible internal material diversity, maintaining a limited acquisition
effort. Such bistatic configurations are then included in a conceptual design of a highly
flexible GPR system capable of searching for landmines across a large variety of ter-
rains, at reasonably low cost and targeting operators safety.
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The research programme, funded by the charity Find A Better Way (http://
www.findabetterway.org.uk/), has been fundamentally directed towards the ex-
perimental mapping and characterisation of landmine electromagnetic signatures, as
well as developing new configurations for low-cost, accurate and efficient GPR equip-
ment. Special focus has been placed on accurately characterising landmine signatures
over a wide range of bistatic angle.
The foremost contribution of the work described in this thesis consists in the per-
spective of discriminating landmines based on the presence of scattering contributions
generated by the internal assemblies of the target, which has demonstrated to be an
effective and robust feature for target characterisation. Hence, the presented material,
in addition to advancing the knowledge of what can be extracted from the GPR signa-
ture of a landmine, opens the possibility to identify targets with internal structure and
discriminate the buried anomalies accordingly.
The work has resulted in some key achievements, whose impact is two-fold: firstly,
results have highlighted the importance of using neutralised landmines for effectively
exploiting the potential of GPR of detecting the internal structure of a target and prop-
erly characterising its signature. Secondly, the investigated features are characteristic
of the target itself, and are not only source but also scenario independent. This might
lead to the development of a common landmine signature database, so that the out-
comes can be embedded in a range of GPR systems and made available to a wide range
of demining teams.
In addition, yielding the same level of information at a lower computational cost,
the suggested bistatic/multistatic approach allows the conceptualisation of a 2D GPR
system with the same performance as a 3D one. This consisted of an autonomous
ground based platform capable of remotely acquiring dense and regular bistatic data.
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If these adults have a problem with these
other adults, then go and fight them. [...].
Don’t stick a bomb somewhere you’ll
hurt kids and ordinary women who never
did anything to you.
Dolores O’Riordan
Chapter 1
Introduction
A landmine is the perfect soldier: ever
courageous, never sleeps, never misses.
P. Jefferson, 1991, [1]
Contamination by landmines and all other types of unexploded ammunitions is a world-
wide problem with enormous humanitarian impact [2]. The first antipersonnel mines
have been used during World War I, and after that the variety of landmines drastically
increased [3]. At the end of the twentieth century, more than 350 types of devices
were manufactured in more than 50 countries [4]. A typical landmine consists of a
ring mechanism, detonator that sets off the booster charge, and an explosive charge that
constitutes the body of the mine and plastic, wood, ceramic or metal casing that con-
tains all of the mentioned elements. A landmine is a type of self-contained explosive
device, which is placed into the ground to constitute a mine field, and it is designed
to destroy or damage, equipment or personnel. A mine detonates by the action of its
target (a vehicle, a person, an animal, etc.), the passage of time, or controlled means.
At least 60 countries are being affected by landmines, but reliable estimates of the
area affected worldwide are not readily available. Estimates of the number of mines
laid vary, from tens to hundreds of million [5].
While military minefields are laid in a certain order and are reasonably well docu-
mented, mines laid by militias are almost never marked or mapped, and when a conflict
ends, the landmines are forgotten or deliberately left in the fields, remaining active
for decades, becoming a psychological weapon that undermines confidence in the local
governments [6]. Although landmines are seen as an effective and inexpensive weapon,
they undermine peace and stability and leave behind maimed individuals who require
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continuing health care and may cease to be fully productive members of society. The
war is a cause for displacement, and after hostilities they endanger the lives of returnees
and humanitarian aid workers, delay return and impede reintegration and reconstruc-
tion, hinder arable land from farming and roads are abandoned due the presence of
landmines [7]. Each day these mines are triggered accidentally by civilian activities
and animals, ravaging the arable land and killing innocent people [8].
In December 1997, 123 countries signed the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their
Destruction (often called the Ottawa Treaty) in Ottawa, Canada [9]. The Treaty has
reduced the number of new mines that are laid every year and the mines that are stock-
piled by the signatory countries. However, there are still thousands of hectares of field
polluted by landmines. With a current demining rate of approximately 200,000 anti-
personnel landmines per year, mine clearance is proving to be a much slower process
than was thought in the beginning [10].
Numerous techniques have been used to detect mines, and many of them have
demonstrated promising results, but the majority has a low maturity level for field ap-
plication.
1.1 Motivations of the work
The metal detector, representing the most sophisticated demining tool until recently,
suffers from problems such as insufficient detection depth and a high False Alarm Rate
(FAR) for landmines with low metal content, due to the high sensitivity required. Ac-
cording to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) at
present there are few cases of mines laid with no metal content whatsoever, but the so-
called minimum metal mines, in which the only metal parts are related to the detonator
and contain less than 5 grams of metal, represents a challenging detection task [11].
Without the use of reliable high-tech tools for humanitarian demining, it remains
an unsafe (60 casualties were recorded in 2017 among deminers [5]), slow and costly
process [12]. According to For military demining, some tools to trigger mines and
cause their explosion [13] do exist, but such mechanical demining does not meet the
high safety standards for a cleared area established by the United Nations (UN) [14].
In the last decades, a lot of attention has been paid to the application of Ground
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Penetrating Radar (GPR) as a landmine sensor, thanks to its capability of successfully
detecting minimum metal mines and the possibility of classifying detected objects [15].
A radar signal is sent, and its reflected signal is analysed according to dielectric vari-
ations produced from reflections from the soil such as the presence of an object. GPR
can detect the soil disturbance due to the mine, which may be either mechanical (de-
ployment of the mine) or hydrological (soil moisture distribution) [16].
GPR has two important features, which makes it an important sensor for landmine
detection [17]. First, it is the only advanced sensor that can get horizontal sections
of the subsoil at different depths, which constitutes a 3D image of the ground, thus
providing volumetric information. Potentially, high-resolution images even allow for
classification of landmines. Second, the scatter from a target signal can be used for
target classification, as it covers an ultrawide bandwidth. The overall performance of
the GPR sensor for landmine detection heavily depends on the way in which it is used
and what processing algorithms are implemented in it [18, 19].
Although Ground Penetrating Radar for landmine technology is established, it is
capable of further developments to enable continued classification of evolving targets
and continued reduction of the size, weight and power of equipment, at the same time
to reduce the human presence and supervision [20].
At present, GPR systems do not fully exploit the information available in the re-
flected signal, which could be used to identify particular types of landmine. This would
allow a greater breadth of capability and performance [21].
As inferable from its operational principles, GPR implemented as a subsurface
anomaly detector may potentially detect any subsurface object. Typical minefield envi-
ronments include natural structures, such as rocks, roots or animal burrows, and man-
made debris, such as shell casings and urban debris, and these may constitute the vast
majority of subsurface scatterers. As a result, the false alarm rate may rise, particu-
larly when considering the extremely high probability of detection required by mine
detection sensors.
Landmines are not the only explosive threats to civilian populations once a war
ends. Often, bombs, artillery shells, mortars, rockets and grenades, or cluster mu-
nitions that did not explode when they were employed, still pose a risk of detonation,
sometimes many decades after they were used or discarded. Also, many post-modernist
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conflicts have seen the wide-spread use of improvised explosive devices.
The principal question is, are there scattering features that can uniquely define the
nature of the target and unambiguously characterise a landmine? And, would it be fea-
sible to increase the achievable level of information without increasing the complexity
of demining operations?
Theoretically, the reflector can be fully identified based on its shape, size, and
spatial distribution of dielectric permittivity [22]. All these features can be provided
by solving the inverse problem [23]. However, the huge total amount of necessary
measurements of the reflected fields and the very high computational costs involved
prevent practical realisation of this approach.
The ability to separate landmines from clutter targets is essential if a sensor is to
exhibit both a high probability of detection and an acceptable false alarm rate. When
a buried target is illuminated by an electromagnetic wave, energy scatters via several
mechanisms, each of them containing characteristic information that is essential for
target recognition. Therefore, the key to better target recognition lies in understanding
and analysing the electromagnetic signatures of landmines.
Mines (as a man-made objects) exhibit a level of vertical or circular symmetry that
is not prevalent in other clutter targets. A scatterer that exhibits these planes of vertical
symmetry will have unique scattering responses in terms of bistatic scattering angle and
polarisation. As a result, a radar that can make independent bistatic scattering, as well
as diverse polarisation observations, can provide important information for separating
targets with some symmetry from subsurface objects that do not have this characteristic.
In this manner, the scattering response can be used to identify landmines and reject
non-symmetric clutter targets. Still, given the resolution capability, a large number
of false alarms can fall in this category, if one just relies on shape considerations. In
addition, a large number of landmines have been moulded in irregular shape to impede
a visual detection and the symmetry and regularity feature could vanish when the target
is inclined, hence the shape could not be a discriminant feature. In a radar image, a
symmetric target will nearly always appear symmetric, whereas an asymmetric target
will often appears asymmetric.
To overcome this problem, advanced descriptors that could exploit features beyond
the physical properties of the object need to be collected and extracted from the radar
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data in order to identify a discriminant property.
A discriminant plane can be found in the nature of the target. A landmine is a
complex object, composed by a number of different assemblies and structures to allow
a proper detonation and activation of the mine, thus its signature would likely differ
from the one collected from a natural clutter object. The potential of GPR imaging
to show the internal structure of a landmine, given the prohibitive false alarm rate,
can be a significant improvement for the detection and especially the identification of
buried landmines. The presence of internal scattering components in the target radar
signature represents a discriminant feature, and it can be unambiguously associated
with a composite objects, hardly found in the majority of clutter targets.
1.2 Research scope and methods
The approach developed in this Thesis aims at exploiting possible presence of internal
structure beneath the target, which for landmines means the activation or detonation
assemblies and possible internal material diversity, maintaining a limited acquisition
effort. Under this perspective, the point in question is whether this family of targets
could benefit from angular diversity, as few contributions have been found addressing
this issue. Indisputably, identification and recognition are only possible if these re-
flections are detected, therefore the first consideration is that a sufficient resolution is
needed in the collected data.
Three major milestones and research challenges have been identified:
• Evidence of internal reflections from landmines: as these contributions are
hardly to be present in other targets than landmines (or generally buried man-
made threats), the challenge is to be able to effectively sense these internal re-
flections and evaluate the level of accuracy of the GPR images. Ideally, being
able to delineate the internal design of a target could fill the gap between detec-
tion and recognition, breaching also the path to target identification.
• Bistatic signature analysis and characterisation: as per previous considera-
tions, each of the internal components of a landmine will have its angular scat-
tering pattern, consequently, a change in the separation between the transmitter
and the receiver could better highlight these events and bring an improved target
characterisation.
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• Design of a bistatic system: the optimum configuration is intended to be de-
ployed in a highly mobile ground penetrating radar system capable of searching
for landmines across several terrain conditions. This equipment must be reason-
ably low cost and affordable to meet the dynamics of the humanitarian demining
market and to make it effectively deployable.
Ideally, the ultimate outcome needs to be as simplest as possible, i.e. an image with only
landmines positions highlighted, regardless of any physical, geometrical and environ-
mental matters. The system architecture should not only provide a logistical progress
over the current operations methodologies, but also improve the safety and reduce the
hassle of the operator. Area surveying and object detection are repetitive, meticulous
and painstaking steps in demining operations, reasons for which a machine-based ap-
proach, rather than a manual sensing, can provide important advances in operations
quality. From a practical point of view, an autonomous solution will eliminate the need
for extensive training of operators, which is a time consuming and subjected to a per-
formance decay, and ideally allows continuous operations, handing down to the human
the manual removal of the identified objects only. Even if the last step can be regarded
as the only really dangerous part of manual mine clearance, it strongly relies on the
performance of the area sweeping step. Finally, as GPR imaging performance depend
of the data collection accuracy, the constancy of operations of an automatic solution
can hardly be matched by manual surveying. A reliable unmanned platform is required
as the ultimate solution. The target robot should have the capability to operate in dif-
ferent control modes, should have reliable navigation capabilities over an area to be
cleared with efficient and flexible locomotion capability. It should be easy to use, as
even someone with only basic training should be able to operate the system. Lastly, the
cost of the equipment should not be significantly more expensive on a sensor to sensor
basis than current metal detectors.
The mentioned research question and the related milestones have been addressed
by analysing the GPR responses of a number of landmines characterised by different
design and structure, with different environment conditions and geometry, and evaluat-
ing the information that can be extracted from the different operational mode in which
GPR can be operated. For each step, a comparison to a solid replica of the target has
been computed to verify the results.
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An introductory evaluation has been obtained through the employment of FDTD
numerical simulations, to gain a fundamental understanding of the scattering mecha-
nisms that contribute to the overall target signature and to validate the research scope.
An additional preliminary analysis has been made carrying out a series of free space
measurements, with a consistent wavelength to target size ratio (compared to the sub-
sequent field experiments) to give the off the ground signatures a meaningful value.
Experimental trials have been performed in controlled conditions and using a dedicated
GPR platform assembled for the purpose of the study and based on already available
technology.
It is essential that properly constructed landmine models are used for test and
development, otherwise their signatures could differ from real ones. Considering that
landmines are objects which are difficult to replicate, it was the first priority to obtain
reliable inert (or neutralised) landmines to ensure the collection of landmine signatures
as close as possible to those of a real live device. Three representative landmines,
provided by the Defence Academy of the UK, have been used. These were complete
with all their external and internal components and were filled with a high explosive
simulant commonly used to train UK Ammunition Technical Officers.
Given the reliability of the proposed approach, in particular the employment of
inert device and the controlled conditions of the trials, the collected signatures and im-
ages can constitute a preparatory basis for the development of a catalogue of landmines
signature, which could benefit future works and researches. This possibility is of no-
table importance also for target recognition/identification algorithms, for which a large
number of observations, as much accurate as possible, are needed. If one considers the
large number of research institutes that are currently involved in the topic, it is obvious
that the learning curve can rise faster if a reliable and consistent database is available.
1.3 Scientific innovation and perspective
The foremost novelty aspect of the work described in this Thesis consists in the per-
spective of discriminating landmines based on the presence of scattering contributions
generated by the internal assemblies of the target. Following this direction, the main
original contributions are listed below.
• Demonstration of the capability of GPR methodology of discriminating the in-
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ternal structure of the target, both through a numerical prediction and employing
a realistic GPR platform in controlled conditions. A thorough evaluation of this
GPR potential is previously not found in the literature.
• Accurate delineation of the internal design of landmines from a series of dense
3D GPR images. The close agreement with the actual structure could pave the
way for target recognition scheme, as the internal assemblies could be uniquely
associated with a particular family of landmines.
• Employment of different bistatic geometries to additionally characterise the in-
ternal design of the target, including the location and spatial extension of the
scattering contributions, showing that the same level of information can be ob-
tained through a more efficient survey scheme (compared to a dense and accurate
3D volume).
• Validation of the previous results varying the inclination angle of the buried target
towards the surface to prove that the strategy could provide the same performance
even when the symmetry of the target is not maintained.
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1.5 Thesis outline
The thesis is split into 7 Chapters. The Chapter following this introduction provides
a detailed and comprehensive description of the landmine problem, analysed in all
his facets, from its socio-economic impact to the technological challenges. Chapter
3 develops a critical review of the main publications relevant to the research context,
covering the existing literature with respect to the highlighted milestones. A particular
focus is put on publications covering the radar application for sensing and identifying
the scattering contributions from the internal structure of landmines, including bistatic
and/or multistatic and polarimetric strategies. Weaknesses and limitations of the listed
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contributions are also given to motivate the originality of this work.
Chapter 4 provides the analytical basis for addressed problem and the subsequent
experimental section. This chapter is roughly divided in two, where the first part covers
the fundamental principles governing the GPR methodology and summarises the key
concepts influencing electromagnetic wave propagation from a theoretical perspective.
Special attention is put on the constraints that the demining framework possesses. Dis-
cussed theory is then investigated in the second part of the Chapter, in which a series of
numerical simulations involving the key variables affecting the imaging performance is
developed and assessed in the light of the research objectives here described.
Chapter 5 is dedicated to the assessment of the design and the outcomes of the
experimental campaigns. The contents of this chapter includes: a set of initial mea-
surements of the landmine signature changing the antenna orientation and target aspect
angle. This dataset, acquired both in free space and in a sand pit, provides a prelimi-
nary evidence of the effects generated by the target internal structure. After highlight-
ing some limitations related to unfavourable geometries and complex target design,
and after showing that neither a 2D profile can guarantee the detection of the internal
contributions, the Chapter presents the results obtained from a 3D GPR experimen-
tal campaign which demonstrate the capability of accurately delineating the internal
design from a set of images, confirming the suitability of the methodology and the va-
lidity of the approach. Some limiting considerations on the acquisition constraints for
producing such high resolution images are illustrated as well, underlining the required
acquisition effort. Finally, two different bistatic geometries, a common receiver (CR)
and a common mid point (CMP) scheme, are evaluated in the light of assessing the
benefits that a variation in the antenna separation could bring for target characterisation
and acquisition efficiency. A summary of the findings is appended to each section.
After a detailed overview of the logistical and economical context for a successful
deployment of a landmine detection system, the results of the experimental campaigns
are analysed in Chapter 6 in the light of a conceptualisation of an unmanned bistatic
GPR platform. The aim of this Chapter is to provide a series of operational parameters
that should be considered when designing such a platform.
The conclusion of this work and suggestions for future research are given together
in Chapter 7.
Chapter 2
The landmine problem and the
response of technology
Technological progress has merely
provided us with more efficient means for
going backwards.
A. Huxley, 1937, [24]
In the last decades landmine 1 detection has become a major topic in sensor develop-
ment and research. The main reasons that have pushed and are still pushing countries
for the clearance of mine-affected territories are not only injuries caused to innocent
people by these remnants, but also the usage denial of substantial areas of land for
agricultural and other economic purposes, which may be critical in countries where the
threshold of poverty is already low [25].
Cheap and easy to use, they are favourite weapons in civil wars and wars of insur-
gency, used by governments and guerrillas alike in flagrant violation of international
humanitarian law. These ”eternal sentinels” stand guard long after the conflicts have
ended and kill and maim without mercy or discrimination. Unlike a bomb or artillery
shell which explodes when it approaches or hits its target, a landmine lies dormant
until a person, vehicle, or animal triggers its firing mechanism. Landmines are blind
weapons that recognise no ceasefire and cannot distinguish between the footfall of a
soldier and that of an old woman gathering firewood [26].
1defined from United Nations (UN) protocols as a munition placed under, on or near the ground or
other surface area and designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or
vehicle.
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In the five decades since the end of the Second World War, mine warfare has
gained increasing importance on the battlefield. Given the range of tactical situations,
terrain and types of force that used them, mines have undoubtedly been one of the
most flexible weapon systems of the late twentieth century. Mines became a significant
problem after a war because little or no effort was made to clear them and few if any
records of them existed. Most mines were laid in close proximity to areas frequented by
civilians and the victims of mines were often the very people whom they were supposed
to protect. Returning refugees generally had no knowledge of mined areas and were
especially prone to treading on them [27, 28].
That mines were not cleared by government forces at the end of conflict was the
result of several factors. In general, many of the conflicts did not end in a simple man-
ner, the security situation remained tense even after the official ceasefire. Government
forces rarely saw any advantages in marking mines as these were the very weapons on
which they relied.
The presence of vast numbers of live mines renders large areas of land inacces-
sible, prevents refugees and displaced people from returning home, precludes farmers
and shepherds from working their fields, and hinders development and rebuilding fol-
lowing the end of war. During and after hostilities, mines can hinder, or even prevent
humanitarian activities. The presence of mines also increases the cost of delivering
relief supplies [29]. Relief workers obviously are less likely to enter areas heavily in-
fested by mines. Mines can also be used to harm and terrorise peacekeeping forces, as
happened in August 1993 when Somali militia used a landmine to attack a U.S. mili-
tary vehicle in Mogadishu, killing four soldiers. In Bosnia, there have been incidents
in which refugee convoys have been blocked by mines on roads intended as evacuation
routes. In Afghanistan, some provinces are inaccessible to mine action operators. In
2017, three humanitarian deminers were killed and one injured in conflict-related at-
tacks [30]. In 2017 and 2018, humanitarian demining operators had vehicles seized and
damaged by Colombian FARC dissidents, in some cases resulting in the suspension of
operations[31]. In South Sudan, four mine action personnel were seriously injured in
an ambush, and there were several instances of criminality in which teams were robbed
by armed groups.
There are no precise figures on the total number of landmines in the ground, but
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the number is less important than the impact — it only takes a couple of mines or the
mere suspicion of their presence to render a land area unusable. As of December 2018,
sixty states and areas have an identified threat of anti-personnel mine contamination,
with a further 10 countries having either suspected or residual anti-personnel mine
contamination. However, several of the states for which no estimate is provided are
heavily or massively contaminated. Total global clearance of landmines in 2017 was
about 128 km2, declined for the third year in a row although in some areas the amount
of land release through survey was doubled, with at least 168,000 anti-personnel mines
destroyed, figures that are possibly underestimated due to the lack in reporting from
some actors (armies or even informal clearance).
Ukraine
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Figure 2.1: Contamination status as of December 2017. Courtesy of icbl.org campaign.
High numbers of casualties continued to be recorded in 2017, following a sharp
rise in 2015, with a total of more than 7,000 people killed or injured by antiperson-
nel and antivehicle landmines, including improvised landmines, as well as unexploded
cluster submunitions and other explosive remnants of war (Fig. 2.2).
While remaining very high, the total for 2017 marks a decrease on the casualties
recorded for 2016. However, it is certain that numerous casualties went unrecorded, as
some of the most affected countries do not have national casualty surveillance systems
nor adequate reporting in place [5, 32].
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Figure 2.2: Casualties from remnants of war as of December 2017. Courtesy of icbl.org cam-
paign.
The primary victims are unarmed civilians, and children are particularly affected,
compared to military and security forces, continuing the well-established trend of civil-
ian harm that influenced the adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty: 87% of casualties were
civilians in 2017 where the status was known [33]. Of the total recorded casualties in
2017, 60% occurred in 35 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty (Fig. 2.3).
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Figure 2.3: Recorded casualties as of December 2017. Courtesy of icbl.org campaign.
Government forces of Myanmar used anti-personnel landmines in 2017 [34],
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while in at least eight countries, including Yemen and Colombia, armed factions and
terrorist groups have produced and used improvised landmines [31, 35]. Again, lack of
available information meant that it is not possible to determine if mine incidents are the
result of new use of antipersonnel mines or due to legacy contamination of mines laid
in previous years.
The existence of landmines is considered a vital socio-economic and environmen-
tal problem facing many countries exposed to their use. More than half of the affected
countries are among the least developed countries, those least able to bear the burden
posed by the threat posed by these remains as they fall behind in growth and sustainable
development.
In countries emerging from conflict, mines and other ERW slow the repatriation
of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs, whose numbers have reached over
60 million), hamper the provision of aid and relief and deprive communities of the
productive and safe use of land for cultivation, the gathering of firewood and other
necessities, reconstruction and water. Their presence on roads and infrastructure not
only restricts freedom of movement but also makes travelling and rehabilitation efforts
hazardous. Their removal requires surveys, clearance and the development of mine
action programmes. The world has responded to the risks posed by landmines and UXO
by spending over $ 5 billion on mine clearance in the last 10 years (Fig. 2.4), with the
highest level of international support recorded in 2017 (more than $673 million). The
overall trend is for spending to rise, with over $ 395 million (93% of total contribution)
spent on mine clearance and risk education in 2017.
Tragically, removing landmines is far more expensive than putting them into the
ground in the first place. The cost of removing a landmine is considered ten times more
than the price for its production and installation.
Cost–benefit evaluations of landmine clearance are contradictory, probably influ-
enced by inadequate data. Benefits from clearance include human benefits, the value
of casualties and medical costs saved, and development benefits, revenue from new
production or tourism and travel costs saved. To estimate human benefits it is com-
monly assumed that clearance reduces relevant casualties in proportion to the area of
land cleared, based on the productive value of victims.
The methods of estimating development benefits depend on land use. For agri-
2.1. Evolution of mine warfare 42
Less than $3 million
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Figure 2.4: Support for mine action as of December 2017.
cultural land and irrigation systems they are based on the additional value of farm
revenues. For roads and bridges, wells and water supplies, schools, and health stations
estimates are based on reductions in travel costs, while for historical and cultural sites
additional tourist revenue is calculated.
Landmine programs typically involve targeted clearance operations rather than an
average clearance task so that mine fields with the greatest benefits are likely to be
cleared first. For example, the clearance of landmines that prevent the use of existing
infrastructure or allow new development projects such as access roads, water systems,
and irrigation works are likely to yield significant economic returns. As a result, the
true economic benefits of real landmine programs are seriously underestimated.
2.1 Evolution of mine warfare
Landmines today range from very simple devices improvised in the field by soldiers
to high-technology, sensor-activated weapons. Landmines are small, usually round
devices designed to injure or kill people by an explosive blast or flying fragments. Most
modern mines are fabricated from sophisticated non-metallic materials and incorporate
advanced electronics, making them increasingly smart.
Modern landmines trace their lineage from non-explosive predecessors (Fig. 2.5)
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such as the spikes and stakes that were employed by ancient armies [1]. The word
”mine” is derived from the Latin word mina which means ‘vein of ore’ and was origi-
nally applied to the excavation of minerals from the earth. The term was then borrowed
by military engineers whose job it was to dig mines in the ground during sieges of forts
and castles, often under walls to cause them to collapse.
Figure 2.5: From defensive barriers to contamination: the evolution of concealed traps.
The first use of concealed traps in a tactical defensive context to gain advantage
on the battlefield dates back to the Siege of Alesia, in 52 B.C., when Emperor Caesar
used pits, arrays of stakes and devices called caltrops to impede the progress of the
Gauls (Fig. 2.6(a)). Similar devices were used in the battle of Bannockburn (1314)
and the Wars of the Roses (1455 - 1485). After the discovery of gunpowder in the 13th
century, explosive charges were used in siege warfare. This led to the development
of the fougasse – essentially an underground cannon, placed forward of a defensive
position to shower rocks and debris over a wide area (Fig. 2.6(b)). In the mid 1950s
the concept of the fougasse was reborn in the guise of the extremely lethal American
M18A1 anti-personnel directional fragmentation mine, better known as the ”claymore”.
Precursors of conventional landmines appeared in the 15th century at the Battle of
Agincourt in France and in the 18th century during the American Civil War, when
the first devices designed to explode on target contact were first employed by the US
Confederate Navy as floating mines. Even at that early date, the use of mines raised
strong feelings, with many judging them as ”unworthy and improper to the conduct of
war”. However, the ability of a cheap mine to destroy an expensive warship was an
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Figure 2.6: Landmine warfare precursors. (a) Romans fortification. (b) American fougasse.
Taken from [1]
irresistible economic argument for its deployment [36].
On 4 May 1862, while scouting along a road leading to Yorktown, a horse rider ac-
tivated one of the earliest landmines, which had been fabricated by assembling artillery
shells so that they could be exploded by pulling trip wires, becoming the first person to
be killed by a pressure-operated landmine. After his troops encountered these devices,
the commander of the Union Army, General William T. Sherman, said that the use of
landmines ”was not war, but murder”. The Civil War experience also demonstrated the
longevity of mines in the ground. In 1960 five landmines belonging to this period were
recovered in Alabama, still potentially functioning.
The British Army was keen to use landmines during their African campaigns in
the 1880s. During these wars they used fougasses and tripwire/pressure-operated mines
that were generally manufactured in the field. By the 20th century the concept of land-
mine warfare had permeated through most regular armies.
The development and use of the landmines became a major military strategy be-
tween 1918 and 1939. Mines only began to appear on a large scale in 1918, as an answer
to another new piece of weaponry, the assault tank. To combat the growing number and
effectiveness of Allied tanks, the Germans needed to design new weapons. Initially
they used artillery shells dug into the ground and covered with wooden boards, to give
a wide pressure plate (Fig. 2.7(a)). A number of anti-personnel mines and booby-traps
were laid in abandoned positions in anticipation of an enemy advance. These weapons
were adapted from artillery shells, with specially designed fuzes screwed into the bot-
tom of the shell. The Germans entered the Second World War with just two types of
anti-tank mines and one anti-personnel mine. By the end of the war they had manu-
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factured sixteen different types of anti-tank mines, ten different types of anti-personnel
mines (Fig. 2.7(b)) and employed many different types of booby traps (improvised de-
vices). From 1942 they fought almost constantly on the defensive, placing increasing
importance on mines as a weapon of attrition.
In 1940 French troops encountered a new device that leapt out of the ground before
detonating. The Schrapnellmine was the size of a beer can and was activated by a three-
pronged push device or a pull igniter attached to a tripwire. When fired, a cannister was
launched about one metre into the air by a primary charge before it was detonated by a
secondary charge scattering 350 steel balls out to a range of 150 m [37].
Figure 2.7: Early German landmines. (a) Anti-tank mines from WWI. (b) Anti-personnel
mines from WWII. Taken from [1]
The first major innovation of the war was in 1942, with the introduction of the
wooden-cased mine. The smaller amount of explosive that the case could contain was
sufficient to leave its victim limbless but not strong enough to kill him, opening the
way to the practical intention of maiming rather than killing. Towards the end of 1944
American soldiers first came across non-metal mines in Lorraine, France. In a single
minefield they found 12,000 mines made out of bakelite plastic or wood, which made
them more difficult to locate with metal detectors. Still, at this time, mines were used
in a controlled manner and specifically targeted at soldiers. It was not until the 1960s
that the random distribution of landmines began [38].
Advances in mine technology, as in all areas of weaponry, accelerated in the
decades following World War II, primarily in response to changing battlefield require-
ments, in the nature of warfare and the development of new military technologies. With
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the end of fighting and the dawning of the Cold War, barrier minefields became a com-
mon feature of national border defences, sometimes, as in the case of East Germany,
designed to keep the population in rather than the more traditional role of keeping the
enemy out [39].
In the early 1960s, the United States first introduced the use of a new and so-
phisticated class of contact antipersonnel mines, known as remotely delivered mines
or scatterables (Fig. 2.8), to stop the flow of men and materiel from North to South
Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia [1].
Figure 2.8: Remotely delivering mine system. (a) British Shielder Vehicle-Launched Scatter-
able Mine System. (b) US M139 Volcano Mine System. Taken from wikipedia.org
The most commonly deployed devices were the BLU-43 and BLU-44, weighting
only 20 grams but capable of tearing off a foot. These were the forerunners of the
Soviet PFM-1, or ”butterfly” mine, used extensively in Afghanistan during the late
1970s. Because of the hit-and-run nature of the Vietnam War, American ground forces
often found themselves retreating through areas that their own pilots had previously
saturated with mines.
During the Cambodian conflict, government troops used mines offensively by
placing them around the perimeters of enemy villages. They then bombarded the vil-
lages with artillery fire so that the enemy, mainly non-combatant civilians, was forced
to flee into minefields. Other examples of mines being used intentionally against civil-
ian populations include Afghanistan, where Soviet and Kabul forces mined grazing
areas, agricultural land, and irrigation systems in an effort to undermine civilian sup-
port of the Mujahidin, and Northern Somalia, where Siad Barre’s forces mined wells
and grazing lands [40]. In both cases, there was no pretence that the widescale use of
mines was directed purely at the military opposition. Landmines were used extensively
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throughout the conflict following the breakup of Yugoslavia (Fig. 2.9), as one of the
aims of the fighting was to drive people out of their homes and keep them away, gener-
ating the so called Europe’s biggest minefields [41]. As well, when Saddam Hussein’s
Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait, they set about encircling that country with a double ring
of minefields to seal off the Kuwait City area.
Figure 2.9: Mine contamination of the Sarajevo area in 1997. Taken from balkansnet.org
In Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan,
and more recently Ukraine, Syria and along the territories occupied by the IS forces,
anti-personnel mines have been widely used as part of military strategy or simply to
terrorise civilians or control their movements.
As can be inferred, mine have had a part to play at every level of conflict, in any
terrain, against a variety of targets. They can be laid in advance, thus allowing the most
economical use to be made of scarce engineer resources. For a fraction of the cost of a
main battle tank, a mine can wreak devastating and disruptive damage upon that, as well
as decimating an infantry squad as easily as a machine gun, but at lower expense. Of
all the hazards of war, the mine was the most insidious and the most feared, providing a
disturbing psychological dimension, as highlighted by the British officer Colonel J.M.
Lambert in 1952:
Mine warfare is an unpleasant business. It is foreign to our character to set traps
cold bloodedly, or to kill a man fortnight in arrears, when you yourself are out of
harm’s way; and most British soldiers who have experienced it will own a rooted
dislike of mine warfare in principle and practice.
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and, more recently, from a letter recovered from a colombian eradication man to his
commanding officer [42]:
It’s a silent killer which stalks us and threatens us, and yes, we admit it, frightens
us.
2.2 The path to the global ban
Concerning international law, on August 1949 the Geneva Conventions, Fig. 2.10,
were updated to reflect the changes in the nature of warfare in the previous decade.
Apart from forbidding prisoners of war from employment on mine clearance duties,
no specific restriction was placed on the use of mines. Even the 1980 Convention on
Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious and to have Indiscriminate Effects (or CCW), did
not adequately address the problem of the unique threat that mines posed to civilians,
as it had two important shortcomings: it did not formally apply to internal conflicts and
there was no means of implementing it.
Figure 2.10: The 1949 Geneva Convention. Courtesy of icrc.org
After the Vietnam War, the inability of landmines to stave off an attack, while
stressing the horrific injuries they had caused to people, was worldwide clear and man-
ifest. However, it was not until the early 1990s that the issue of landmines really became
a matter of international attention. By that time, it was clear that thousands of civilians
were victims of mines that had been laid without reference to the CCW and it was con-
tended that mines had been used specifically to target civilians. In 1991 Human Rights
Watch and Physicians for Human Rights published the first detailed study of how land-
mines were actually being used [43]. The book made a strong case for humanitarian
demining, which aims to make the land completely safe for human use - a far cry from
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stock military mine clearing techniques.
October 1992 marked the real beginning of the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines (ICBL) when a coalition of six non-governmental organisations combined
their separate initiatives and harnessed popular support, sponsoring the creation of the
campaign: Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines
Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights and Vietnam Veterans of America Foun-
dation. None of the six groups on the steering committee of the International Campaign
came from the disarmament community [44]. By 1995 the Campaign had embraced a
multitude of groups from all corners of the world, and been given a huge boost when the
International Committee of the Red Cross overcame its usual reluctance to deal with
political issues and launched its parallel, well-documented campaign. Bypassing the
failure of consensus politics, a Canadian initiative in October 1996 convened an historic
conference in Ottawa (Fig. 2.11 (a)) [45]. The 50 governments who fully participated
signed a declaration recognising the urgent need to ban anti-personnel landmines.
Against the backdrop of the intensive campaigning was the growing involvement
of Diana Spencer, Princess of Wales, in the global landmine issue. Before her untimely
death, the Princess had been actively speaking out against the production and use of
landmines and she made several visits to affected countries. In 1997 at the invitation
from the International Red Cross, Princess Diana visited Angola in an effort to create
an international awareness of landmines, including the plight of Angolan children [46].
During her visit she was invited by the HALO Trust, a British demining agency, to view
and walk through an active minefield. The visit by Princess Diana to Angola received
extensive media coverage, and gave the ICBL campaign a welcome boost. Her crusade
against landmines led also to her three-day visit to Bosnia in August, 1997, during
which she met victims who had sustained injuries from devices planted during the
savage civil war in the 1990s [47].
Unbeknown to her, several high profile UK politicians took offence at what she
was saying publicly at the time and publicly distanced themselves from her. This
caused further publicity and news items which ultimately benefited the campaign. Lou
McGrath OBE, the founder of the British organisation Mine Advisory Group, speaking
on the 20th anniversary of her death, said [48]:
Without her we couldn’t have brought forward what was the fastest arms control
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treaty in the world.
This concerted effort culminated in 1997 with the adoption of the Ottawa Treaty,
becoming a milestone in international law, at a conference in Oslo, Norway [49]. The
ICBL received a further boost in October of the same year when the Nobel Peace
Prize was awarded jointly to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and its co-
ordinator Jody Williams ”for their work for the banning and clearing of anti-personnel
mines” (Fig. 2.11 (b)) [50].
Figure 2.11: The Ban campaign. (a) Princess Diana walking through a minefield. Courtesy
of halotrust.org. (b) The Treaty signing ceremony. The ICBL Coordinator Jody
Williams is the first on the left. Courtesy of canadianlandmine.org. (b) Nobel
Peace Prize award, Oslo, December 1997. Courtesy of handicap-international.ca
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Trans-
fer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, shortly known as the Ottawa
Treaty, made a significant effort to stop the diffusion of anti-personnel landmines
worldwide, stating right at the beginning of the treaty [9] that:
1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
(a) To use anti-personnel mines;
(b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or
indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
(c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to
a State Party under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
In summary, the Ottawa Convention bans States Parties from using ”victim-activated”
explosive devices, but the convention does not ban mines that are designed to be ex-
ploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle (i.e. anti-vehicle and anti-tank
mines) and explosive devices that are remotely controlled [51]. This is the most argued
issue of the Treaty, as its opponents point out that the inhumane nature of landmines
stems not from whether they are anti-personnel as opposed to anti-vehicle, but from
their persistence in the ground.
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Although a triumph for popular will (to date there are 164 States Parties to the
treaty plus one that has yet to ratify), 35 member states, including the United States,
China and Russia (the three largest military powers) did not sign the treaty and are
still are non-signatories (Fig. 2.12). The majority of non-signatories claim that when
used correctly, anti-personnel mines are defensive weapons that harm only attackers,
and that the psychological effect of mines increases the threshold to attack and thus
reduces the risk of war. Furthermore, some states felt that a ban on such weapons
would compromise their national security to an unacceptable degree 2. Presumably they
believe that the humanitarian dimension lies in protecting their people from aggressors
rather than from the residual effect that mines may have.
Non-signatories
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Figure 2.12: Mine Ban accomplishments as of December 2017. Courtesy of icbl.org campaign.
Since the Convention came into force in 1999, the use of anti-personnel mines
has decreased, as well the active production of these devices. However, non-signatory
2”Even as we take this further step, the unique circumstances on the Korean Peninsula and our com-
mitment to the defence of the Republic of Korea preclude us from changing our anti-personnel landmine
policy there at this time.” US Department of State; ”A mine-free world remains our common goal.
Nonetheless, our movement towards this goal has to be realistic and gradual, sustaining the necessary
level of security and stability.” Statement of Russia; ”We are still obliged to maintain anti-personnel land-
mines as necessary for self-defence and security needs. Israel regrettably cannot commit to a total ban as
they are a legitimate means for defending its borders.” Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs; ”As a country
with long land borders, China must reserve the right to use anti-personnel mines on its territory. The
Treaty addresses only the humanitarian concerns, thus China is not able to sign”. Statement of China.
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States to the treaty continue to use and stockpile these landmines, and more than 82
countries have some form of widespread landmine contamination from past and on-
going conflicts. The use of anti-personnel mines by states remains a relatively rare
phenomenon, even if there are confirmation of their employment by non-state armed
groups in dozens of countries, due to the recent proliferation of low intensity conflicts
[52, 53]. Of course, although governments may sign on to the International Campaign
to Ban Landmines, terrorist groups do not conform to such [54].
In this respect the United Nations reported estimates and statistics illustrating the
scale of the disaster: 120 million landmines still in the ground and a comparable number
in military stockpiles, which could be eliminated after 1100 years (provided that no
additional mines are planted) at a cost of more than 30 billion dollars. This means
1 landmine for every 16 children in the world. On the basis of the figures currently
being promoted, the clearance of mine affected areas would be next to impossible and
politically unfeasible.
Figure 2.13: Pyramid of Shoes against landmines. (a) Place de la Republique, Paris.(b) Trafal-
gar Square, London. (c) Capitol Hill, Washington. Taken from the web.
Certainly, the campaign has brought a great deal of publicity to the issue (Fig.
2.13), but it has distorted the size and the shape of the problem and distracted attention
from the crux of the issue (the clearance of redundant minefields), making a moral
issue out of a practical problem. Indisputably, the massive circulation and promotion
estimates, statistics and figures on landmines and landmine victims has played a central
role in efforts aimed at reaching a total legal ban on landmines but the dissemination of
grossly exaggerated estimates do not serve the interests of potential victims.
Even if it will make no difference to a farming community whether a given square
kilometre of land may be infested with one, a hundred or ten thousand mines, since the
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risk of death or injury precludes its use unless cleared, and the concentration of mines
may not be the prime factors determining the speed of mine clearance, since the time
required for its humanitarian clearance roughly remains the same, a precise apprecia-
tion of the landmine contamination in a given territory is indispensable to evaluate and
plan mine clearance programmes. 3
2.3 Landmine classification
There are currently more than 600 different types of landmines (black market produc-
tion excluded) available, not only to official armies but essentially to all fighting groups
and armed factions worldwide, as well as many improvised mines made by military
forces engaged in fighting (ordata.info).
They are grouped into two broad categories: anti-personnel mines (APL) and anti-
vehicle mines, also commonly referred to as anti-tank mines (ATL).
AP mines can be found on the ground, buried or fixed above ground and are gen-
erally small devices that come in many different shapes. Often, they are camouflaged
to help them blend into the surroundings and can be fabricated from wood, plastic or
metal. Once triggered, AP mines cause death or serious injury by an explosive blast
and/or flying fragments. They are grouped according to their design, or to the manner
in which they inflict injuries:
• Blast (Fig. 2.14): designed to be triggered by the pressure caused by phys-
ical contact with the mine, mostly by stepping on them. Most mines of this
type are designed to cause serious injury, rather than death. They create a blast
shock wave consisting of hot gases travelling upward at extremely high veloc-
ity. In addition to buried blast mines, a common type of mine is the scatterable
mine, so-called as it is scattered over the ground by aircraft or artillery fire.
3A useful essay on the landmine estimation controversy can be found in [55].
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Figure 2.14: Examples of blast mines. (a) Italian VS-Mk2. (b) Belgian PRB M409. (c)
Israel No. 4. (d) Spanish P-4-B. Taken from ordata.info
• Fragmentation, typically designed to cause death, often to a large number of
people, from fragments propelled by the mine’s explosive charge. Most of these
mines have metal casings, or contain ball bearings or metal fragments that are
turned into lethal projectiles by the detonation of the mine. There are three basic
types of fragmentation AP mines:
i) stake mines (Fig. 2.15), fitted with one or more tripwires that set
the mine off when pulled or cut. Tripwires are very hard to see, and
may be strung across paths or doorways, and attached to a solid ob-
ject such as a tree, or to another mine. Once set off, metal frag-
ments are projected over a 360-degree radius, causing lethal injury
to anyone within an unobstructed four metre range and causing death
or serious injury to people at much greater distances. Beyond this,
the uneven size and distribution of the fragments makes the effect
unpredictable; over time, stake mines may fall over or the stake on
which they rest may disintegrate, making them even more dangerous.
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Figure 2.15: Examples of stake-mounted fragmentation mines. (a) Chinese type
59. (b) Soviet POMZ. Taken from jmu.edu
ii) directional mines (Fig. 2.16), or ”Claymore” type, are designed to project
a dense pattern of fragments in a specified direction. Directional frag-
mentation AP mines are usually command-detonated, but they can also
be initiated by tripwire. Once detonated, most mines of this type project
their fragments within a 60-degree horizontal arc and to a height of about
two metres. Most are designed to have an effective range (causing se-
rious injury or death) of around 50 metres. They are capable of killing
people, as well as disabling or destroying passenger and pick-up vehicles.
Figure 2.16: Examples of directional fragmentation mines. (a) US M18 Claymore
(note the well-known inscriptions FRONT TOWARDS THE ENEMY.
(b) Yugoslavian VMRUD Taken from iwm.org.uk
iii) bounding mines (Fig. 2.17), normally buried and triggered by trip-
wires or direct pressure. Once triggered, an initial explosion lifts
the mine out of the ground to about waist height before the main
charge detonates. Upon detonation, the explosion shoots out metal
fragments over a 360-degrees horizontal radius. Design variations
mean that the number, size and distribution of fragments vary widely,
but a typical bounding mine is likely to be lethal within 25 metres
2.3. Landmine classification 56
and capable of inflicting serious injury at ranges up to 100 metres.
Figure 2.17: Examples of bounding fragmentation mines. (a) Italian P-40. (b)
French 51/55. Taken from ordata.info
Anti-vehicle landmines, instead, are designed to disable or destroy vehicles. Like
anti-personnel mines, AT mines can be detonated by pressure (though normally much
greater weight is needed), by remote control, by magnetic influence or through the
disturbance of a tilt rod (a sort of vertical tripwire). Because AT mines are made to de-
stroy vehicles, they are generally found on roads, roadsides, paths and tracks. Clearly,
this family of mines are much larger than their anti-personnel equivalent, and have a
far heavier explosive charge (Fig. 2.18). It normally takes considerable pressure to
detonate a standard anti-vehicle mine, around 120 kg to 150 kg.
Figure 2.18: Examples of anti-vehicle landmines. (a) Italian Bakelite type II. (b) Russian PG-
MDM. (c) German T-42. (d) British Mk-V. Taken from iwm.org.uk
This does not necessarily mean that people weighing less can safely step on them.
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Fuze systems may deteriorate or be deliberately adjusted, resulting in a reduction in
pressure required to detonate. In some cases AP mines have been laid on top of AT
mines which, when initiated, will generally cause the anti-vehicle one to detonate as
well. Anti-personnel mines are often used to prevent the recovering of the anti-vehicle
ones, and the technique of laying these two families of landmines together in clusters
is common [56].
There are two further categories of explosive devices which eventually could have
the same effects of landmines, even if their main purpose is different:
• Explosive Remnants of War (Fig. 2.19): explosive ordnance which has
been primed, fuzed or otherwise prepared for action, and which has been
fired, dropped, launched, projected or placed in such a manner as to con-
stitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel or material and re-
mains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause.
Under the international legal definition, they consist of unexploded ord-
nance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), but they do not
consist of mines, because of the different primary aim of these weapons.
Figure 2.19: Examples of explosive remnants. (a) Unexploded mortar bomb in Cambo-
dia. (b) Israeli cluster bomb with penetrating submunitions. Taken from
icrc.org and wikipedia.org.
• Improvised Explosive Devices (Fig. 2.20): dating back to the bombs
made by the Irish Republican Army using explosive based on fertiliser [57],
they are a type of unconventional explosive device placed or fabricated in
an improvised manner and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass or dis-
tract. They may incorporate military explosive items, but are often de-
vised from non-military component and can come in many forms. Impro-
vised devices can be carried or delivered in a vehicle; carried, placed, or
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thrown by a person; delivered in a package; or concealed on the roadside.
Figure 2.20: Examples of improvised explosive devices. (a) Victim activated fuel con-
tainer in Afghanistan. (b) Mortars and shells in Nigeria. (c) Mortars and
landmines in Iraq. (d) Ordinary items used for IEDs. Pictures taken from
wikipedia.org, nato.int and courtesy of the Defence Academy of the UK.
Acting de facto as anti-personnel landmines, IEDs account for 25% of the total casual-
ties every year and countless more injuries [5].
2.4 Standards and Definitions
There are two principal types of mine clearance operations: military and humanitarian
[14]. Military demining is conducted for a strategic advantage, i.e. the clearance of
a path through a minefield, and it is about reducing risk, therefore casualties may be
accepted. Normally the clearance is performed with armoured vehicles equipped with
hardened roller, steel flail or similar tools capable of neutralising objects on or near the
surface (Fig. 2.21).
Otherwise known as minefield breaching, military mine clearance does not nor-
mally expect to achieve more than 60-75% clearance of a given mined area (up to 90%
when employing explosive breaching machines).
Humanitarian mine clearance, on the other hand, aims to return land to the civilian
population, with civilians being the beneficiaries of the activity. Clearance means that
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Figure 2.21: Route clearance and minefield breaching machines. (a) Toothed rake machine.
(b) Mine flail. (c) Mine roller. (d) Typical route clearance trails. Taken from
nolandmines.com and wikipedia.org
there is nothing dangerous left in the ground till an agreed depth. The UN statement of
requirement [14] defines the clearance criteria as follows:
The area should be cleared of mines and UXOs to a standard and depth, which
is agreed to be appropriate to the residual/planned use of the land and which is
achievable in terms of the resources and time available. The contractor must
achieve at least 99.6% of the agreed standard of clearance. The target for all
UN sponsored clearance programmes is the removal of all mines and UXOs to a
depth of 130 mm.
Demining time is not considered to be a major factor in humanitarian operations,
in particular less important than the safety of the clearance personnel and the relia-
bility and accuracy of the process. Safety is of utmost importance, and casualties are
unacceptable. Another consideration by humanitarian demining is the use of land for
development, as there is a need to reduce the environmental and ecological impacts that
may results from the demining operation [58].
The process has the primary aim of safely returning the area to its normal use,
so no explosive hazards can be left behind. It must be noted that the solutions devel-
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oped for the military are generally for the military and cannot be used for the purposes
of humanitarian demining. Military procedures cannot be employed in humanitarian
operations because they cannot achieve what is defined as ”clearance”, i.e. the identifi-
cation and removal or destruction of all mine and ERW hazards from a specified area to
a specific depth. The techniques for breaching the minefields are not effective enough.
Flails, tillers and rollers can be useful when trying to make a fast breach. Ploughs can
push the mines aside, leaving them buried at unpredictable angles and burying them
under piles of earth, causing further difficulties for mine clearers. Some machines are
useful for breaching a single lane through a minefield in battle, but achieving close to
the clearance rates demanded of humanitarian mine clearance has proved elusive [59].
The flail chain and hammers can damage munitions but very rarely detonate them. The
explosive methods can be ruled out because they would be potentially polluting. Ulti-
mately, they are also usually expensive.
The need for a systematic, 100% clearance of a contaminated land generally re-
sults in the decision to conduct manual clearance, as had been done since the Second
World War, using probes, sniffer dogs and metal detectors (Fig. 2.22) [60]. It is widely
acknowledged that current mine clearance techniques are extremely slow, the technol-
ogy having barely advanced since the 1940s 4.
Most mine clearance is done manually in lanes, with one or more individuals using
a mine detector and/or a metal prodder to locate each mine (Fig. 2.23) . Vegetation
must be cleared with extreme caution, as tripwires will otherwise detonate surface-laid
mines. This clearance is often done manually using hand tools such as shears and sick-
les, but in some case petrol strimmers can be adopted. Large machines are used to both
remove the undergrowth and prepare the ground surface. Such methods are difficult,
expensive, labour intensive, and not without risk. In addition, the efficacy of manual
clearance is reduced from the fact that mines are increasingly being made of plastic
materials, minimising the more easily detectable metal components. Then, mined ar-
eas are often spread with metal debris creating a high false alarm rate (FAR). Even if
anti-personnel landmines are commonly shallow-buried to guarantee detonation, once
4The first mine detector was developed in 1941 by a Polish officer, Lt. Kozacki, who escaped to
Britain at the beginning of the war. He was requested the manufacture of such a device as a result of the
need to move or relay minefields laid to protect Britain’s beaches. The British Army was still using a
version of the same device up to 1995 [1].
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Figure 2.22: Manual demining operations. (a) Mine detection dog in Lebanon. (b) Vegetation
clearance in Colombia, (c) snowy operations in the Balkan region, and (d) clearing
in urban scenario. Taken from halotrust.org
the mines are in place vegetation grows uncontrolled in the minefield areas. On the
occasions when storms causes flooding, the vegetation traps mud and silt carried by the
water, increasing the ground level [61]. In this way, mines could gradually be buried
up to a metre below the surface. In addition, mines can be deliberately buried deeply to
defeat conventional mine detection techniques [62].
Figure 2.23: Mine clearance operations. (a) Afghanistan, (b) Kurdistan. Taken from maginter-
national.org
In the age of stealth aircraft it seems ironic, if not tragic, that such primitive meth-
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ods are still necessary. Daily progress varies greatly depending on the method and
technology used as well as the operating terrain, type of soil and current weather. Daily
clearance output for one deminer has been observed between five and 150 sqm. Manual
clearance is most effective and efficient when integrated with other detection and clear-
ance methods. The employment of animals, such as dogs and rats, can be faster and
more cost-effective than manual demining detector methods. Daily progress has been
recorded from 300 m2 to 2000 m2, depending on environmental conditions, the type
of task and the operational concept in use. Animals are at their best when indicating
individual mines or minefield boundaries, rather than trying to work within dense con-
centrations of mines, and have the strong limitations of inconsistency in performance.
A detailed survey of landmine status and problem understanding can be found in
[63].
The development of standard cost models for manual mine clearance programmes
is far from straightforward. While many organisations have come to believe that the
simple division of total programme costs by the number of square metres of land cleared
will provide a satisfactory solution, the reality is somewhat more clouded than that. The
full cost is at least the sum that allows an organisation to continue operating at the same
level for an indefinite period. A complete accounting of full costs would include direct
cost, directly related to the demining operations such as cost of personnel, facilities,
materials and equipment, and indirect cost, necessary to the organisation but hard to
couple their impacts on the demining activities. Ideally, it is this figure that should be
used when comparing costs across demining operations.
2.5 Background on Sensor Technology
Following a vicious circle, landmine design has followed, often anticipating, the evo-
lution of countermine equipment.
If all mines were metal cased or had substantial metallic content, all that would
be required for detection are metal detectors. The widespread use of minimum metal
landmines necessitates development and deployment of more sophisticated detection
technologies, which attempt to exploit ancillary disturbances in the background, such as
thermal, chemical, or dielectric. Further, due to changing environment conditions that
influence measurements and existence of other natural or man-made objects that give
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sensor readings similar to the landmine, the interpretation of sensor data for landmine
detection is a complicated task [64, 65].
Here lies the cornerstone: once a subsurface feature has been detected, the em-
ployed technology should be capable of recognising its signature and differentiating it
from the surrounding environment. A landmine detection system should be able to de-
tect mines regardless of the type of explosive used, since mines are made of a variety of
explosive materials. Mines come in a variety of shapes and in various types of casings,
and therefore a detection system should be either insensitive to the geometrical shape
of the mine and the type of casing material, or preferably provide imaging information.
This latter feature will enable the system to better distinguish mines from background
clutter. Since mines can be buried at different depths under the ground surface, the
detection system should not be overly sensitive to the depth of burial. The operator of
a detection system should be able to avoid close proximity to the position of the mine
to minimise the possibility of inadvertent triggering of the mine. The detection pro-
cess should also be speeded up and detection reliability and accuracy maximised. In
addition, the system should not represent a logistical burden by requiring complex ma-
chines and operations. The diversity of the mine threat points out the need for different
types of sensors and equipment to detect and neutralise landmines [66].
Detection techniques that are in development can be grouped depending either on
their operational characteristics (Fig. 2.24):
• Electromagnetic;
• Optical;
• Acoustic;
• Nuclear;
• Biological.
or on their final results:
• sensors that see an image of the landmine through scattering;
• sensors that detect anomalies at the surface or in the soil;
• sensors that detect landmines explosive or associated chemicals.
Their operational characteristics are listed in Table 2.1. Detailed descriptions and fur-
ther analysis can be found in [63, 67, 68].
The key issue with any sensor for mine detection is the probability of detection
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Table 2.1: Outline of sensors
Technology Sensor Operative principle Strength Limitations
Metal Detector [69] Induction of electric cur-
rents in metal compo-
nents.
Ready-to-use and
lightweight. Still on
the forefront of dem-
ining operations.
[70]
Minimum content metal
mines, metal-cluttered
urban environments and
mineralised soil.
Electro-
Magnetic
GPR [71] Reflection of EM waves
at the boundaries of di-
electric contrast.
Detects all anoma-
lies, even if non-
metallic. [72]
Natural and hand-made
clutter, soil conditions.
Technologically complex
and limited resolution.
Electrical
Tomography
[73]
Determines electrical
conductivity distribution.
Detects all types of
mines. Suitable for
wet environment.
[74]
Deep buried mines. Con-
tact required. Dry and
non-conductive environ-
ments.
Electro-
Optical
Hyperspectral [75] Detects differences in ma-
terial reflectivity
Discriminates differ-
ent surface-laid ma-
terials from stand-
off distance. [76]
Extremely variable due
to changing environment,
weathering can eliminate
anomalies.
Thermography [77] Study of the temporal
evolution of temperature
profiles.
Detects every type
of mine [78].
Significant variability.
Early stage of thermal
signature understanding.
Acoustic
&
Seismic
Seismic
Sensors
[79] Response of the ground to
an applied shock.
Detects all types of
buried mines. Low
soil moisture impact.
[80]
Man made clutter and
deep buried mines.
Ultrasonic
Sensors
[81] Backscattered ultrasonic
wave.
Low false alarm
rate and unaffected
by moisture and
weather. [82]
Soil condition for ultra-
sonic wave propagation.
Heavy vegetations.
Explosive
Vapour
Detection
Biological [83] Odour discriminating
skills of living organism
(dogs, rats and bees).
Explosives presence
confirmation and
material characteri-
zation. [84]
Extensive training and
difficulty in maintaining
continuous operations.
Chemical [85] Chemical identification of
microscopic residues of
explosive compound.
Lightweight and
simple to operate.
Low detection
threshold. [86]
Suffers from residual
vapours and chemical
clutter, complexity of col-
lecting enough explosive
molecules.
NQR [87] Resonation of the chemi-
cal bonds when subjected
to RF pulse.
Very low false alarm
rate (not driven by
clutter). Specific for
landmines [88].
Susceptibility to RF in-
terference. Low SNR
and stationary detection
required.
Bulk
Explosive
Detection
TNA [89] Radiation emissions from
atomic nuclei in explo-
sives.
Low strength source
radiation. Identifies
the elemental con-
tent. [90]
Ground surface fluctua-
tions. High false alarm in
wet environment (sensi-
tive to hydrogen content).
X-ray [91] Difference in mass densi-
ties and atomic number.
High resolution
imaging capabil-
ities. Potential
lightweight and
portable. [92]
Shallow penetration and
sensitivity to soil topogra-
phy. Long time for image
generation.
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Figure 2.24: Outline of remote sensing technologies for landmine detection.
(PD, the amplitude of the signal being higher than the threshold whenever the target is
present) and false alarm rate (PFA, an erroneous decision caused by noise or other inter-
fering signals exceeding the detection threshold) [93]. Table 2.2 shows the efficiency
of different demining methods (derived from [94]).
Table 2.2: Probability of detection by various demining methods.
Type of asset Assessment of quality Probability of detection
Manual mine clearance
All mines and ERW are found to the
required depth
100%
Mine detection dogs
Verification of dogs indications is
conducted manually
100%
Flail and tillers
Performance is variable, very poor
for some ERW
40 - 80%
Rollers
Performance depends on the ground
and type of mines
0 - 40%
The two quantities are strictly bounded, as a decreasing of the detection threshold
could ensure a comprehensive detection, but also may lead to the detection of smaller
misleading detections, generating a high false alarms rate and slowing down the oper-
ations. The two different approaches to landmine clearance, military and humanitarian
operations, can be plainly explained considering these two factors (Fig. 2.25): the first
procedure follows the idea of not identifying a target as a mine unless there is an abso-
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lutely certainty that it is a mine, while for the latter a landmine is marked even if there
is a low suspect on its presence.
Figure 2.25: Operational mode for landmine clearance procedures.
While the detection probability is mostly dependent on the target properties and
the specifications of the system, the false alarm rate instead is affected by all the sur-
rounding objects and minefield scenario. Clutter can be either man-made, such as metal
fragments, pipes or building remnants just to mention a few, and natural, such as rocks,
tree roots or water ponds. Depending on the physical principle of the employed tech-
nique, the source of false alarms could be very different (Table 2.3).
Table 2.3: Common sources of false alarms for mine detection.
Detection technology Source of false alarms
Induction Metal scrap, natural soil conductivity and magnetisation
Radar Natural clutter (roots, rocks) and metal debris
Acoustic Hollow, man-made objects
Nuclear Radio frequency interference
Optical Man-made objects.
Biological Explosive leakage, battlefield debris
Any new technology product being offered must provide good detection perfor-
mance, significant improvements in false alarm rate over current technology, must be
simple and easy to use, in all countries, and not significantly more expensive on a sensor
to sensor basis than current metal detectors (approximately $ 5k) [95]. Technologies
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to be developed should take into account the facts that many of the demining operators
will have had minimal formal education and that the countries where the equipment is
to be used have poor technological infrastructure for equipment maintenance, opera-
tion, and deployment.
New sensors should detect minimum metal/non-metallic mines and ideally the
explosive contained therein. It is clear that no single technology has the capability to
detect and recognise a variety of mines under all circumstances. Some of them are more
suitable for confirmation than for primary detection. The most efficient way to increase
the detection probability while minimising the false alarm rate consists of using several
complementary sensors in parallel and then combining the information collected by
these sensors. The main benefit for using a multi-sensor systems lies in the potential
for a reduction in the number of false alarms and/or improved probability of detection
against a wider variety of mine types and terrains. Several analysis have shown that by
reducing the false alarm rate (expressed in false alarms per square metre) by a factor of
the order of 10 could result in an improvement in the overall mine clearance rate of a
factor of 2.
Technically this is possible, but reliable explosive detection technology may not
meet cost, weight or low power requirements. Many technologies are promising, but
few of them are of the sensitivity, size, weight, manufacturability and price range re-
quired for humanitarian demining (Fig. 2.26) [96]. Even if it is rather difficult to
get detailed price estimates (as most systems are prototypes), this price level makes
it difficult for dual or generally multi-sensor technology to compete and even the most
developed systems are significantly more expensive, although once produced in volume
it would be reasonable to expect that price will reduce.
A promising solution to reduce false alarm rates and to overcome current landmine
detection limitations will be by applying fusion of sensory information from various
sensor outputs through the use of advanced signal processing techniques, by integrat-
ing different sensor technologies reacting to different physical characteristics of buried
objects.
Mutual processing of the data coming from different sensors is called data fusion
and a distinction is commonly made between three different levels of sensor fusion: (1)
data-level fusion, (2) feature-level fusion, and (3) decision-level fusion. In the majority
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Figure 2.26: Inferences about the maturity of mine detection technologies.
of multisensor systems developed so far, data acquired by different sensors are fused
at a decision level. Fusion at lower levels requires more computational power and a
deep knowledge of the performance of each sensor, as well as access to the raw data of
these sensors. Despite evident difficulties with its realisation, feature-level fusion can
provide much better results in terms of detection and FAR.
The feature-level sensor fusion process starts with the selection of the regions of
interest with their features as measured by the individual sensor and consists of three
steps: feature extraction, feature reconciliation or object association, and decision mak-
ing. In principle, feature-level fusion can handle all features from all sensors. However,
the number of selected features should be kept to a minimum as an exhaustive search
over all feature combinations would require an enormous amount of evaluations and is
not feasible.
This work will focus on Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) technology, one of the
technologies that have been extensively researched as a means of improving mine de-
tection efficiency and considered one of the few that can provide meaningful opera-
tional capabilities.
GPR is beginning to be fielded as a sensor for mine detection, where its ability
against the minimum metal mine often surpasses the ubiquitous metal detector. Re-
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ports on the successful field deployment of GPR can be found in [97, 98, 99, 100, 101].
Considering the operating principle, it is more than likely that a GPR system will be
combined with a metal detector, although some work has been carried out on the in-
tegration of metal detector, GPR and Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance techniques for
detecting explosive as well as microwave and millimetre wave radiometers [102] [103].
However the complexity and cost of these systems has made them uncompetitive with
the conventional induction technique.
In terms of technology readiness level, the most advanced systems are the US
Army AN/PSS-14 (formerly HSTAMIDS) hand-held detector [104] developed by
CyTerra (now L-3 Communications, US), the Anglo-German Vallon - Cobham VMR3
Minehound (formerly MINETECT) humanitarian detector [105, 106], and the ALIS,
developed by Tohoku University Sedai, Japan [107]. The three platforms are depicted
in Fig. 2.27.
Figure 2.27: Deployed GPR equipment. (a) AN/PSS-14. (b) VMR3. (c) ALIS
The HSTAMIDS system combines a metal detector system manufactured by
MineLab of Australia with a three antennas stepped frequency GPR system developed
under US Army funding by CyTerra. The MINEHOUND system combines a metal
detector system manufactured by Vallon of Germany with a two antenna impulse radar
GPR system developed by ERA Technology. ALIS is a combination of a metal detec-
tor (produced by CEIA, Italy) and can select one from two different GPR systems,a
stepped frequency radar and an impulse radar system.
Operationally, the signal from the metal detector, representing the prime search ca-
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pability, is used to trigger the GPR, methodology which constitutes the simplest form
of data fusion. Each sensor returns a unique audio signal and can be heard by operators
individually or in combination with the other. Following the MD alert, the GPR unit
checks the area around the metal reading to verify whether the response of can be as-
sociated to a landmine like material. Joint occurrence of these two events confirms the
presence of landmine. In ALIS, accurate positioning information is available, allowing
for computing 3D subsurface image and image-based object detection. In all handheld
systems, classification of detected objects is left to the operator.
In the field trials of produced handheld mine detectors, it has been demonstrated
that the GPR sensor improves the overall performance of the whole detection system.
Statistics of the operational use of AN/PSS shows improvement from 7 to 17 times
in comparison with a single metal detector, while operational testing of VMR3 has
demonstrated reduction of the false alarms by a factor of better than 5:1 and 7:1 de-
pending on the soil conditions. Similar performance of ALIS has been reported.
Reports on field evaluation trials for the described equipments can be found on the
gichd.org repository.
2.6 Ground Penetrating Radar
From the early beginnings the development of GPR took place in parallel to the de-
velopment of radar and in 1910, only six years after Hu¨lsmeyer applied for a patent
and performed experiments with anti-collision devices for ships, Leimbach and Lo¨wy
applied for a patent to locate buried objects with radar technology (Fig. 2.28) [108].
Their technique consisted of burying dipole antennas in an array of vertical boreholes
and comparing the magnitude of signals received when successive pairs were used to
transmit and receive.
Figure 2.28: Sketch of the first GPR system comprising an array of borehole antennas. Original
sketch taken from [108]
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However, the technology was largely forgotten until in the 1950s a U.S. Air Force
plane crashed in Greenland, because its radars were seeing through the ice layer and
misread the altitude [109]. This was the initial spark for investigating into the ability of
radar to see into the subsurface not only for ice sounding but also for mapping subsur-
face properties. Different scientific teams began to work on radar systems for viewing
into the ground in the early 1970s, including the lunar science mission planning for
the Apollo program [110]. In the beginning, these radars were developed for military
applications such as locating tunnels constructed by the Viet Cong during the Vietnam
War and in the demilitarised zone between North and South Korea [111, 112]. Soon
thereafter public utility and construction companies were interested in such radars as
a practical tool to map pipes and utility lines under city streets [113]. GPR has been
very successfully used in forensic investigations [114], with the most notorious case
occurring in the United Kingdom in 1994 when the grave sites, under concrete and in
the house of Fred West, of the victims of the serial murderer were pinpointed [115]
[116]. Nowadays, Ground Penetrating Radar is widely accepted for subsurface sensing
in the fields of geology, archaeology and utility detection (just to mention, see [16] and
[117]). GPR technology is being applied to abandoned landmines as a means of reduc-
ing the false alarm rate and providing improved detection of low metal content mines
[118, 119].
Compared with other subsurface sensing technologies, the potential benefits of
GPR can be summarised as follows:
• False alarm reduction by target identification based on measured target responses.
• Ability to detect both metal and non metal cased landmines, and generally every
dielectric discontinuities occurring in the subsurface.
• Ability to detect both surface laid and buried landmines, theoretically without the
need of being in contact with the surface.
• High resolution 3D imaging capability.
• Unmanned operations and sensor combination suitability.
GPR is a non-destructive technique that can provide a 3-D pseudo image of the subsur-
face [120], including the fourth dimension of colour (scaled to signal amplitude), and
can also provide accurate depth estimates for many common subsurface objects [121]
as well as precise information on its nature, under favourable conditions.
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GPR is an electromagnetic method similar in principle to the seismic reflection
technique, except that it is based on the propagation and reflection of electromagnetic
waves rather than acoustic ones. The electromagnetic wave is radiated from a transmit-
ting antenna and travels through the material at a velocity which is determined primarily
by the permittivity of the material. The wave spreads out and travels downward until it
hits an object that has different electrical properties from the surrounding medium, is
scattered from the object, and is detected and recorded by a receiving antenna.
When a wave impinges on interface, it scatters the energy according to the shape
and roughness of the interface and the contrast of electrical properties between the host
material and the object. Part of the energy is scattered back into the host material, while
the other portion of the energy may travel into the object.
Since the dielectric properties of the soil control the attenuation of the signal, and
the contrast between the landmine and the background medium controls the scattering
and reflection strength, the electromagnetic properties of both mine and soil are cru-
cial variables [122]. A reflection occurs when the electromagnetic wave encounters
any electrically heterogeneous material, and its magnitude depends on the boundary
dielectric contrast.
2.6.1 Operational principles and survey techniques
GPR Equipment can be broadly categorised as frequency or time-domain systems, de-
pending on the operating principles:
• Time Domain Radar: the transmitter emits a short pulse of electromagnetic
energy and the receiver collects the echo for a certain time period. The exact type
of the transmitter and receiver, shape of the electromagnetic pulse, and system
set-up depend on the specific application;
• Frequency Domain Radar [123]: a stepped-frequency signal probes the en-
vironment with a discrete set of frequencies The main advantage is the greater
measurement accuracy inherent in a frequency domain system and the flexibility
to adjust the operating frequency range to suit the specific ground conditions.
The application of GPR is mostly related to the use of impulse radar systems, due to
a major easiness of usage and data interpretation. For both types of GPR the total
subsurface response, formed from a combination of the responses from all reflectors
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within the medium, can be inverted using various imaging algorithms [124].
Concerning the configurations of the antennas, a GPR system is configured as:
• Monostatic: a unique antenna operates as both transmitter and receiver.
• Bistatic or Multistatic: transmitter and receiver are separated and independently
managed.
Most GPR systems employ separate antennas for transmitting and receiving, although
the antenna elements are housed in a single module with no means of varying the an-
tenna geometry, commonly referred to quasi-monostatic configuration.
Further on, an additional distinction is commonly made between ground coupled
and air launched systems, defining whether the equipment is working in contact with
the surface or above it (Fig. 2.29).
Figure 2.29: Examples of GPR survey strategy. (a) Ground coupled, (b) air launched, and (c)
forward looking. Courtesy of idscorporation.com
The selection of deployment approach represents a trade-off between both opera-
tional simplicity and data quality or interpretability. It should be noted that the height at
which antennas need to be placed for the configuration to be considered air-launched is
poorly defined, as well as how close is close enough to be considered ground coupled.
Figure 2.30 presents a simulated example of the effects originated by elevating the
antennas from the ground.
Generally, the probability of detection by close-in sensors such as GPR degrades
rapidly as the sensor is lifted from the ground due to reductions in both the ground cou-
pling and reduced sensitivity caused by the spreading loss resulting from the increased
distance to the mines [125, 126].
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Figure 2.30: Comparison of GPR imaging performance of a dielectric target buried at 13cm in
low loss soil. (a) Ground coupled data. (b) Elevated antennas (5 cm).
Ground coupled GPR measurements are generally more effective, since raising
the antennas off the ground surface degrades lateral spatial resolution. In addition,
despite being intuitively an optimal choice, the efficacy of airborne GPR systems is
limited by the rough air/ground interface, below which landmines are typically buried.
Stand-off radar systems suffer from a low energy coupling process efficiency since,
in the presence of lossy materials, complex angles of refraction may occur. At larger
incident angles than the Brewster angle the losses at the air/ground interface increase
rapidly. A rough surface would scatter GPR waves randomly, making the received
data difficult to analyse, as well as complicating the prediction of the the effective
propagating waveform [127, 128]. In addition to the problem of coupling energy into
the ground, one should take into account that the scattering amplitude of all landmines
decreases when they are buried. Obviously, working at a stand-off distance has its
straightforward advantages, especially considering that it can be operated at high speed
and is more flexible to vehicle mountings [129].
Conversely, employing a ground coupled platform could improve signal penetra-
tion and data resolution [130]. When the antennas are in contact with the ground, the
subsurface waveform is nearly unaffected by the roughness of the soil and therefore
is predictable and easy to analyse [131]. Ground coupled systems survey an area at
slower speeds and cannot be operated on every surface topography, but are less prone
to external noise, surface clutter (as it is incorporated into the first echo), and take ad-
vantage of a theoretically perfect coupling between the antennas and the soil interface
[132].
Typical GPR surveys are collected in common offset (CO) or single-fold (SF)
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mode. CO acquisition deploys one transmitting and one receiving antenna that move
together along the surface keeping a constant offset. When a single antenna acts al-
ternately as transmitting or receiving one (monostatic configuration), the configuration
is called zero-offset conditions. During a survey, a fixed geometry is usually applied,
using not only a constant separation but also a fixed orientation between the antennas
(Fig. 2.31). From a practical point of view, this method allow easy access to most
survey area and a relatively fast and simple acquisition.
Figure 2.31: Common offset GPR survey. T x and Rx represents respectively the transmitter
and the receiver.
To maximise target coupling, antennas should be spaced such that the refraction
focusing peak in the transmitter and receiver antenna patterns points to the common
depth to be investigated. In practice, a small antenna offset is often used because oper-
ational logistics usually demand simplicity of operation.
In general, survey lines run perpendicular to the trend of subsurface features object
of investigation, as for discrete objects it will result in hyperbolic radargram signatures
which can be easily interpreted. In addition, more information can be gathered using
fewer survey lines.
Until about 20 years ago, surface GPR studies were based on sparse 2D profiles.
Unfortunately, interpretation is often not sufficient for complex scenarios or extended
targets and thus recognition and identification remains a challenge. This challenge
could be mitigated if a properly sampled 3D dataset is available, allowing the extraction
of physical and geometrical information of the buried target, as well as eliminating
ambiguities due to soil effects and other spatially-extended noise artefacts.
3D GPR is able to provide a deeper insight of the subsurface features, as well as
to visualise their spatial extent. Although the significant advantages of three dimen-
sional surveying strategies are well documented [133, 134, 135], they generally require
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much greater acquisition expenditure and effort than traditional sparse bidimensional
acquisitions. Three dimensional imaging with GPR has been tested in most domains of
shallow subsurface disciplines [136, 137, 138]. The price to pay is a very high accuracy
in trace positioning and acquisition regularity [139, 140, 141].
As the objective of GPR surveys is to obtain information about the subsurface
structures, the wavefield as a function of space and time must be properly sampled and
recorded. Therefore, survey design must adhere to fundamental sampling principles
[142, 143]. Certain important limitations of sampling interval should be noted. From
the sampling theorem [144], in order to reconstruct the buried features as accurately
as possible, trace spacing should be dense enough for the unaliased recording of all
diffraction hyperbolae:
∆x≥ v
4 · f · sinθ (2.1)
where v is the wave velocity, f is the working frequency and θ is the dip angle along
a diffraction hyperbola. For large angles, the sin function could be approximated as
unity, thus leading to the common adopted sampling parameter of λ/4.
Applying the Nyquist criterion requires the GPR measurements to be spaced by
quarter of the wavelength of the highest frequency in all directions, because diffraction
hyperbola cones have rotational symmetry. In principle, the technology for performing
3D GPR acquisitions is readily available, but in practice the density specifications that
are implicit in all 3D surveys can be a demanding requirement [139, 140, 145, 146], as
summarised in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: GPR spatial sampling criterion for different frequencies and soil velocities.
Frequency Velocity 8 [cm/ns] Velocity 12 [cm/ns] Velocity 18 [cm/ns]
200 MHz 10 cm 15 cm 22.5 cm
600 MHz 3.3 cm 5 cm 7.5 cm
1 GHz 2 cm 3 cm 4.5 cm
3 GHz 0.66 cm 1 cm 1.5 cm
In some instances, it may be possible to increase the sampling interval slightly
beyond what is quoted, but only when data volume and speed of acquisition are at a
premium over integrity of the data. When the station spacing is too large, the data
will become unable to adequately define structures such as steeply dipping layers. Al-
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though adequate spatial sampling is important, there are no significant benefits from
over-sampling. Survey line spacing depends on the extent of variation in subsurface
features along the trend direction (for example, pipe orientation or strike direction). If
there is little to no variation, only one profile line may be needed to accurately char-
acterise the target features. If there are significant variations, the profile line spacing
should be set according to the Nyquist sampling interval.
Despite the majority of experimental trials have been performed with a fixed an-
tenna separation, a bistatic geometry in which the transmitter and the receiver are in-
dependently managed may offer several key benefits, especially for low-observable
targets or low Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) scenarios [117, 147]. Common offset data
is always limited in imaging capabilities because it provides only a single look at the
subsurface, as only a single near offset trace is acquired for each position along the
profile. In comparison, multi-offset data involves multiple reflection angles of inves-
tigation, equivalent to multiple looks at each subsurface position [148]. A separate
receiving antenna allows to record the character of the transmitted signal as it appears
entering the ground. Objects with irregular or rough shape could reflect the incident
wave in a particular direction far from the monostatic receiver, thus multiple looks at
a target from a variety of antenna spacing could make it easier to distinguish target of
interest from clutter features [149].
Multi-offset GPR data offers numerous imaging benefits over common offset sur-
vey, such as increased signal to noise ratio and depth penetration, and improved re-
flector continuity and dip imaging [150, 151]. Another relevant benefit of multi-offset
data is the improved lateral imaging capabilities it provides [152]. Further on, it will
be useful for remotely surveying the area by setting a transmitter at a fixed position and
only the receiver scanning the ground surface. Obviously an accurate relative antenna
position knowledge is required. These systems provide more information as pairs of
antennas provide different views of the target.
Finally, GPR propagation is along raypaths defined by Snell’s law, hence wave
propagation and target scattering characteristics are equally affected by directional de-
pendencies, and they have a significant impact on the final image. Polarisation is
one of the fundamental feature of radar, as the way in which a target scatters sig-
nal of different polarisations provides important additional information [153]. In ad-
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dition, even the subsurface, under certain conditions, is capable of depolarising the
EM wave ([154, 155]) as a result of combination of multiple reflection phenomena
[156, 157, 158]. The same considerations apply for a change in the angle of incident of
the wave, i.e., a variation of the antenna separation [159]. For example, targets designed
to minimise backscatter might be easily detected by a bistatic configuration. Separating
the transmitter and the receiver will allow the ground wave to detach from the surface
reflection, providing a finer estimate of the dielectric characteristics of the propagating
soil, and surface clutter effect can be reduced through a bistatic acquisition.
All the above described procedures suffer from some constraints and limitations
that depend on the physics of the EM wave propagation and on the instrumentation.
Since the antenna dimensions have an inverse correlation with their central frequency
due to physical constraints, the minimum offset for a bistatic antenna pair cannot be
too small. Moreover, several commercial systems use shielded antennas, which are
bigger than the corresponding unshielded ones. In addition to these logistical con-
straints there are some physical limitations that cannot be overcome. The immediate
vicinity (less than about one wavelength) of an antenna is usually referred as near field,
and is characterised by a strong electromagnetic field that theoretically prevents true
wave propagation, as this energy is not yet coupled with the ground.
Therefore, in the GPR experiments the offset should be set large enough to assure
far field conditions, at the same time the offset cannot be too large especially where
high conductive subsurface materials are present. The maximum separation distance
generally does not exceed 1-2 times the depth of the target interface.
In addition, the minimum transmitter-receiver separation should not exceed the
Nyquist sampling interval defined above. Therefore, for each successive reading, the
transmitter-receiver separation should increase by ∆x, meaning that the transmitter and
receiver should be moved a distance ∆x/2.
2.6.2 Performance factors
Easy understandable, the major design control in a GPR system is the frequency of
the emitted wave, and thus its wavelength and bandwidth. Image quality improves as
the wavelength decreases and the frequency increases. However, at high frequencies,
penetration of the incident wave into the soil can be poor. When choosing equipment for
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a particular application it is necessary to find a compromise between these parameters.
The performance of a radar system can be evaluated through two major factors,
namely maximum detectable range and radar resolution. The maximum detectable
range is defined by the maximum distance at which the radar can detect the object,
while the radar resolution is defined by the Rayleigh criterion as the limit of certainty
in distinguishing between two close signals obtained during the GPR mapping, before
their separate identity is lost and they appear to be one event (Fig. 2.32) [15].
Figure 2.32: Resolution concept for GPR.
The vertical (also range or depth) resolution provides information about the system
ability to differentiate, in time, two adjacent reflections as different events. The vertical
resolution for unmodulated transmissions mainly depends on the effective duration of
the radar pulse, obtained from the width of the signal envelope. Note that GPR systems
are designed to achieve bandwidths that are about equal to the centre frequency and
thus the pulse period is inversely proportional to the centre frequency. This is why
GPR frequency and bandwidth are often interchangeable.
This suggests that the shorter the pulse duration (i.e. the wider the bandwidth),
the better its resolution, and that the slower the propagation in the medium the higher
the discrimination performance, as the effective pulse duration depends on the wave
propagation velocity in the medium.
Theoretically, taking into account Fig. 2.33, ∆t can be defined as:
∆t = t2− t1 = 2∆rv (2.2)
where t1 and t2 are the travel times for reflections r1 and r2 and v is the wave velocity.
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Figure 2.33: GPR vertical resolution concept.
In general, it is accepted that two close events can be distinguished if the targets are
separated in time by a difference of half the effective pulse duration (i.e. twice the
bandwidth). Therefore, the expected spatial vertical resolution can be calculated from
the effective duration of the radar pulse (τp) and the wave propagation velocity in the
medium:
∆r ≥ τpv
4
=
v
4B
=
λ
4
(2.3)
in which is clear that the pulse width and the velocity in the material dictate the range
resolution.
Practically, two pulses, one reflected from the top and the other from the bottom of
the target are distinguishable from each other when offset by a quarter of the wavelength
of the GPR signal (for a 100% fractional bandwidth system).
Table 2.5 lists achievable values for vertical resolution for different materials and
typical bandwidth.
This is theoretically independent of distance from the source in an ideal world,
but in practice in most natural materials, the attenuation of the electromagnetic waves
increases with frequency, widely known as the dispersion effect. This low-pass filter ef-
fect within the propagating materials causes an increase in the duration of the pulse and,
therefore, worsens the resolution. As the wave propagates, it loses its high frequency
components; although in some cases the resolution is approximately independent of
this loss. Earth materials with significant water content tend to have higher attenuation
properties but this characteristic is balanced out with the reduction of the pulse length
due to a slower wave velocity in wetter materials.
Obviously, a signal having very large bandwidth is needed to be able to distinguish
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Table 2.5: Vertical resolution of GPR systems.
Soil type Soil velocity [cm/ns] Bandwidth [GHz] Resolution [cm]
0.6 6.3Dry Sand 15
3 1.3
0.6 5Limestone 12
3 1
0.6 2.5Clay 6
3 0.5
0.6 3.3Silt 8
3 0.7
0.6 6.6Ice 16
3 1.4
0.6 12.5Air 30
3 2.5
between closely spaced targets and to show the detailed structure of a buried target.
Horizontal (also lateral or angular) resolution indicates the minimum distance that
should exist between two reflectors located next to the other at the same depth (parallel
to the analyzed medium surface) so that the radar detects them as separate events. It
mainly depends on the radiation characteristics of the antenna and the depth of inves-
tigation. The farther the targets are from the source, the larger the wavefield footprint,
the worse the resolution. It is closely related to the Fresnel zone concept.
Figure 2.34: GPR horizontal resolution concept.
The zone of influence is defined as the area which can contain a second target
that cannot be uniquely resolved. Hence, horizontal resolution can be identified with
the footprint size, commonly identified with the diameter of the first Fresnel Zone. As
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before, the time difference between the two events is expressed as:
∆t = t2− t1 = 2(
√
r2 +∆l2− r)
v
(2.4)
Employing the approximation of considering the target sufficiently distant from
the antennas, the time difference becomes:
∆t = t2− t1 = ∆l
2
vr
(2.5)
and therefore the horizontal resolution must be:
∆l =
√
λ
2
r (2.6)
which is identical to the Fresnel zone radius for monochromatic signals of that partic-
ular frequency. Note also that the horizontal resolution defines an area of resolution
since all targets encompassed by a radius of ∆l/2, perpendicular to r cannot be re-
solved. Finally, at best it is equal to the distance between transmitting and receiving
antenna.
Table 2.6 lists achievable values for horizontal resolution for different materials
and typical bandwidth, considering a target buried at 10 cm.
Table 2.6: Horizontal resolution of GPR systems for a 10 cm buried target.
Soil type Soil velocity [cm/ns] Bandwidth [GHz] Resolution [cm]
0.6 11Dry Sand 15
3 5
0.6 10Limestone 12
3 4.4
0.6 7Clay 6
3 3
0.6 8Silt 8
3 3.7
0.6 11.5Ice 16
3 5.3
0.6 15.8Air 30
3 7
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In general, to achieve an acceptable lateral resolution, a sharp beam is needed.
However, small antennas with significant gain require a high carrier frequency, which
may not penetrate the material to a satisfying depth. The footprint dimensions are
related to the propagating material, hence plan resolution improves as attenuation in-
creases, provided that there is sufficient signal to discriminate under the prevailing
clutter conditions [126]. In addition, it is dependent on the survey design, which will
determine the lateral variations able to be imaged.
Figure 2.35 shows the effect of resolution for targets discrimination using a system
with a central frequency of 1.5 GHz.
Figure 2.35: Examples of GPR resolution concept. (a) Horizontal resolution. Objects separa-
tion is respectively 100 mm, 200 mm and 250 mm. (b) Vertical resolution. Ob-
jects separation is respectively 0 mm, 50 mm and 100 mm. Courtesy of geoscan-
ners.com
The maximum detectable range, which is the maximum detectable depth in GPR,
is determined by the ratio of the transmitted power and the minimum detectable signal
level, which is normally the noise level of the receiver. The detectable range in a free
space is determined by the radar equation, but for GPR, the detectable depth is strongly
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dependent on the subsurface material. Therefore, GPR penetration performance cannot
be defined in an absolute way.
The image of a buried target generated by a GPR radar will not correspond to its
geometrical representation. The fundamental reasons for this are related to the ratio
of the wavelength of the radiation and the physical dimensions of the target, which
generally is close to unity. This compares very differently with an optical image, which
is obtained with wavelengths such that the ratio is considerably greater than unity. This
results in a GPR image with a much lower definition and that is highly dependent on
the propagation characteristics of the surrounding ground.
2.6.3 Radar cross section and clutter
Both propagation parameters and the target Radar Cross Section (RCS) define the fun-
damental system detection performance. The RCS represents a convenient way to de-
scribe the strength of scattered fields observed in the far-field, theoretically defined in
Eq.2.7 as the area intercepting the amount of power that when scattered isotropically,
produces at the receiver a density that is equal to the density scattered by the actual
target [156].
σRCS = limr→∞4pir
2
∣∣∣∣EsEi
∣∣∣∣2 (2.7)
where Es and Ei are the far field scattered and incident electric field intensities, respec-
tively, and r is the target distance. It depends mainly on target dimensions (compared
with the wavelength), shape, materials, polarisation and aspect angle [160]. In particu-
lar, it has been demonstrated that targets showing some directional features have a sig-
nificant polarisation dependent scattering [161]. This is particularly true for elongated
objects, as pipes and cables [162], but even complex targets could show a polarimetric
behaviour [163].
In practice, it describes the spatial distribution of the reflected energy through-
out the surrounding medium. This property can be interpreted as a consequence of
constructive and destructive interference of the field reflected from a collection of co-
herently illuminated point scatterers.
Examples of RCS diagram for different targets are provided in Fig. 2.36.
When the scattering object is small its RCS is proportional to its physical size,
thus the complexity of detecting landmines. Given this, it is very important to under-
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Figure 2.36: Examples of typical RCS diagram for: (a) Random - shaped target. (b) Elongated
object.
stand the physical construction of landmines as this has a major influence on their RCS
[164, 165].
The majority of landmines are moulded from plastic materials, the metallic com-
ponents being minimal or absent. A landmine may be characterised by a number of
scattering centres, each with its own angular radiation pattern, in particular when the
plastic content of the internal structure is high. Most landmines may be considered as
multiple layered dielectric cylinders that interact with each other to produce multiple
reflections, and it is expected to have a certain impact on the overall target signature
and RCS. For example, some minimum metal landmines are substantially solid explo-
sive, but others have significant air gaps or composite assemblies to allow movement
behind the pressure plate. Other aspects of the radar cross section of landmines are
concerned with the relative contributions of specular reflection, diffraction of discon-
tinuities, travelling waves including direct illumination running wave, creeping wave
on metal, trapped guided wave on dielectric as well as the contribution due to resonant
scatterers, which are a combination of discontinuities that allow the echo to build up.
The ensemble of these events enhances the RCS, beneficial for target detection.
Both target and clutter RCS are a function of the look angle and hence multiple
looks at a target from the variety of antenna spacings could make it easier to distinguish
targets of interest from clutter, as landmines could have some geometrical features and
symmetry that are not present in clutter signature [166].
Clutter in radar technology is defined as reflections coming from events which
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are unrelated to the target scattering characteristics but occur in the same time win-
dow and have similar spectral characteristics to the target wavelet. This disturbance is
a deterministic signal, stable in time, thus it cannot be removed via traditional radar
clutter filtering and might reduce the detection threshold of the system. In the world of
subsurface imaging, clutter represents a large variety of sources [167, 168] .
Soil heterogeneity, in terms of high fluctuations of the dielectric permittivity and
conductive texture of soil, causes the electromagnetic wave to be reflected and results in
very high level of ground clutter which could mask weak target signatures. Small stones
and gravel, as well as tree roots, animal burrows, metal fragments and other debris
included in the soil are causes of undesired reflections [169, 170]. These conditions
are often found in minefields, as for example shown in Fig. 2.37. The type of clutter
is just as important in that other subsurface heterogeneity, such as rocks, roots, surface
roughness, and soil spatial variations also yield a signature. [171].
Figure 2.37: Examples of minefield scenarios.Taken from cmas.gov.kh.
Seeming unusual, these disadvantages brings equally significant benefits: imaging
all discontinuities in the subsurface brings a large amount of data yielding a significant
amount of information. Features can then be extracted and behaviour outlined, making
the methodology suitable for classification and identification processing.
In conclusion, GPR performance as a landmine detector is governed in terms of
detection by the RCS of the mine, its depth of cover from the top of the mine to the
surface of the soil, and the propagation properties of the surrounding medium.
2.6.4 GPR Data presentation
GPR data can be displayed in a number of different formats. These are generally rep-
resented as a one-, two-, or three-dimensional dataset, denominated by the acoustic
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terminology A-, B- and C- scans. Each presentation mode provides a different way of
looking at and evaluating the investigated target:
• A-scan, Fig. 2.38(a), displays the amount of received energy as a function of
time. The energy is plotted along the vertical axis and the elapsed time is dis-
played along the horizontal axis. In the A-scan presentation, changes in the
impedance of the different materials can be estimated by comparing the signal
amplitude obtained from an unknown reflector to that from a known reflector.
Reflector depth can be determined by the position of the signal on the horizontal
sweep.
• B-scan, Fig. 2.38(b), is a two dimensional plot representing an ensemble of A-
scan acquired moving the equipment on a straight line. The horizontal axis stands
for the number of inline traces or scan length, whereas the vertical axis represents
the time scale.
• C-scan, Fig. 2.38(c), is a three dimensional display of GPR data resulting from
a side by side arrangement of several B-scans. It can be seen also as a collection
of horizontal slices, where each slice corresponds to a particular depth.
Figure 2.38: GPR results visualisation techniques. (a) A-scan. (b) B-scan. (c) C-scan
A-scans and their energies are generally used for target detection tests at the corre-
sponding scan positions. The hyperbolic response can be easily obtained by the geom-
etry of the scanning system. It is important to note that this hyperbolic response due to
a single target will shift in the scanning direction if the inline position of the target also
shifts. The shape of the hyperbola is the same for targets at the same depth but shape
changes with depth. In particular, the hyperbola becomes more flat for deeper targets.
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It is obvious that the three display modes are in ascending order according to the
acquisition effort, but also by increasing level of information that can be gathered.
2.7 Summary
Landmines are a persistent and complex problem. Although numbers have declined
significantly in the last two decades, landmines still affect almost 30 per cent of coun-
tries, and have caused an average of more than 5,000 casualties per year in the last 5
years, with sharp rise in the last two. Landmines still pose a serious and global problem
despite the work of engineers, NGOs, and policymakers, who have made real headway
in the last 20 years, reducing both the number of landmines deployed, and their use.
Moreover, landmines pose a problem that is complex, seen in different terms by differ-
ent players, and therefore defies a clear solution.
Conventional antipersonnel mine detection has not evolved as much as one would
like. The most widely used method for detecting and removing antipersonnel mines
follows the same techniques developed during the Second World War, and directly in-
volves human beings. Metal detectors for identification are used and a detailed and slow
analysis of the affected zone is made. Every suspicious element found is meticulously
checked.
Difficulty in detecting tiny amounts of metal in a minimum metal landmine with
a metal detector has led to the surfacing of Ground Penetrating Radar as a promising
technology. GPR has been extensively applied to investigate subsurface structures or
buried objects in geology, civil engineering, environmental and soil science. This non-
destructive method of subsurface analysis is becoming increasingly important for many
environmental and shallow geophysical applications. GPR can quickly and accurately
determine the subsurface structure, can easily move on the ground surface but does not
have to touch it, and it can detect both metallic and non-metallic objects in the soil.
Due to these features, detection of buried landmines has proved to be a successful
application of GPR technique. GPR has a number of advantages over other landmine
detection sensors. First, it is complementary to conventional metal detectors. Rather
than detecting exclusively the presence of metal, it senses variations in the electromag-
netic variations of the ground, and therefore it can find mines with a wide variety of
casing, including minimum metal landmines. Second, it can generate an image of the
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mine or another buried object, on which basis the detected object can be confidently
identified and classified. Third, GPR scans at a rate comparable to that of an EMI
system.
However, GPR is not a specific sensor for explosives, and it detects only secondary
signs of explosive devices. Because the technique responds to all electromagnetic in-
homogeneities of the ground, all natural subsurface inhomogeneities will be a source of
false alarms, which should be discriminated in later processing. Whether or not a GPR
will detect a landmine highly depends on soil moisture, surface roughness, and mine
location; such complex interplays make its performance highly variable and difficult to
predict. Due to the above-mentioned reasons, a GPR sensor will hardly perform the
role of standalone sensor for landmine detection, but it can play a crucial role within a
multisensor platform, as for the deployed systems described above.
While considerable research into target recognition techniques has been carried
out, the variability of the soil and target parameters has challenged the development
and implementation of robust and reliable signal processing methods, meaning that
there are still considerable opportunities for improvements in detection performance as
well as reduction of false alarms.
Chapter 3
Research Context
The saddest aspect of life right now is
that science gathers knowledge faster
than society gathers wisdom.
Isaac Asimov [172]
Ground Penetrating Radar surveying is aimed at retrieving unknown physical proper-
ties of the internal status of the structure under investigation by making use of limited
measurements of scattered electric fields. Traditional radar approaches allow the ex-
traction of qualitative information from the radar echoes, whereas in many cases, such
as for instance demining applications or archaeological surveys, there is the need of
obtaining quantitative information on the buried targets. This requires to cope with an
electromagnetic inverse scattering problem that is non-linear and ill-posed [23]. Inverse
scattering theory demonstrated that ideal noise-free data for orthogonal polarisation and
all aspect angle can uniquely determine a target. In reality, due to measurements uncer-
tainties and errors, the inversion is strongly ill posed, thus only approximate solution
can be retrieved [173].
The application of Ground Penetrating Radar for landmine clearance is by no
means an undiscovered topic in scientific literature. However, the development is not
straightforward, due to a number of physical or operational limitations. Many anti-
personnel landmines are mostly dielectric objects with little metal content and a size
less than 15 cm. This requires a very high spatial resolution. Lossy soils act as a fre-
quency low-pass filter, whereas in low-loss soils, the dielectric contrast between the
mine and the surroundings can be very low. In both cases, a very weak signal needs to
be detected in the presence of strong disturbances and clutter. Although technologically
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advanced, GPR systems still suffer from severe limitations concerning clutter reduction
and image resolution. The effects of surrounding soil, landmine characteristics (both
geometrical and physical), equipment design and acquisition strategies are only a few
of the major aspects affecting the quality of the outcomes [174].
The next challenge is therefore to move from qualitative interpretation, which de-
pends heavily on the human visual interaction with the data, towards the extraction
of quantitative target parameters and identify target attributes quickly and (possibly)
automatically.
To cover the research in these areas, contributions from several research commu-
nities have been evaluated and the main contributions have been reviewed.
3.1 Scattering from composite targets - landmines per-
spective
An important aspect that needs to be considered when studying scattering from plastic
cased landmines is their internal structure. Each type of landmine has its own operation
principle and hence internal structure varies. Nevertheless, certain common character-
istics may be identified.
For a pressure actuated blast mine, which is the most common type of anti-
personnel mine, the internal structure may roughly be subdivided into the following
four components: (1) the external mine casing, (2) the main explosive charge, (3) the
fuze, and (4) the trigger mechanism. Since plastic materials have permittivity similar to
those of explosives (Table 4.4), from an electromagnetic point of view the casing and
the explosives may be considered as one.
The explosives include the main charge, which is set off by a smaller amount of
explosive called the detonator. Sometimes the firing train also contains a booster charge
to amplify the ignition by the detonator. Different types of fuze mechanisms exist, such
as the mechanical pressure fuze or the chemical pressure one. Usually the fuze is the
only component of a plastic cased landmine that contains parts of metal, however its
metal content may be limited to no more than a small firing pin or a striker spring [175].
In particular the presence of air gaps is expected to amplify the target response when
the mine is buried and hence should facilitate its detection with GPR. Furthermore, due
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Table 3.1: Relative dielectric constant of landmine constituents.
Material Relative dielectric constant εr
Neoprene rubber 6-9
Bakelite 3-5
Polycarbonate 2.9-3.5
Polyethylene 2-2.5
Epoxy resin 3-4
TNT 2.7
PETN 2.72
Comp B (RDX TNT) 2.9
Tetryl 2.9
Semtex (RDX PETN) 3
Comp C-4 (RDX) 3.14
Nytroglycerine 19
to their particularity, the potential of imaging these components (location and spatial
extension) could be beneficial for target classification and identification.
Figure 3.1 shows some examples of disassembled landmines.
Figure 3.1: Examples of anti-personnel landmines internal design. (a) Soviet PMN-2, (b) South
African R2M2. Taken from nolandmines.org and ordata.info
Simplifying the situations, the target can be modelled as a three layer objects, inl-
cuding (1) the activator plate, (2) an air-filled layer, and (3) the main body, as sketched
in Fig. 3.2.
Very few works have addressed the task of detecting the reflections generated by
the internal components of buried landmines and determining their effects, as most
trials have been performed employing devices and surrogates which imitate the outer
shape of real landmines filled with a dielectric material which has a similar dielectric
constant to the explosive substance.
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Figure 3.2: Simplified model of anti-personnel landmines.
As a starting point, a signal having a large bandwidth is required to be able to
distinguish between the various targets and to show the detailed structure of a target.
Therefore, in this context it is the bandwidth of the received signal which is fundamen-
tal [176, 177, 178]. In [179], it has been found that the internal structures of penetrable
objects can perturb the phase property of radar waves, therefore a distinction of objects
with different internal structure can be made exploiting the phase variations induced by
rough surface scattering. Unfortunately, the method allows this distinction for target
located in the same homogeneous layer of soil, and buried under a flat surface. Sim-
ilarly, the Authors of [180] explicitly employ the impedance discontinuity profile of a
landmine in a syntactic, rather than statistical, pattern recognition scheme to discrimi-
nate landmines from clutter, underlining that these patterns are unique in the presence
of clutter since they are based on the internal structure of the landmine. However, the
impact is limited by the evaluation of anti-tank landmines only. Work in [181], even if
with a completely different aim, gives an experimental evidence of the resonance effect
of the GPR waves entering the mine and reflecting internally inside the mine.
In addition, research reported in [182, 183] both indicate that the signature re-
sulting from minimum metal landmines is affected by the internal structure, providing
modelling and approximation in order to take into account this effect in the scatter-
ing theory. Another evidence of the internal scattering is given in [184], in which a
cross-polar contribution in the radar signature, quite unexpected considering cylindri-
cal objects, is to be attributed to the presence of the detonator and other internal mine
structure. What can be inferred is that identifying landmines by looking for targets with
negligible cross-polar response is not to be recommended.
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3.2 System design
For the purpose of enriching the information received from the target, a strategy is to
employ GPR configurations with multiple components and a particular emphasis will
be put on the exploitation of angular diversity. This diversity can be obtained varying
the relative geometry between the system and the target, hence separately managing the
transmitter and the receiver.
3.2.1 Multistatic GPR
Most of the contribution to GPR development has been directed at monostatic systems
or bistatic systems with closely spaced antennas, as for the case of the previously de-
scribed GPR systems. Although most of the current GPR cover wide frequency band-
widths and some of the advanced ones utilise polarimetric antennas, the quality of the
acquired information and processing can still be enhanced.
The potential benefit of a multistatic system over monostatic or quasi monostatic
systems is the opportunity to obtain more information on the target by taking advantage
of the angular diversity from different transmitter-receiver pairs [185, 186]. Principal
drawbacks are the physical limitations that could not allow a hand-held implementa-
tion. The increased complexity of these configurations is expected to pay back in an
enhanced image resolution or clutter suppression [187, 188].
In recent years a remarkable advancement in the GPR field has taken place place
thanks to the implementation of new multi-channel systems. Arrays have been deeply
implemented for landmine detection, which was one of the first GPR applications with
very specific requirements and constraints, gaining importance for their vehicle mount-
ing capability and for forward-looking landmine detection ability, which allows long
standoff distances and fast interrogation of wide areas [189]. A multi-channel array can
obtain more angle-dependent scattering information, i.e., the bistatic scattering infor-
mation, and thus, it is demanded to improve the capability to discriminate landmines
from clutter [190]. Generally, it is understood that these acquisition schemes allow to
obtain enhanced subsurface imaging.
First of all, multistatic GPR, intended here as a system in which the transmitter
and the receiver are separated and independently managed, has three surveying modes
(Fig. 3.3) depending on how the transmitter and receiver antenna moves:
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(a) Multi-offset: both antennas move together in the direction of survey with a fixed
offset, changed for each profile.
(b) Common source (receiver): the transmitter (receiver) is fixed, however, the re-
ceiver (transmitter) moves along the survey direction.
(c) Common depth or common mid point: both, the transmitter and receiver antenna,
move away from a common point in opposite direction.
Figure 3.3: Multi-offset GPR survey. T x and Rx represents respectively the transmitter and the
receiver. (a) Multi-offset. (b) Common source.(c) Common mid point.
The expected potential of these strategies is to yield lighter weight, lower cost sys-
tems and improved performance, in terms of detection, identification and coverage, and
system flexibility, as they can operate in several modes. From a logistical point of view
it is quite obvious that the most efficient geometry is (a), that requires just one trans-
mitter and receiver, followed by (b) where just one antenna is moved, and finally (c),
which requires the maximum acquisition time. On the other hand, in terms of accuracy
the best strategy is (c) while the less precise is (a) because is not so straightforward to
follow the same path several times.
Considering the aim of the work, the advantages of the first scheme are limited by
several reasons. Landmines are small objects, and their internal components are even
smaller, and if one considers the width of the radiation pattern it is hard to imagine that
sharp, preferential scattering directions exist, as it could be for highly reflective large
planar targets. What has been found is that a change in the antennas separation could
highlight internal reflections and that there could be evidence of asymmetry in the tar-
get design, but it is not possible to determine an optimum offset under which there are
unique features to mark. For such a family of targets, the information gathered from a
multi-offset scheme converts to the content of a single offset one. Reflections gener-
ated by the internal structure are a result of multiple reflections/transmissions events,
therefore these returning waves will have a limited amplitude, bounding the effective
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antennas spacing. Practically, this means that from these bistatic profiles it is not pos-
sible to extract clear indications on the presence of internal scattering components, and
consequently that multiple profiles are needed, with all the drawbacks that have been
previously highlighted.
To provide a conceptual explanation, Fig.3.4 describes the expected impact of an
offset variation applied to the characterisation of the internal structure of a buried target,
comparing the two cases of a solid dielectric object and a target including an internal
assembly.
Figure 3.4: Effect of antenna separation. Solid target: (a) Common source. (b) Common re-
ceiver. (c) Common mid point. Composite target: (d) Common source. (e) Com-
mon receiver. (f) Common mid point.
As the wave propagation is defined by the ray path, a signature collected at partic-
ular incident angle will be characterised by a number of propagation phenomena which
may be different for complex and composite targets. This is not supposed for a solid
dielectric target, for which a change in the angle of arrival of the wave should not pro-
duce noticeable changes. Hence, these changes are highly dependent on the internal
design of the target, as presented in the previous Chapter.
Regarding the terminology, the term multi-offset comprehensively includes all the
geometries involving a change between the transmitter and receiver separation.
Figure 3.5 provides an example of a multi-offset radar image and the events that
can be observed from its analysis.
Generally, images include three well determined events: (1) the air wave, which is
the wave that travels directly from the transmitter towards the receiver, (2) the ground
wave, which is the wave propagating over the surface, and (3) the reflections generated
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Figure 3.5: Evant recognition on a multi-offset GPR image.
by the target scattering. The gradient of the reflection events is inversely proportional to
the electrical properties of the material in which the wave is propagating; therefore, for
a target buried in a homogeneous medium, the latter two events have the same slope.
The bistatic angle can be computed accordingly from the trigonometric relationship
between the transmitter/receiver offset and the target depth.
Generally, these multi-offset strategies have been extensively employed for the ve-
locity estimation, as they offer offer more accurate and precise estimates than hyperbola
fitting methodology, to reduce random (i.e. not coherent) noises to emphasise the sig-
nal content, and to discriminate and selectively remove specific noise components. In
addition, the continuous multi-offset method improves the quality of subsurface images
through stacking and provides measurements of vertical and lateral velocity distribu-
tions.
However, these configurations have traditionally been employed as an obvious
method of increasing the productivity rate, acquiring millions of traces in a relatively
short time and with high location accuracy, rather than to implement the system as
an integral array exploiting the increased capability related to inserting into the array
antennas with different frequency, orientation, spacing.
Under this hypothesis, a number of works have exploited the advantages of having
multiple looks at a target from a variety of antenna spacings.
Work in [191] employed numerical scattering models to compute the monostatic
and bistatic image of two metallic targets (ogive and missile-like shape) to provide an
imaging comparison. With different acquisition geometry and bistatic angle, it demon-
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strated that bistatic images could lead to a better description of the higher order scatter-
ing effects, thus depicting different target features. Similar comparison has been made
in [192], where it is shown that angular diversity allows for highly resolved images
from single frequency data.
In [193] a multistatic GPR array is used on a number of targets in both free space
and in soil, evaluating as well the effect of surface clutter. Results show that for shallow
targets a close proximity yields SNR ratio, while a large spacing is unsuitable for their
detection. Obviously, the concept is reversed for deeper targets. In addition, a coherent
sum of the collected bistatic pairs demonstrated some potential for enhancing the qual-
ity of the obtained images. The same concept is demonstrated in [194], where a target
to clutter ratio can be improved combining images from different bistatic configurations
and elevations. Authors in [195] used a similar same approach for testing an inversion
algorithm, underlining the strong interference generated by the surface clutters.
In [196], an approach based on the combination of monostatic and bistatic sys-
tems is presented in order to lower the effect of multipath scattering. Starting from
the assumption that false targets detected by the monostatic case are located at differ-
ent positions from the bistatic one, a simulation with three point scatterers illustrates
the benefits that can be obtained by cancelling the multipath effect using information
contained in the bistatic data.
The authors of [197] presented a feature extraction scheme to obtain bistatic scat-
tering information from a vehicle mounted GPR system with multistatic capabilities.
The resulting images effectively demonstrate the symmetrical behaviour of landmines,
as opposed to some clutter objects. The applied processing is based on the extraction of
the seven moment invariants from a space-wavenumber processed image, which con-
tains frequency and aspect-angle information, in order to obtain invariant properties.
The assumption is that a landmine is a perfect body of revolution.
Studies in [198, 199] exploited the angular diversity for increasing the informative
content of a GPR 2D image, providing at the same time a practical hardware and signal
processing implementation of the proposed solution. Examples of what can be gained
from multiple illumination are provided through experimental and simulated data.
Work in [200] provided a demonstration of the improved resolution that could be
achieved using a multistatic array processing, in particular overcoming the influence of
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target radar cross sections and antenna radiation directions of monostatic 2D GPR data.
A multistatic geometry can be beneficial also for features extraction scheme,
as evaluated in [201] in which an array of receivers increased the robustness of a
resonance-based feature classification technique, recovering many characteristic tar-
get resonance signature. Authors in [202] applied a non-linearised image formation
scheme relying on single frequency angular diversity data, hence requiring a multistatic
radar system. The same factorisation method has been used in [203] to combine infor-
mation gathered from a mulstistatic geometry, realised in the form of multiple fixed
offset. Similarly, work in [204] shows that measurements using bistatic observations
can be valuable for evaluating target symmetry, but also underlines that a large and di-
verse collection of measures formed from different bistatic geometries are needed for a
proper classification.
Independently managing the transmitter and the receiver means that interferences
from the ground reflection can be properly mitigated estimating the Brewster angle and
set up the system accordingly, as shown in [205, 206].
3.2.2 Polarimetric GPR
The polarisation information contained in the waves backscattered from a given target is
highly related to its geometrical structure and orientation as well as to its physical prop-
erties [207]. A mono-frequency electromagnetic wave propagating in a given direction
has four basic characteristics: (1) frequency, (2) amplitude, (3) phase, (4) polarisation.
Polarisation refers to the locus of the electric field vector in the plane perpendicular to
the direction of propagation. While the length of the vector represents the amplitude
of the wave, and the rotation rate of the vector represents the frequency of the wave,
polarisation refers to the orientation and shape of the pattern traced by the tip of the
vector.
Three main polarisation states can be defined:
• Linear polarisation: the vector is confined to a plane that is parallel to the direc-
tion of propagation. It can be further divided in horizontal and vertical.
• Elliptical polarisation: the rotating E field follows a path that traces an elliptical
pattern with time.
• Circular polarisation: A special case of elliptical polarisation. It can be further
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divided in right and left.
Linearly polarised waves are unique because the E field does not rotate with time,
therefore the only way to change its orientation in an isotropic material is to reorient
the transmitting or receiving antenna. This is why in most cases, polarisation and an-
tenna orientation terminology are alternatively employed. Hence, antenna orientation
is critical for antennas that generate linearly polarised signals, but it is not as critical
for antennas that generate elliptical or circular polarised signals. Finally, any linearly
polarised wave can be obtained as a superposition of a left circularly polarised and a
right circularly polarised wave, whose amplitude is identical. Most commercial GPR
antennas are dipole or bow-tie antennas that radiate linearly polarised energy with the
majority of the radiated electric field oriented along the long axis of the dipole or bow-
tie.
Circular polarisation, commonly radiated through spiral antennas, has some ad-
vantages over linear polarisation in that: if a linearly polarised antenna is used, the
strength of the reflected wave from an object will depend on the azimuthal position of
the antenna relative to the object. Also, if the orientation of the transmitting and receiv-
ing antennas is orthogonally to reduce the mutual coupling between the two linearly
polarised antennas, then the receiving antenna will hardly detect the reflected wave
from the object. Another advantages of circular polarisation is that the reflected signal
from the surface of the soil at oblique incidence has the opposite sense of polarisation
compared to the incident wave, due to the fact that the ratio between the permittivity of
soil and air is larger than one. Thus the equipment will not receive the reflected wave
from the surface at oblique incidence. These advantages are unfortunately compensated
by a reduced efficiency in converting the input power into radiated one.
Wave polarisation can be represented in a number of ways, usually in terms of the
polarisation ellipse [208], which defines the polarisation state through the parameters of
ellipticity angle, which is the ratio between the two ellipse axes, the orientation angle,
corresponding to the rotation of the major axis and the horizontal one, and the polar-
isation sense, given by the rotation sense of the field vector. In the Poincare´ sphere
representation [209], the polarisation state is represented by a point in a polar coor-
dinates system. Every point on the sphere uniquely defines a polarization state. A
descriptive sketch is provided in Fig. 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: Representation of different wave polarisation state. (a) Linear horizontal polarisa-
tion. (b) Elliptical polarisation. (c) Circular polarisation.
Another useful representation is the polarisation chart, obtained by an orthogonal
projection of the Poincare´ sphere on its equatorial plane. Lastly, the polarisation state
of waves can also be described by the Stokes vector [210].
As per the reciprocity theorem, the polarisation vector of the backscattered wave
can be expressed as a function of the monostatic scattering matrix of the target [211,
212, 213] ([214, 215] for the bistatic equivalence), which represents a set of parameters
for describing the symmetry, structure, torsion and helicity of a target.
Polarisation affects how a radar system sees the objects in the scene. Therefore,
radar imagery collected using different polarisation combinations may provide different
and complementary information [216, 217].
The advantages of using polarimetric radar systems for the characterisation of
intrinsic target properties arise from two main factors: (1) the vector information con-
tained in the target backscattered wave is retained (by reception diversity), and (2) the
entire backscattering behaviour of a target can be obtained (by transmission diversity).
The benefits of considering polarisation in the GPR method are can be summarised
as follows:
• Optimisation: in many cases, using a certain type of input polarisation will ac-
complish a given task better than any other. The shape of some targets can be
inferred using a polarisation other than the conventional linear polarisation com-
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monly used in GPR surveys.
• Discrimination: if two signals arrive at the same time, they might be impossible
to separate based on just frequency, amplitude or phase. Often, however, the
two waves differ or can be made to differ in polarisation. For example, data
recorded using cross-polarised antennas will record almost zero direct signal,
which implies less interference.
• Identification: since the shape and orientation of a scatterer on the one hand and
the propagation medium on the other hand influence the polarisation, it is some-
times possible to isolate the scatterer geometry or the host medium properties by
observing the polarisation characteristics of the scattered field.
When discussing wave polarisation of GPR signals, three concepts are common
and important. These concepts are (1) polarisation due to antenna construction, (2) po-
larisation due to antenna orientation, and (3) depolarisation (or changes in polarisation)
due to target orientation.
The target symmetry (shape and orientation) has an impact on the polarisation of
a scattered wave, as do the incident angle of the wave, antenna separation, and the
impedance contrast of the materials. A scattered wave can have the same polarisation
as the incident wave, or it can be polarised differently, in which case it is said to be
depolarised. It has been noted that various targets of GPR surveys, such as buried
pipes and fractures, have polarisation-dependent scattering characteristics. This implies
that the visibility of a subsurface scatterer in the acquired data depends on the used
antenna configuration and its orientation with respect to the feature to be imaged. As a
consequence, certain subsurface objects might not be imaged using a single component
antenna configuration.
Antenna orientation, definition adopted for linearly polarised equipment only, is
not only based on the antennas’ position relative to each other but also on their ori-
entation relative to the survey line direction. Parallel orientation of antennas allows
maximising the polarisation match between them; in this case, the antennas can be ar-
ranged in broadside or end fire configuration with respect to the survey line direction,
i.e., with an orientation parallel or perpendicular to the line. On the contrary, when
the transmitting and receiving antennas are arranged with orthogonal orientations, they
are cross-polarised and target information can be extracted based on the coupling an-
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gle [153]. Cross polarisation occurs when the target changes the polarisation of the
reflected wave compared to incident one.
These configurations are sketched in Fig.3.7.
Figure 3.7: Representation of different antenna configuration for multicomponent data acqui-
sition. (a) Co-pole, end fire. (b) Co-pole, broadside. (c)-(d) Cross-pole.
For a monostatic system, which utilises the same or at least co-located antennas for
both transmit and receive functions, the two cross-polar configurations coincide, i.e.
the scattering matrix is symmetrical and has only 3 independent elements.
The power of a wave scattered from an isotropic target (e.g. a sphere) is indepen-
dent of the transmitter polarisation, while for linear target the polarisation of the scat-
tered field is independent of the transmitting polarisation. For a general target, instead,
both the power and polarisation of the reflected wave vary with transmitter polarisation
[218]. The electromagnetic field is a vector field and the target structure is usually 3-
D. Clearly, different polarisation combinations of sending/receiving antennas generate
different polarimetric returns. These differences can be used for target identification
purposes.
It is clear, then, that polarisation plays a fundamental role in applications such
as pipe and cable detection, but also for the correct imaging of extended targets. It
is also clear that the way in which the target respond to an impinging polarisation is
critical in the light of wave depolarisation. Polarisation is implicit in this definition of
radar cross section, and usually, it is assumed that a single polarisation is employed for
both the transmitted and received fields. This assumption is not required, however, and
radar cross sections can be defined for arbitrary polarisation of transmitted and received
fields.
The RCS for circular polarisation is supposed to be equal to the RCS for linear
polarisation if the angle between the E-field and the wire is 45 degrees, i.e., half of
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the RCS for parallel orientation, hence elongated targets with arbitrary orientation can
be detected by GPR using either a circularly polarised antenna or two perpendicularly
oriented antennas with linear polarisation.
Several detailed works on the effects of polarisation for common GPR targets
have been produced. Polarisation is understood to have a significant impact for the
identification of elongated objects and asymmetrical subsurface features [219, 220],
and it is largely employed as a further tool that could provide additional information
and features of the buried objects [221, 222, 223, 224]. However, few GPR sensors use
more than one polarisation.
In [225] an FDTD solution was used to simulate the polarimetric scattering from
symmetric and asymmetric targets and analytical measures were developed in order to
show that symmetry features can be used to adequately separate symmetric objects from
asymmetric ones. One of the main features of the technique is that it is independent of
target shape, size, material, or depth. As a result, no a priori knowledge about the target
or its scattering properties are required.
Authors in [226] described a polarimetric GPR which is invariant to rotations
(demonstrated in [227]) to acquire quantities related to the shape and dimension of
the target from the target scattering matrix. Target used was a disk brake rotor, hence
the formation of the scattering matrix is facilitated.
In [228] the author offers an insight from what can be gained from polarimetric
analysis of GPR backscatter signal. Assuming the target being metallic, elongated
and buried at a shallow depth, simulations provide interesting results in terms of (1)
length, (2) orientation and (3) radius inference. Graphs show a clear implications of
the angular patterns: backscattered magnitude drop down when there is a misalignment
between the antenna and the target, following the well-known trends of linear target.
Work in [229] has a similar aim, to show the influence of geometry on the fin-
gerprints of different landmines. In particular, a comparison of landmine signature for
different observation points, both vertically and laterally shifted and tilting objects is
discussed. The analysed target is a M14 mine, characterized by a low metal content
and a reduced dimension (40 mm height and 56 mm diameter) with a cylindrical shape.
Results show a variation in the magnitude of the backscattered electric field as receiver
position and orientation changes. Results illustrated that the shape of the fingerprint
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within the bandwidth always remains nearly the same. Differences are visible with the
highest part of the spectrum, in which of course the spatial resolution is higher. It can
be noticed that a tilting of the landmine significantly changes the energy trend.
Results in [230] demonstrated that the backscattered fields from a body of rev-
olution (BOR) target excited by a vertically or horizontally polarized plane wave are
characterized by a zero cross-polarisation component. Through an experimental cam-
paign carried out with a metallic landmine surrogate, these polarimetric characteristics
are proven to be valid, independently of the mine electrical properties, as long as it
satisfies the BOR model.
3.3 Summary
In this Chapter literature considered relevant to the research problem has been presented
and discussed. This analysis has confirmed that rather few works have addressed the
task of discriminating landmines on the basis of their internal scattering contributions,
and that there is a lack in understanding of the significance of these signature com-
ponents and how they can improve GPR performance. Even if the presence of such
reflections has been pointed out, the feature has not been exploited and researched.
Moreover, despite the vast literature on radar responses of different targets, not many
results are available for landmine responses. There are several reasons for this: first,
available results typically deal with metal targets, while the majority of AP mines and
some AT mines are dielectric objects with some metal inclusions. Second, the influence
of the environment on target response is quite complicated. Finally, in a typical radar
scenario, the target is situated in the far field of both the transmit and receive anten-
nas. In typical landmine detection scenario (and often in UXO detection), the target is
situated in a near field of the antenna system.
Up to now, the exploration of angular diversity in the sense of monostatic and
bistatic look angles at the target has only rarely been taken into account. The majority
of works on bistatic GPR configurations have focused on the evaluation of geomet-
rical features, showing some potential but highlighting also limiting hypothesis, both
concerning target modelling and acquisition scheme. Similarly, publications on polari-
metric GPR largely focus on the challenge of distinguishing targets with a predom-
inant geometry from objects showing a symmetrical structure. Theoretically, multi-
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component analysis may produce a useful discrimination, however, it is currently not
clear whether polarimetric information can as well be exploited for very small tar-
gets like anti-personnel landmines, and whether it could cope with inclined targets, for
which the symmetrical feature will vanish.
From this review of recently published work, it can be stated that the research
questions formulated in Section 1.7 and the scientific innovation summarised in Section
1.8 have not previously been addressed in the literature.
Chapter 4
GPR Design and Modelling
In theory, there is no difference between
theory and practice. But, in practice,
there is
Jan L. A. van de Snepscheut [231]
The objective of this Chapter is to establish a theoretical justification of the addressed
problem and to provide an analytical basis for the subsequent experimental section.
This Chapter covers the fundamental principles governing the GPR methodology, em-
phasising the differences not only between GPR and conventional radar, but also be-
tween GPR as a landmine detector and for other GPR applications.
Firstly, a succinct overview of the key concepts influencing electromagnetic wave
propagation and reflection is provided and the physical issues evaluated in order to give
a sense of the role played in the process. Through the radar range equation, the analysis
continues considering the principal factors affecting the design of a GPR in order to
illustrate those factors which need to be investigated and providing an initial estimate
of the range performance of a GPR system. To examine the impact that a dynamic
separation between the transmitter and the receiver has on the involved parameters,
bistatic developments of the previous formulations are given as well.
As the aim of the work is to characterise a landmine in light of its internal struc-
ture, particular attention is put on the constraints in place for a landmine detection
equipment, discussing the principal challenges concerning the identification of the in-
ternal scattering contributions.
In the latter part of the Chapter, a number of numerical simulations based on FDTD
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modelling involving the key variables affecting the imaging performance is developed
and assessed in the light of the research objectives previously described.
4.1 Electromagnetic principles of GPR
The foundations of GPR lie in electromagnetic theory, of which Maxwell’s equations
and the electrical properties of materials are the basis, and the aim of this section is to
provide the principal building block needed to work quantitatively with GPR.
4.1.1 Physics of propagation
4.1.1.1 Energy transfer
In the case of an electrically small linear antenna with a uniform current distribu-
tion,shown in Fig. 4.1, the electric and magnetic field components in free space are
described in Equations 4.1 which are derived from Maxwell’s equations.
Figure 4.1: Electrically small antenna.
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where
dl is the length of the current element.
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I is the current in the element..
η0 is the free space impedance.
θ is the zenith angle to radial distance r.
φ is the azimuth angle to the radial distance r projection.
r is the distance from the element to the point of observation.
k is the wavenumber.
Three field components can be identified:
• Inverse cube term: quasi-stationary term or electrostatic field term. This results
from the accumulation of charges at the ends of the element.
• Inverse square term: induction term. This represents the energy stored in the
field during one quarter of a cycle and then returned to the antenna in the next.
Fields do not display a spherical wavefront, thus the pattern varies with distance.
• Inverse term: radiation term. This term represents the flow of energy away from
the conducting element of the antenna. The E and H fields support and regenerate
one another as their strength decreases as the inverse square of the distance.
The regions may also be described as the near field, also called the reactive near field,
the region closest to the transmitting aperture and for which the reactive field dominates
over the radiative fields, the radiating near field (or Fresnel zone), in which the radiation
fields dominate and where the angular field distribution depends on the distance from
the transmitting antenna, and the far field (or Fraunhofer zone), where the radiation
pattern is independent of the distance from the transmitting antenna [156].
At a distance r = λ/2pi , all of these terms are equal, and this distance represents
the boundary between the near fields and far fields where the contributions from the
radiation, induction and the quasi-stationary terms are all of the same magnitude (Fig.
4.2).
The initial boundaries of the three regions are commonly defined as in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Boundaries for field region definition.
Reactive NF Radiating NF Radiating FF
r = 0 r = λ/2pi r = 2D2/λ
in which D is the maximum dimension of the antenna. The last formula corresponds
to a phase error (due to the curvature of the actual spherical wavefront) of no more
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Figure 4.2: Signal level versus distance for EM field components. Distance is normalised to
r = λ/2pi
than 22.5 degrees (pi/8) across the aperture. It is generally considered that the above
integral formulation is not rigorous for the reactive components since the boundary
conditions are undefined. Any consideration of the signal detected in a radar receiver
should therefore fully account for the physical proximity of the antenna and the target
[232].
The principal differences between the near field and the far field propagation be-
haviour can be summarised as follows:
• Near field:
– E and H fields are out of phase by 90 degrees.
– Plane wave assumption does not hold.
– Energy decays very rapidly with distance.
– The average energy density remains fairly constant at different distances
from the antenna (localised energy fluctuations).
– The shape of the radiation pattern may vary appreciably with distance
• Far field:
– E and H fields are orthogonal to each other.
– The fields behave as plane waves.
– Energy decays very rapidly with distance.
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– The angular distribution of the energy does not vary with distance.
– The power level decays according to the inverse square law with distance.
– The power radiated in a given direction from distinct parts of the antenna
are approximately parallel.
– Radiation pattern does not change shape with distance.
Essentially GPRs operated in standoff mode are fully described by radiated field mod-
els, whereas radars operated in proximal mode may achieve better performance due to
the increased contribution by the quasi-stationary and induction fields. In the case of
borehole radars, the antenna actually radiates within a lossy dielectric, whereas in the
case of the radar working above the surface the antenna will radiate from air into a
very small section of air and then into a lossy half-space formed by the material. The
interaction between the antenna and the dielectric is also significant as this may cause
modification of the antenna radiation characteristics, both spatially and temporally, and
should also be taken into account in the system design [233].
4.1.1.2 Wave nature of EM fields
Depending on the relative magnitude of energy loss (associated with conductivity) to
energy storage (associated with permittivity and permeability), the fields may diffuse
or propagate as waves (frequency-independent) [16].
With GPR, the electromagnetic fields propagate as essentially non-dispersive
waves. The signal emitted travels through the material, is scattered and/or reflected
by changes in impedance giving rise to events similar to the emitted signal. In other
words, signal recognition is facilitated by the fact that the return signal is theoretically
correlated to the emitted signal.
GPR field behaviour occurs over a finite frequency range generally referred to as
the GPR plateau where velocity and attenuation are frequency independent. The GPR
plateau usually occurs in the 1 MHz to 1000 MHz frequency range. At lower fre-
quencies (diffusive field behaviour), all the wave properties are frequency-dependent,
implying that there will be some variation in the velocity of propagation with frequency.
Dielectrics exhibiting this phenomenon are termed dispersive, and the consequence of a
propagation in a dispersive medium is that the different frequency components within a
broadband radar pulse would travel at slightly different speeds, causing the pulse shape
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to change with time.
At higher frequencies, instead, the properties become frequency-independent, and
all the frequency components travel at the same velocity and suffer the same attenu-
ation. An impulse will travel with its shape intact, but several factors increase signal
absorption such that penetration is extremely limited.
For successful GPR measurements a plateau exists where these properties become
frequency independent, as shown in Fig. 4.3. The obvious success of the GPR method
indicates that many applications are not subject to severe dispersion, however in some
high loss materials, the plateau may not be present.
Figure 4.3: General character of EM field phase velocity and attenuation in a lossy dielectric
material versus frequency.
The transition frequency between diffusion and propagation behaviour is defined as
follows (Eq. 4.2):
ft =
σ
2piε
(4.2)
This plateau may still exhibit some gradual increase in velocity and attenuation with
frequency. The increase in attenuation is usually the most important as many GPR
applications are close to the attenuation limit and any increase may mean the difference
between success and failure of a GPR investigation. There are two primary factors
which induce this increase: (1) the presence of water, which starts to absorb energy
more and more strongly as frequency increases toward the water relaxation frequency
(10 GHz), and (2) the scattering loss, which are frequency dependent and can become
a critical factor.
The simplest solution of Maxwell’s equations is the transverse electromagnetic
(TEM) plane wave. The wavefronts are planar, the direction of propagation is the same
everywhere, and the electric and magnetic fields are orthogonal to one another and to
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the direction of propagation. A wave propagating in the positive z-direction in a perfect
dielectric can be described by equation 4.3
Ez = E0e− jkr (4.3)
and the velocity of propagation (Eq. 4.4) is:
v =
1√εµ =
c√
εr
(4.4)
In a perfect dielectric no propagation losses are encountered and hence there is no
consideration of the attenuation, which occurs in real dielectric. The phase constant is
defined as k =ω/v=ω√µε (referred also to as the propagation factor for the medium),
and the ratio of the electric and magnetic fields is equal to the characteristic impedance
of the medium (Eq. 4.5)
Z =
√
µ
ε
(4.5)
For nonmagnetic media, µ = µ0, and Z =
√
µ0/ε may be written in terms of the
impedance of free space (Z0 = 377Ω) as in Eq. 4.6:
Z =
√
µ0
ε
=
Z0√
εr
(4.6)
As a reference, in free space the magnetic susceptibility and electric permittivity are
constants, hence they are independent of frequency and the medium is not dispersive.
4.1.1.3 GPR source near an interface
GPR sources are normally deployed close to the ground, and the radiated field can lo-
cally be considered as a planar wave impinging on the boundary at a specific incidence
angle defined by geometry [234], as shown in Fig. 4.4. The signal is reflected and
refracted according to Snell’s law and the Fresnel coefficients.
If one examines the wavefront in the ground, it is no longer spherical, as bending occurs
with differing degrees depending on the varying incidence angle.
In case of GPR surveys conducted with the source very close to the surface, which
represents the most common situation, the limiting case of the source right at the inter-
face can be considered. This case is sketched in Fig. 4.5.
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Figure 4.4: Wavefronts from a localised source located above the ground.
Figure 4.5: Wavefronts from a source located on the ground interface.
The incident and reflected waves in air coalesce into an upgoing spherical wave. In
the ground, the transmitted signal divides into two parts, a spherical wave and a planar
wavefront travelling at the critical angle, which links the direct spherical air wave and
the spherical ground wave. Near the interface, the spherical ground wave extends into
the air as an evanescent field. When the distance from the source is large compared
to the wavelength or the pulse spatial length, these different components are clearly
separate in time and space, while their identity becomes blurred for shorter distance.
However, the concepts are still valid.
It can therefore be appreciated that the effect of changes in distance between the
antenna and the surface cause significant variation in the resultant radiation patterns in
the dielectric. In particular, when this distance is increased, the antenna field patterns
are modified by a reduction in the effect of the reactive field.
As a comparison, Fig. 4.6 depicts the wavefront footprint for a dipole antenna,
representing one of the most common equipment employed in GPR design.
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Figure 4.6: Wavefronts from a dipole antenna located on the ground interface. (a) E-field. (b)
H-field.
There can be several possible paths from a transmitter to the receiver, sketched for a
simple two layers model in Fig. 4.7 and characterised as follows:
1 Direct air signal: travelling through the air in a direct line from the transmitter
to the receiver. As a result, the direct air wave is always the first signal measured
by the receiver.
2 Direct ground signal: travelling along the surface interface at velocity v1.
3 Direct reflected signal: travelling through medium 1 at a velocity v1 and back
after reflection at the interface.
4 Critically refracted signal: because v1 < v0 reflected waves are critically re-
fracted at the surface. While this wave propagates along the surface interface, it
will have velocity a velocity roughly the speed of light.
Figure 4.7: Signal paths between a transmitter and a receiver on the surface.
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The relative importance of each path depends on the target depth, the separation be-
tween the transmitter and receiver and the elevation of the transmitter and receiver.
Moreover, the refracted path (4) includes the refraction/reflection path and its specular
reflected/refracted one, even if they can’t be distinguished.
In most GPR cases, the transmitter receiver separation is small and the predomi-
nant paths are (1), (2) and (3), even if for proximal operations the direct air and ground
arrival can hardly be separated from the background reflection. The signal following
path (4) can have an impact if both the transmitter and receiver are a substantial distance
from the target.
4.1.1.4 Reflection, refraction and transmission at interfaces
Ground penetrating radar methods normally depend on detection of reflected or scat-
tered signal. Planar boundaries provide the simplest model for qualifying the behaviour,
while the Fresnel reflection (and transmission) coefficients quantify how the amplitudes
of the EM fields vary across an interface between two materials.
Figure 4.8: Geometry for Snell’s law.
Snell’s law expresses how wavefronts change direction as the fields move through
materials where velocity is not constant. The concept is illustrated in Fig. 4.8, showing
an EM signal incident (ki) on the boundary between two materials of different prop-
erties (σ ,µ,ε). The transmitted was experiences a change in propagation direction,
thus becoming a refracted wave. Mathematically, Snell’s law requires the horizontal
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component of the propagation vector in each material to be equal.
k1 · sinθ1 = k2 · sinθ2 (4.7)
When the material are low loss (i.e. wave regime approximation), Snell’s law takes the
more simple form (Eq. 4.8):
sinθ1
v1
=
sinθ2
v2
(4.8)
In this case, the angle of incidence and refraction are directly related to the propagation
velocity of EM waves within each media. When v1 > v2, medium 2 has a critical angle
beyond which energy cannot propagate from medium 1 to 2.
The Fresnel reflection (and transmission) coefficients quantify how the amplitudes
of the electromagnetic fields vary across an interface between two materials. Vector-
field EM waves separate into two independent components defined by field orientation
with respect to the boundary. Components are referred to as the TE (transverse electric
field) and TM (transverse magnetic field), shown if Fig. 4.9.
Figure 4.9: Incident wave at planar boundaries. (a) TE mode. (b) TM mode.
The incident, reflected, and transmitted field strengths are related by the following
equations (4.9):
IT E +RT E · IT E = TT E · IT E (4.9a)
IT M +RT M · IT M = TT M · IT M (4.9b)
R and I are determined by requiring Snell’s law to be satisfied, the electric and mag-
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netic fields in the plane of the interface to be continuous, and the electric current and
magnetic flux density crossing the interface must be equal on both sides.
The result is described by equations 4.10 and 4.11:
RT E =
Y1 cosθ1−Y2 cosθ2
Y1 cosθ1 +Y2 cosθ2
(4.10a)
RT M =
Z1 cosθ1−Z2 cosθ2
Z1 cosθ1−Z2 cosθ2 (4.10b)
TT E = 1+RT E (4.11a)
TT M = 1+RT M (4.11b)
where Zi and Yi are the impedances and admittances of the i− th material. The critical
factor is that an EM impedance contrast must exist for there to be a response.
When the EM wave is vertically incident on the interface (θ1 = θ2 = 0), there is
no distinction between a TE and a TM wave, and the TE and TM reflection coefficients
become identical (for the field components). For non-vertical incidence, the coefficients
are different.
In a non-conducting medium such as dry soil, and when considering only a single
frequency of radiation, the above expressions may be simplified and rewritten as (Eq.
4.12:
R =
√
εr2−√εr1√
εr2 +
√
εr1
(4.12a)
T =
2
√
εr2√
εr2 +
√
εr1
(4.12b)
where εr is the relative permittivity of the medium.
From these results, the following considerations should be pointed out:
• If the impedance contrast is small most of the incident wave is transmitted
through the interface, and viceversa.
• The reflection magnitude becomes larger at large angles.
• The TM reflection coefficient can show a null or a reduction to a minimum as the
angle of incidence increases. The angle of the minimum is known as the Brewster
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angle, where maximum transmission occurs.
• For TE waves, the admittance must decrease at the interface for Brewster angle
to exist, while for TM waves the impedance must decrease crossing the interface.
• When the waves are travelling from a low velocity to higher velocity medium, the
magnitude of the reflection coefficients becomes unity for angles greater that the
critical angles. The waves are totally reflected but fields do exist in the other ma-
terial but behave as evanescent signals which decay exponentially with distance
from the interface.
• The sign of the reflection coefficients can be either positive or negative and deter-
mines whether the reflected wave experiences a reverse in polarity. As a result,
the polarity of reflected signal to determine whether the impedance of the first
layer is greater than or less than the below one.
The normal incidence reflection coefficients for some air-dielectric interfaces are pro-
vided in Fig. 4.10.
Figure 4.10: Reflection and Transmission coefficients for normal incidence as a function of
material dielectric.
4.1.2 Propagation in a dielectric
The signal pulse consists of an electromagnetic wave which oscillates at a particular
frequency, and as it propagates through the subsurface, it is distorted due to the distri-
bution of subsurface electromagnetic properties (σ ,µ,ε).
Electromagnetic waves propagating through natural media experience losses, to
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both the electric (E) and magnetic (H) fields [67]. This causes attenuation of the orig-
inal electromagnetic wave. For most materials of interest, the magnetic response is
weak and need not be considered as a complex quantity, unlike the permittivity and
conductivity.
The propagation of a plane wave along the z-direction, perpendicular to the sur-
face, in a homogeneous medium is governed by the wave equation (Eq. 4.13):
∂ 2E
∂ 2z2
=−ω2µεE (4.13)
where
E = ℜ
{
E0e jωt
}
is the sinusoidal time varying electric field vector (V/m), with
E0 the amplitude of the electric field vector (V/m).
ω is the angular frequency (rad/s).
z is the distance along the propagation direction (m).
µ is the magnetic permeability.
ε = ε ′− jε ′′ is the complex permittivity (F/m).
σ = σ ′− jσ ′′ is the complex conductivity (Ω/m).
Electrical conductivity characterises free charge movement (creating electric current)
when an electric field is present, as resistance to charge flow leads to energy dissipation.
Dielectric permittivity instead characterises displacement of charge constrained in a
material structure to the presence of an electric field. Charge displacement results in
energy storage in the material. The real component, ε ′, represents the energy stored
through electrical polarisation (relative permittivity), and the imaginary component, ε ′′
represents a measure of energy loss associated with both conductivity and frequency.
The solution of Maxwell’s equations for a wave propagating within a homoge-
neous medium describes an EM field which is affected by an amplitude decay depen-
dent on distance (Eq. 4.14):
E = E0e− jkz (4.14)
with propagation constant (Eq. 4.15):
k = ω
√
µε(1− j tanδ ) (4.15)
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in which the loss tangent tanδ = σ
′+ωε ′′
ωε ′−σ ′′ , sometimes expressed as a dimensionless
factor ε
′′
ε ′ , can be interpreted as the ratio between the conduction current density to the
displacement current density. In the case of a material that relatively lossless, it may
be reasonable to consider that the loss tangent constant over the GPR frequency range.
However, for materials that are wet and lossy such an approximation is invalid.
If the real and the imaginary parts of jk are separated, the attenuation parameter
α and the phase parameter β are described by Eq. 4.16:
α = ω
√[µε
2
]√
1+(tanδ )2−1 (4.16a)
β = ω
√[µε
2
]√
1+(tanδ )2 +1 (4.16b)
Therefore, Eq. 4.14 can be rewritten as:
E(z) = E0e−αze− jβ z (4.17)
The amplitude of the GPR pulse decreases as it propagates in the material medium, and
the pulse shape is distorted because of the nonlinear phase term β z. The first exponen-
tial term represents the attenuation of the plane wave in a lossy medium. The rate is
specified by α , the attenuation constant, and the second exponential term represents the
propagation, controlled by the phase constant β . From the first exponential function it
is seen that at a distance z = 1/α the attenuation is 1/e. This distance is known as the
skin depth and theoretically provides an indication of the penetration depth of the GPR
system.
Attenuation defines the continuous loss of amplitude a wave experiences as it prop-
agates through a particular medium. Considering typical GPR scenario, a few constric-
tions can be assumed. In most soils the relative magnetic permeability is equal to one
and will thereby be neglected. In the frequency range of common georadar applica-
tions (10 MHz to a few GHz), the imaginary part of the electrical conductivity can be
ignored and the real part is assumed to be frequency independent and equal to the DC
conductivity.
It can be seen from the above expressions that the attenuation constant of a material
is, to a first order, linearly related (in dB/m) to frequency (Fig. 4.11), and in a second
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instance to the square root of the permittivity of the material.
Figure 4.11: Material attenuation as a function of frequency and relative dielectric constant.
Applying the wave regime approximation, the expression for the material attenuation
in Eq. 4.16 becomes:
α =
σ
2
√
µ
ε
(4.18)
This essentially underlines that the higher the conductivity of the material, the faster
the wave will dissipate into the ground.
Empirically derived forms such as Topp’s relationship [235] and variations of
Archie’s law have long demonstrated the relationship between permittivity, electrical
conductivity, and volumetric water content for soils [236, 237]. Because of high rates
of signal attenuation, penetration depths are greatly reduced in soils that have high
electrical conductivity, parameters which increases with increasing water, soluble salt,
and/or clay contents. As a general rule, the permittivity at zero volumetric water con-
tent is in the range 3− 4 and conductivity is usually very small. As water is added to
the mix, the permittivity and conductivity rise until the porosity of the material reaches
its maximum saturation, dictating the maximum permittivity and conductivity of the
mixture.
The velocity of electromagnetic wave propagation in a medium with electrical
parameters as described in Eq. 4.13, and considering nonmagnetic material (µr = 1), is
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expressed as:
v = c
ε ′− σ
′′
ω
2ε0
√1+(ε ′′+ σω
ε ′− σω
)2
+1

− 12
(4.19)
Considering ω large compared to σ ′ and σ ′′, the expression becomes:
v = c
{
ε ′
2ε0
[√
1+(tanδ )2 +1
]}− 12
(4.20)
The velocity of propagation is also slowed by an increase of loss tangent as well as
relative dielectric constant, however tanδ must be significantly greater than 1 for any
slowing to occur. The effect is shown in Fig. 4.12(a).
Under this approximation (ε ′′ is small compared to ε ′), Eq. 4.20 can be approxi-
mated as:
v =
c√
ε ′
ε0
=
c√
εr
(4.21)
The propagation velocity decreases with increasing relative permittivity (Fig. 4.12(b)),
and the wavelength within the material also decreases as the velocity of propagation
slows.
Figure 4.12: Effects on wave velocity of (a) loss tangent, and (b) relative dielectric constant.
From the general equation for propagation velocity, we see that as σ →∞, the propaga-
tion velocity goes to zero, meaning that the wave cannot propagate through extremely
conductive objects. Because of this, when a wave reaches the interface between the
Earth and a highly conductive object, the wave is completely reflected regardless of the
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incident angle.
4.1.2.1 Properties of lossy dielectric materials
Unfortunately, there is no simple model to describe the variations of permittivity and
conductivity for the great variety of soils and rocks that can be encountered in GPR
surveying. This, to a great extent, is a result of the formation of soils and rocks as
mixtures of a number of simpler substances which each have different influences on
the electromagnetic fields.
The determination of the dielectric properties of earth materials remains largely
experimental. Rocks, soils and concrete are complex materials composed of many
different minerals in widely varying proportions, and their dielectric parameters may
differ greatly even within materials, which are nominally similar. Most earth materials
contain moisture, usually with some measure of salinity. Since the relative permittiv-
ity of water is of the order of 80, even small amounts of moisture cause a significant
increase of the relative permittivity of the material. The influence of moisture content
upon the dielectric properties of earth materials is significant and is well documented
in the literature.
Table 4.2 provides typical dielectric constant and electrical conductivity values for
common materials encountered using GPR.
Table 4.2: Typical electromagnetic properties for common geological materials at 100 MHz.
Material Dielectric constant Electrical conductivity (mS/m)
Air 1 0
Sea water 80 30000
Fresh water 80 0.5
Distilled water 80 0.01
Ice 3-4 0.01
Limestone 4-8 0.5-2
Sand, dry 3-5 0.01
Sand, wet 20-30 0.1-1
Silts 5-30 1-100
Clay 5-40 2-1000
Notice how water has both the highest and lowest conductivity - and hence attenu-
ation rate - depending upon salinity. This is why the presence and composition of water
is the single most significant contributor to the dielectric properties of the material, and
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consequently to GPR performance. Clay is also a very important factor, with only a
small amount of clay contributing to significantly decreased GPR performance.
Among the methods of classifying soils, the clearest way is probably the textu-
ral triangle, shown in Fig. 4.13, which represents all possible combinations of soil
separately.
Figure 4.13: Soil textural triangle.
Following this classification, some useful soil mixture can be described (Table 4.3):
in which it is once again evident that the permittivity of subsurface materials can vary
Table 4.3: Typical electromagnetic properties for common soil mixtures at 100 MHz.
Material Dielectric constant Electrical conductivity (mS/m)
Sandy, dry 4-6 0.1-100
Sandy, wet 15-30 10-100
Loamy, dry 4-6 0.1-1
Loamy, wet 10-20 10-100
Clayey, dry 4-6 0.1-100
Clayey, wet 10-15 100-1000
dramatically, especially in presence of free and bound water. Finally, recalling Table
4.4 describe the dielectric properties of landmine constituents, from which it is easily
understandable why detection of zero metal landmines is a very challenging task [238].
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Table 4.4: Relative dielectric constant of landmine constituents.
Material Relative dielectric constant εr
Neoprene rubber 6-9
Bakelite 3-5
Polycarbonate 2.9-3.5
Polyethylene 2-2.5
Epoxy resin 3-4
TNT 2.7
PETN 2.72
Comp B (RDX TNT) 2.9
Tetryl 2.9
Semtex (RDX PETN) 3
Comp C-4 (RDX) 3.14
Nytroglycerine 19
Scattering from mines is reduced by a larger factor because of reduced dielectric
contrast between the mine material and the surrounding soil, so that in wet sandy soils,
minimum metal mines are more readily detected than in dry conditions [239, 240]. Ex-
amples of detection performance depending on soil characteristics and environmental
factors can be found in [241, 242]. As an electromagnetic subsurface imaging tech-
nique, GPR is highly sensitive to soil heterogeneity and anisotropy, thus soil texture
should be considered as well [243, 244].
4.2 System design
GPR concept and design differs significantly from conventional radar primarily be-
cause of the short range of the targets, which is of the orders of metres, and the lossy
propagation media for the EM waves, for which the attenuation and the inhomogeneous
nature of the earth become a dominant factor for GPR.
In addition, the target dimensions sought with GPR are of a different order of
magnitude than the ones which are usually detected with atmospheric radar, and they
are in all case stationary.
4.2.1 GPR range equation
GPR system performance is also governed fundamentally by the radar range equa-
tion, but some additional losses have to be introduced, i.e. the transmission loss at the
air-ground interface, transmission losses associated with any mismatch in the ground
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(different layers in the ground) and propagation loss in the ground.
The modified GPR equation can be written as:
Prx =
PtxεtxGtxArxGrxεrxσRCS
(4piz2)2
· (Ztx · e−2αz · e−2αz ·Zrx) (4.22)
in which:
Ptx is the transmitted power.
εtx,εrx are the transmitter and receiver antenna efficiency.
Gtx,Grx are the transmitter and receiver antenna gain.
Arx is the receiver antenna effective area.
σRCS is the target cross section.
z is the distance of target from transmitter (assumed equal to the one from the
receiver).
Ztx,Zrx are the coupling losses.
α is the attenuation coefficient of the material.
A schematic diagram of the different variables of the radar equation is provided in Fig.
4.14.
Figure 4.14: Block diagram of the GPR range equation.
The strength of the received signal depends on the radar cross section of the target and
the losses encountered by the radar signal as it couples into the ground, propagates
from the transmitter, reflects from the target and returns to the receiver. The processes
producing losses are sketched in Fig. 4.15.
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Figure 4.15: Processes that lead to reduction in signal strength.
All the parameters are detailed in the following sections.
4.2.1.1 Antenna efficiency and mismatch
Antenna efficiency relates to the fact that all practical antennas suffer from losses. The
antenna efficiency is a measure of the power available for radiation as a proportion of
the power applied to the antenna, while the antenna mismatch loss is a measure of how
well the antenna is matched to the transmitter.
4.2.1.2 Coupling losses
The proximity of the antenna to the ground means that it is necessary to consider the
coefficients of reflection and transmission as the wave passes through the dielectric
to the target, described by the Fresnel equations. According to this, at the boundary
between two media, some energy will be reflected and the remainder transmitted.
The ground has a frequency dependent characteristics impedance which lies in the
range of 50 to 200 Ω, whereas most antennas are designed to radiate into free space
(impedance of 377 Ω). The variability of the ground impedance is a primary source of
loading and mismatch. For proximal operation, the efficiency of the coupling process
is generally high, but this is not the case for standoff radar systems since, where lossy
materials are involved, complex angles of refraction may occur. Note also that the
transmission coefficients further suppose that the interface is flat and in the far-field of
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the antennas. In practice these two assumptions are not always respected.
4.2.1.3 Spreading losses
Spreading losses are related to the decay of energy due to the distribution of the energy
on the front, as the energy of the wavefront is spread over an increasingly larger area.
In conventional radar, the target is in the far field of the antenna and the spreading
loss is proportional to the inverse fourth power of distance provided that the target is a
point source. In many situations relating to ground penetrating radar the target is in the
near field and Fresnel zone and the relationship is no longer valid.
The nature of the target influences the magnitude of the received signal. Consider-
ably more backscattered energy will be returned from planar reflector at a given depth
compared with other target types exhibiting similar dielectric contrasts. Therefore, the
following adjustments should be considered when evaluating the parameter:
• Point scatterer: inverse fourth power.
• Line reflector: inverse cube.
• Planar reflecting surface: inverse square
4.2.1.4 Scattering losses
At any change in material properties, some propagating energy is scattered. Scattering
is a function of the contrast in material properties at a boundary, the spatial scale of
the contrast, the angle of the propagating wave to the boundary, the polarisation of the
wave, and the wavelength of the propagating wave. The scattered energy behaves as if
it were reradiated from another antenna at the interface.
Many of the targets being searched for by subsurface radar methods are non-
metallic, so their scattering cross-section is dependent upon the properties of the sur-
rounding dielectric medium. The physical shape of the target will influence the fre-
quency and polarisation of the backscattered wave and can be used as a means of pref-
erential detection.
The RCS seen by radar also depends on whether the radar is monostatic or bistatic,
in which case the bistatic RCS must be considered.
Scattering losses are problematic for GPR because they reduce the amplitudes of
useful signals while increasing extraneous noise, especially for cluttered environments.
Several sources of scattering are:
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• Irregular surface shape of larger buried objects.
• Rocky soils, which are a large contributor to the scattering of GPR signals.
• Gas bubbles trapped in ice.
• Clutter made up of small buried objects
In the case of a medium with a large number of scatterers which size is smaller than
the wavelength, the scattering is described as the reflection of the wave in deviated
trajectories in a random and not expected direction. This effect is similar in the case of
incident waves on large rough surface.
4.2.1.5 Attenuation losses
Since attenuation is exponential with distance, there is always a finite depth of explo-
ration. The properties of the ground, such as soil type and water content, affect the
path loss, and the path loss is not always a linear function of depth. To overcome path
losses and increase range, the operating frequency can be lowered, but this reduces
bandwidth, which is directly proportional to resolution. The best way to visualise these
losses is by considering the ground as a low-pass filter, with parameters depending on
the soil characteristics, i.e. the texture of soil, the density and the moisture content.
Essentially, ground attenuation has the effect of placing a window across the aperture.
A typical range of loss for various materials at 100 MHz and 1 GHz is shown in
Table 4.5:
Table 4.5: Attenuation properties of common materials at 100 MHz and 1 GHz.
Material 100 MHz Attenuation dB/m 1 GHz Attenuation dB/m
Sea water 100 1000
Fresh water 0.1 1
Ice 0.1-5 1-50
Loamy, wet 1-60 10-600
Sandy, dry 0.01-2 0.1-20
Clayey, wet 5-300 50-3000
In the table the linear dependency that exists between attenuation and frequency is
evident.
4.2.2 Bistatic GPR corrections
Separating the transmitter and the receiver means that in what has been described
above, an additional variable needs to be included and its effect on Eq. 4.22 evalu-
4.2. System design 131
ated.
In particular, the principal variations moving from a rigid platform to a bistatic
one are related to (1) the experienced attenuation due to the different path travelled by
the wave, and (2) the target scattering modelling, as in this case the angle of incidence
differs from the direction of the receiver.
4.2.2.1 Attenuation
The difference in the geometry of the problem is clearly inferable comparing the dis-
tance from the target corresponding to the shortest travel time, i.e. when the receiver
is directly located above the target. For a monostatic system, its equal to twice the
target depth, as the transmitter and the receiver are collocated. Employing a bistatic
system, instead, means that only the receiver is located in the optimum location, and
therefore the distance calculation needs to count also for the target-transmitter distance.
The larger is the offset, the longer is the ray path of the reflections and the attenuation
of EM waves may reduce the amplitude of the wave field below the sensitivity thresh-
old of the receiving antenna. If the ground attenuation is high, the signals may die out
before the maximum separation is reached.
Considering a target at 10 cm below the surface, Fig. 4.16 compares the expe-
rienced attenuation by a monostatic and a bistatic configuration for different material
properties. It is evident that due to the increased path length the suffered attenuation is
notably higher for the bistatic case, thus limiting the maximum allowable separation.
Figure 4.16: Modelled attenuation for (a) monostatic, and (b) bistatic system.
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Essentially, this means that the dynamic range of the signals to be handled is reduced,
because of the defined minimum range from the radar equation. As for the depth per-
formance, the soil variability does not allow an accurate estimate of the maximum
separation or of the optimum antenna separation for a unique target characterisation.
4.2.2.2 Target scattering
Bistatic scattering is subject to greater variability than the monostatic case, because
there are more variables associated with the geometry, in particular as its definition
additionally should include the dependency from the antenna separation. Although nu-
merous mathematical formulations have been developed for retrieving the bistatic RCS
from its monostatic equivalent, mostly based on the equivalence theorem, such meth-
ods have a number of assumptions that for GPR applications can’t be met, especially
for complex targets and for objects whose dimension is close to the wavelength.
Moreover, when the antenna offset is large compared to the depth of the targets,
the small spread approximation (SSA) cannot be considered valid anymore and the
reflection traveltimes cannot be approximated by simple hyperbolas [143].
These considerations apply obviously to every source of scattering, including clut-
ter sources and scattering generated by anisotropic and heterogeneous soils. In addi-
tion, for air launched systems, the terrain roughness may represent another aspect to be
considered.
4.3 GPR design for landmine internal structure detec-
tion
There are three principal differences in GPR system design between conventional GPR
sensors and GPR sensors for landmine detection. First, the latter require a down-range
resolution in the order of a few centimetres (in ground) to distinguish between reflection
from a buried landmine and reflection from the air–ground interface. A down-range
resolution of the same order is also required to distinguish between reflections from
the top and from the bottom of a landmine, which is needed for target classification.
Second, to avoid triggering of surface-laid or shallowly buried landmines, the antenna
system of a landmine detection GPR sensor should be elevated above the ground. For
a handheld system, the minimal elevation of the antenna system is of the order of a
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few centimetres, while for a vehicle-based sensor, such an elevation is typically several
decimetres. Third, the requirement for GPR to support classification of detected targets
requires considerably higher stability and accuracy of the reflected field measurements
than that offered by conventional systems.
The variety of environmental conditions in which mines can be found is enormous.
Minefields are not only ordered rows of landmines in flat deserts but can also be found
among the debris of collapsed buildings and post-conflict urban and rural environments.
The complexity of the framework brings several issues when evaluating the parameter
of a GPR system for landmine detection.
There are three main parameters which influence frequency selection:
• Required resolution.
• Clutter limitations.
• Required penetration.
There is a trade-off between spatial resolution, depth of penetration and system porta-
bility. To overcome signal losses and increase range, the operating frequency can be
lowered, but this reduces bandwidth, which is directly proportional to the resolution.
High resolution is generally a desirable parameter, but a high resolution means a high
clutter level. Hence this trade-off is one of the major challenges. Additionally, antenna
size increases as the frequency decreases. For most of the currently employed GPR
system, the solution has been found by choosing a central frequency in the range 500
MHz-3 GHz.
GPR, as well as many other EM techniques, is commonly operated very close to
the surface, therefore it is possible that the far field assumptions may not hold. The
propagation regions, which depend on the covered distance in wavelength, need now to
be calculated considering the effective frequency that is propagating.
Fig. 4.17 presents the near field boundary for a number of frequencies and with
varying dielectric properties of the subsurface.
It can be seen that for an average soil dielectric of 9 and a frequency range of 0.5 GHz
to 2 GHz, the near field condition is dominant up to a distance of approximately 15 cm,
from which it is evident that the target may very often be situated in this region, rather
than in the far field one. Therefore, any consideration of the signal detected should
fully account for the physical proximity of the antenna and target.
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Figure 4.17: Near field boundaries for varying frequencies and dielectric.
First of all, propagation losses decrease at lower rates depending on the landmine
dimensions for near field boundary conditions, and hence targets closer than that dis-
tance will have increased field contributions, resulting in greater signal levels from
targets very close to the antenna (when in proximal operations). As soon as the an-
tenna is moved further away the signal levels return to those of the induction fields.
These considerations suggest that antennas for GPR applications should be designed to
operate within the near field distance to optimise the received signal levels.
In addition, the boundary between the two regions is actually hard to predict and
define, because of the small scale variability of the soil electrical properties. The RCS
is usually defined in the far field. In this case, it is an intrinsic value of the object
under test, totally independent of the radar antenna orientation and of the range of
the radar from the target. These properties hold as long as the antennas maintain a
sufficient distance from the object so that the transmitted wave appear locally planar
at the object surface and the scattered waves appear locally planar at the receiver. For
the much shorter ranges involved with GPR, the near-field case presents an object that
has a significant angular extension as seen from the antenna. In this situation, there are
ambiguities in defining its expression.
Several works have addressed the issue of converting a far field RCS to a near field
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one, but still the unpredictable electrical properties of the subsurface may frustrate the
attempts.
4.3.1 Detection of the landmine internal structure
Detecting the internal structure of a landmine means detecting a signal that is repeatedly
reflected and transmitted as shown in Fig. 4.18(a).
Figure 4.18: Addressed scenario. (a) Schematic diagram, and (b) transmission line scheme.
Dimensions are deliberately exaggerated.
Moreover, it should be taken into account that the scattering event generated by the
internal structure should reach the receiver antenna with enough strength to be detected
(Fig. 4.18(b)). It is inherent that a suitable resolution is needed for a reliable detection
and identification, otherwise some of the components might be missed. This will be
evaluated later in this Chapter.
From Fig. 4.18(b) it is also possible to visualise why a bistatic approach could lead
to a better signature characterisation. Each interface that is depicted has its own scat-
tering characteristic, in terms of transmission and reflection angles, therefore a system
capable of exploiting the angular diversity can offer significant advantages.
4.4 System modelling
Of all the current research areas in GPR, numerical modelling is arguably one of the
most popular, with increasing numbers of publications containing some form of numer-
ical modelling in their content.
Advancing beyond the stage of detecting underground features using GPR into
trying to extract specific information about the nature, type, size, location and other
characteristics of GPR targets, one runs into difficulties.
GPR modelling is critical for the following reasons:
• Understanding of physical behaviour and quantifying response.
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• Providing performance requirements for design of measuring instruments.
• Predicting response and sensitivity to parameter changes.
• Optimising survey design.
• Enabling interpretation at a variety of levels of complexity.
• Facilitating mathematical inversion and quantification of interpretation unique-
ness.
In summary, modelling underpins translation of geophysical observations into useful
information (knowledge).
The extraction of such information from GPR data is not often a simple process,
mainly due to the complexity of the factors involved in the GPR detection mechanism.
Interpretation of GPR data can be assisted and improved with the aid of a model which
will provide a close approximation to the response of GPR to subsurface targets and it
will provide the means of studying the effects of the lossy environment, in which they
are located, on the GPR signals.
In general, electromagnetic simulations are very helpful for achieving an in-depth
understanding of the underlying physical concepts, because it is possible to study the
effect of different parameters of the GPR system systematically.
The sophistication, size, and accuracy of GPR models have accelerated over the
last years as computational resources have improved and become more accessible. All
this, has made numerical modelling a useful and widely appealed approach to the GPR
problem.
4.4.1 Computational methods comparison
GPR geometry can be studied from a simple single frequency evaluation of path losses
to complete 3D time domain descriptions of each physical layer of GPR and its envi-
ronment.
Under the condition that EM waves propagate in the high frequency regime, such
that displacement currents dominate, and that the electrical conductivity of the subsur-
face medium is sufficiently small, one can consider that EM wave propagation within
the subsurface has kinematic properties similar to rays, hence being along ray paths
defined by Snell’s law. Under these circumstances, GPR waveforms can be simply and
effectively simulated based on the ray theory. Reflection and transmission coefficients
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are defined from the dielectric permittivity contrasts at each interface. This allows to
study GPR issues by geometrical ray theory.
The formal mathematical representation of the electromagnetic fields, which is
used to build the modelling procedure, could be directly Maxwell’s equations in dif-
ferential or integral forms, or equivalently the vector wave equations, or any other for-
mulations directly related to Maxwell’s equations or the vector wave equations. The
choice of a differential or an integral formulation leads to numerical methods known as
differential equation methods (DE) or integral equation methods (IE) respectively.
Equally important in the formulation stage of the problem is the decision about
the domain of the formulation. When time is explicitly present as a variable, the nu-
merical methods are characterized as time domain methods (TD) whereas, if a time
harmonic variation of the electromagnetic fields is assumed, the numerical methods are
characterised as frequency domain methods (FD).
In general, time domain methods are most suited for problems when the transient
response is of interest, whilst frequency domain techniques are mainly used when the
steady-state response is required. Clearly, since most GPR systems employ signals of
wide bandwidth and operate in the time domain, a time domain model will be more
suitable than a frequency domain one. This will save in computational effort since
the transient solution will be calculated directly instead of having to calculate the re-
sponse of the same model for a number of frequencies and then use an inverse Fourier
transformation to obtain the required time domain response.
The choice of a differential equation based model instead of an integral equation
approach is justified in general by the ability of the first method to handle inhomo-
geneous problems more efficiently than the latter one. Moreover, since a half space
Green’s function is not available in closed form, an IE approach will not result in a
more computationally efficient model. Overall the simplicity of a DE model makes it
more appealing when compared with the more complicated IE methodology.
The most basic model is that of the Transmission Line Matrix method (TLM),
which is essentially a computer implementation of an electrical network model used
for the solution of an electromagnetic field problem. This electrical network is con-
structed as a mesh of orthogonal two-wire transmission lines. Each layer is modelled
as an equivalent impedance and the propagation of voltage and current pulses in the
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TLM network simulate the propagation of electric and magnetic fields in the actual
electromagnetic problem. Moreover, the constitutive parameters of the media present
in the electromagnetic problem are simulated by transmission line parameters.
The Method of Moments (MoM) [245] is a frequency domain method which dis-
cretises the surface of the source to solve current density or charge density. Once these
are known, the radiated or scattered fields can be found using the standard radiation
integrals. These integral equations can be used for both radiation and scattering prob-
lems. And since MoM involves expanding the currents, which are restricted to a finite
domain, instead of the fields, which may extend to infinite, it is convenient for open
domains. The MoM technique essentially transforms a general operator into a matrix
equation which can be solved easily on a computer. However, for many problems,
the technique is significantly computationally less efficient than volume-discretisation
methods, as it usually gives rise to fully populated matrices. This means that the stor-
age requirements and computational time will tend to grow according to the square of
the problem size.
The Finite Difference Time Domain (FDTD) [246] approach is a numerical
method which provides a solution to Maxwell’s equations, expressed in differential
form, in the time domain. The method is based on the discretisation of the partial
derivatives in Maxwell’s equations using central differencing. The resulting difference
equations are used in a time marching iterative procedure to obtain the required solu-
tion. The strength of FDTD modelling is its ability to calculate the response of the
system over a wide range of frequencies from a single simulation.
4.4.1.1 Assumptions and approximations of models
According to George E.P. Box, FSR [247]:
”Is the model true?”. If ”truth” is to be the ”whole truth” the answer must be
”No”. The only question of interest is ”Is the model illuminating and useful?”
Although varied in their individual approaches, they all attempt to simulate the propa-
gation of the GPR wave from the surface downwards with the emphasis on the interac-
tion of the electromagnetic wave with the subsurface materials. Therefore, the ability
of realistically represents the true 3D geometry and structure of both subsurface targets
and the GPR antennae becomes of vital importance.
Analytical modelling can be applied under simplified hypotheses on the nature of
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the problem, resulting in problem specific solution. For example, the aforementioned
radar equation enables an estimate of the received signal level and related detection
performance, but it has significant weaknesses in that most GPR systems are operating
in the near field and in bistatic mode, whereas the model assumes a far field model.
On the other side, more sophisticated numerical modelling can deal with the com-
plex geometry and its boundary conditions, but they often suffer from low computa-
tional efficiency leading to difficulty in real time implementation.
In constructing a GPR model in two and three dimensions, some assumptions are
necessary. These mainly result from the need to keep the amount of computational
resources, required by the model, to a manageable level and to facilitate the study of
the important features of the GPR response to a target, without cluttering the solution
with details which can obscure the fundamental response. However, the approach fol-
lowed should ideally be easily extendable and able to handle more ”complicated” GPR
modelling scenarios if required. This trade-off between sophistication and usefulness
is strongly bounded to the problem to be solved.
4.4.2 Finite Difference Time Domain scheme
The FDTD technique has become one of the most common modelling methods particu-
larly due to the increase in accessible and inexpensive computational resources. There
are different FDTD formulations, but there are a number of key common elements
[248].
The FDTD approach to the numerical solution of Maxwell’s equations is to dis-
cretise both the space and time continua. Therefore, the choice of cell size (∆x,∆y,∆z)
is critical when employing the FDTD technique - it must be small enough to permit
accurate results at the highest frequency of interest, and yet be large enough to keep
resource requirements manageable. For instance, the higher the permittivity or con-
ductivity, the shorter the wavelength at a given frequency and the smaller the cell size
required.
To understand why the cell must be smaller than one wavelength, consider that at
any particular time step the FDTD grid is a discrete spatial sample of the field distri-
bution. From the Nyquist sampling theorem, there must be at least two samples per
spatial period (wavelength) in order for the spatial information to be adequately sam-
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pled. Because the smallest wavelength may not be precisely determined, more than two
samples per wavelength are required. In addition, another important factor is the error
associated with numerically induced dispersion, inherent in the discretisation process.
Contrary to the real world where electromagnetic waves propagate with the same veloc-
ity irrespectively of their direction and frequency (assuming no dispersive media and
far field conditions), waves of different frequencies will propagate at slightly different
velocity through the grid, causing a dispersion error. Another cell size consideration is
that the important characteristics of the problem geometry must be accurately modelled
[249].
Hence, the FDTD model represents a discretised version of the real problem and
is of limited size and its building block of this discretised FDTD grid is the Yee cell
[250], illustrated in Fig. 4.19.
Figure 4.19: The Yee cell.
By assigning appropriate constitutive parameters to the locations of the electro-
magnetic field components complex shaped targets can be included easily in the mod-
els. However, objects with curved boundaries are represented using a staircase approx-
imation, which may cause significant errors.
The numerical solution is obtained directly in the time domain by using a dis-
cretised version of Maxwell’s curl equations that are applied in each FDTD cell in an
iterative fashion. In each iteration the electromagnetic fields advance in the FDTD grid
and each iteration corresponds to an elapsed simulated time of ∆t. The price to pay
for obtaining a solution directly in the time domain using the FDTD method is that the
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spatial and temporal discretisation steps can’t be assigned independently. As the FDTD
is a conditionally stable numerical process, the maximum time step is bounded by the
values of ∆x,∆y,∆z and determined by the Courant stability condition [251] (Eq. 4.23):
∆t ≤ 1
c
√
1
∆x2 +
1
∆y2 +
1
∆xz
(4.23)
where c is the speed of light in the medium. The stability condition for the 2D case is
easily obtained by letting ∆z→ ∞. Smaller steps do not generally result in computa-
tional accuracy improvements, while larger ones result in instability. In fact, when the
equality holds, the discretised wave most closely approximates the actual wave prop-
agation, and grid dispersion errors are minimised. However, exceptions to this occur.
Even if the stability step is set by the speed of light in free space, and hence by the
maximum velocity of propagation in any medium, for conducting materials stable cal-
culations may require time steps smaller than the Courant limit, as well as for nonlinear
materials.
The nature of the GPR forward problem classifies it as an initial value open bound-
ary problem. That means that in order to obtain a solution one has to define an initial
and allow for the resulting fields to propagate through space reaching a zero value at
infinity because there is usually no specific boundary limiting the problem’s geometry
where the electromagnetic fields can take a predetermined value.
Therefore, one of the most challenging issues in modelling open boundary prob-
lems, such as GPR, is the truncation of the computational domain at a finite distance
from sources and targets where the values of the electromagnetic fields cannot be cal-
culated directly by the numerical method applied inside the model. Hence, an approxi-
mate condition known as absorbing boundary condition (ABC) is applied at a sufficient
distance from the source to truncate and therefore limit the computational space [252].
The role of this ABC is to absorb any waves impinging on it, hence simulating an
unbounded space. The only reflections which will originate at the truncation bound-
aries are due to imperfections of the ABCs and in general are of very small amplitude
compared with the reflections from target inside the model. Clearly, the computational
space limited by the ABCs should contain all important features of the model such as
sources and output points and targets, as shown in Fig. 4.20.
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Figure 4.20: FDTD view of the model’s space.
The FDTD method offers many advantages as an electromagnetic modelling tool over
other numerical techniques in that :
• The solution is obtained with a sequential procedure and is very well suited for
computer implementation.
• The method is very general and simple in nature, its implementation is robust and
could handle complex problems.
• The formulation is entirely in the time domain and therefore is particularly suited
to transient problems. A frequency domain approach would require the solution
procedure to be repeated for a large number of frequencies in order to be able to
perform a Fourier transformation.
• It can incorporate material property changes without the need to alter the mathe-
matical description of the scheme.
• It can include arbitrary, 3D subsurface geometries, complex material features and
sophisticated antenna designs by the use of different grid types and layouts.
• It does not require the solution of Green’s functions.
In summary, the strengths of the FDTD method are that it is a simple, fully explicit,
general, and robust technique. To this list can be added the advantage of computational
efficiency for large problems in comparison with other techniques such as method of
moments, especially when broadband results are required. The main weakness is due
to the fact that the entire computational domain must be discretised which can require
extensive computational resources.
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4.4.2.1 Software description
The FDTD solver used in this section is gprMax, which is an open-source software that
simulates electromagnetic wave propagation for numerical modelling of GPR, avail-
able at http://www.gprmax.com. gprMax was firstly introduced in 1996 and designed
for modelling GPR but can also be used to model electromagnetic wave propagation
for many other applications [253]. gprMax is principally written in Python 3 with
performance-critical parts written in Cython. It includes a CPU-based solver paral-
lelised using OpenMP, and a GPU-based solver written using the NVIDIA CUDA pro-
gramming model. gprMax uses a text-based input file in which users specify all of the
parameters for a simulation, e.g., model size, discretisation, time window, geometry,
materials, and excitation, via pre-defined commands [254].
Compared to some widespread commercial software, such as the computer-aided
design (CAD) tool CST Microwave Studio Computer Simulation Technology (CST,
http://www.cst.com), gprMax provides similar performance and sufficient features for
GPR simulation. In addition, although a CAD-based GUI is useful for creating single
simulations it becomes increasingly cumbersome for a series of simulations or where
simulations contain heterogeneities. Embedding the python script into a model enables
more flexibility, automation and extensity. gprMax allows anisotropic objects to be
modelled in a simulation, as well as dispersive materials and soil topography modelling,
which may be difficult to replicate through a CAD environment. Another feature to be
considered is the fact that in CST the near field response can be obtained only through
the inclusion of a realistic antenna model, which may become overly expensive.
4.4.3 Forward modelling
A number of simulations have been carried out to get a preliminary insight of the effects
that the presence of a components within the target has on the radar signature, at the
same time to provide a basis for the following experimental campaigns.
A 2D simulation is achieved by specifying a computational domain that has only
a single cell dimension in one direction (that direction is considered the infinite direc-
tion), solving the transverse-magnetic mode with respect to the z-direction (TMz). In
this case a theoretical Hertzian dipole source fed with a Ricker waveform with ampli-
tude equalling 1 V is used to simulate the GPR antenna. The corresponding radiation
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pattern shape, which is not a function of the radial distance, is a circular section toroid
shaped and symmetrical about the axis of the dipole.
The simulation parameters are detailed in Table 4.6:
Table 4.6: Model set-up
Parameter Value
Spatial discretisation (∆x,∆y,∆z) 0.1 - 0.05 - 0.1 cm
Domain size 50 x 80 cm
Number of cells 8e5
Antenna separation 6 cm
Time window 12 ns
Time step (∆t) 0.0015 ns
Number of iterations 8045
In this scenario, a landmine-like target is modelled including both the activator or pres-
sure plate and the internal structure, commonly sketched as a thin air layer located
between the activator and the main body of the mine. The target is 8 cm wide and 6 cm
height. The relative dielectric for the activator is 7, while the explosive is considered to
have a dielectric of 3. The soil is simulated as a homogeneous material.
The configuration is pictured in Fig. 4.21. The two points above the soil are the
transmitter and receiver antenna that are polarised orthogonal to the plane of the page
(z polarity)
Figure 4.21: Geometry of the gprMax model.
This section will consider the effects of a range of key parameters to show their impact
on the detection performance. These variables include the bandwidth of the excita-
tion source, its height above the ground, the physical design of the object and the soil
attenuation. The range of variables is listed in Table 4.7.
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Table 4.7: Simulation variables
Parameter Value
Source bandwidth 0.5 - 1 - 1.5 - 2 - 2.5 - 3 GHz
Source height 1 - 6 - 11 - 16 - 21 cm
Internal air layer 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 cm
Pressure pad 1.5 - 2.5 cm
Target depth 5 - 15 - 25 cm
Soil texture low loss - high loss
The aim of such a process is to give evidence of the impact that the characteristics of
the excitation, environment and target have on the resulting signature.
4.4.3.1 Bandwidth evaluation
As previously anticipated, a proper signature characterisation is only possible when
the achievable resolution is high enough to separate each component of the modelled
landmine-like target. Therefore, the first set of simulations involves the assessment of
the bandwidth boundary for being able to detect the internal components of a mine. In
the section the fractional bandwidth is considered to be 1, therefore the terms ”central
frequency” and ”bandwidth” are interchangeable.
The same scenario which has been previously described is employed, and the
source frequency is varied according to Table 4.7. Modelled soil is a sand-like material
with a relative dielectric of 4.5, while the target is located 10 cm below the surface.
With such a configuration, the velocity dispersion error is less than 1% and the wave-
length is sampled by 12 cells, obeying the rule of thumb of a tenth of the wavelength.
The computed time domain signatures of a landmine-like target with varying band-
width are shown in Fig. 4.22.
First of all, it can be noted that a low frequency source does not allow the separation of
the mine reflection from the background one, impeding the detection of very shallow
targets. This effect is also a consequence of the soil texture, as the ground reflection pat-
tern depends on the dielectric properties of the subsurface. Instead, a wider bandwidth
is capable of discriminating even thinner layers.
The late signal perturbation visible in the radar signatures can be associated with
multiple reflection events generated by the ground ringing, as they appear as highly
attenuated and delayed replica of the target response.
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Figure 4.22: Time domain signature of a buried landmine with varying source bandwidth.
These considerations are evident after a background subtraction, shown in Fig.
4.23.
Figure 4.23: Simulated response from a 500 MHz bandwidth source after background subtrac-
tion.
As long as the bandwidth does not reach 2 GHz, the target is detected as a single
reflection, due to an insufficient resolution of the different landmine components. At
this boundary, highlighted in Fig. 4.24, three separate events can be identified: the
upper part of the landmine (marked A in Fig. 4.24), a sharp reflection after it (marked
B in Fig. 4.24) and a weak response indicating the bottom of the target (marked C in
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Fig. 4.24).
Figure 4.24: Simulated response from a 2 GHz bandwidth source after background subtraction.
The reflection belonging to the bottom of the target appears as a very weak reflection
due to (1) the limited impedance contrast between the explosive (εr = 3) and the sandy
soil (εr = 4.5), and (2) the reduced signal amplitude caused by the strong earlier neo-
prene/air interface reflection.
A wider bandwidth is not only able to describe the complexity of the target, but is
also capable of fully resolving the upper activator pad, due to the improved resolution
of the wave. In this case the resulting radar signature includes the reflections generated
by both the top and the bottom of the layer (shaded region in Fig. 4.25).
Figure 4.25: Simulated response from a 3 GHz bandwidth source after background subtraction.
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Moreover, the signature confirms the considerations made on the characteristics of the
bottom reflection, as it can be seen that the resulting reflections shown appear closely
similar. Due to its high velocity characteristic, a correct geometrical reconstruction of
the air layer would be hardly achievable, as its thickness would probably be consistently
larger than the resolution performance.
A useful way to visualise what has been described and for a better understanding
of the physical reasons beyond the results is the representation of the propagating wave-
field, shown in Fig. 4.30. for different bandwidth. Each snapshot has been numerically
computed at the same time instant.
Figure 4.26: Snapshots of the E field with varying bandwidth.
The wider the bandwidth, the shorter the wavelength and hence the shorter the distance
between two subsequent wavefronts. The consequence is what has been described
before, the inability of narrow bandwidth of discriminating between closely spaced
features. This is evident if one looks at the modification of the pattern of the wavefront
produced by the target.
4.4.3.2 Antenna height
As previously discussed, the antenna height above the ground is a critical factor, both
concerning the design of the GPR platform and the quality of the collected data. Re-
calling the described concept, it is clear that a stand-off radar system might represent a
reasonable choice when surveying a minefield, but the impact of elevating the antennas
on the reflected signal strength must be evaluated.
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Considering a central frequency of 2 GHz, the source has been progressively el-
evated from the ground according to Table 4.7, in order to assess the influence of the
parameters on the target radar signature. As before, a fixed scenario has been main-
tained, in therm of soil properties and target depth.
The resulting signatures, plotted in the A-scan mode and normalised by the maxi-
mum value of the closest situation (height of 1 cm) are presented in Fig. 4.27.
Figure 4.27: Time domain signature of a buried landmine with varying source height above the
ground.
All the graphs show that the target response reduces as the height of the antenna is
increased, with the most significant losses occurring in the first steps, i.e. just detaching
the antenna from the ground. In this region, approximately, half of the amplitude is lost,
as described in Fig. 4.28.
Obviously, the reflection generated by the bottom of the landmine, which is the
weakest contribution, is marginally affected by the loss of strength as it occurs after
the air interface, boundary causing a marked signal reflection, thus even in favourable
conditions the amount of energy reaching the bottom of the target is limited.
Then, the signal strength suffers a less pronounced reduction, but still the limited
amplitude may lead to a signal below the sensitivity of the system.
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Figure 4.28: Comparison between reflection peaks magnitude and source height
It is clear that for high loss propagation environment these patterns and signal
reductions will be emphasised, as well as when increasing the depth of the mine as the
path attenuation will become higher.
However, the internal scattering contribution remains a clearly detectable event,
even if its prominence vanishes with the antenna elevation, as it can be noticed that the
spread among the reflection peaks is visibly reduced. This concept is described in Fig.
4.29.
Figure 4.29: Comparison between reflection peaks spread.
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Consequently, the information is that the nearer to the ground the source is, the
stronger the reflected signal will be.
4.4.3.3 Target parameters evaluation
From the previous analysis, it can be assumed that a close proximity with the ground
and a minimum bandwidth of 2 GHz are requisite to ensure a proper internal structure
detection. The logical step ahead is to evaluate the target physical parameters that may
modify the signature of the target and weight their impact on its pattern. Nominal
values are listed in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: Target design: model set up
Parameter Value
Source bandwidth 2 GHz
Source height 1 cm
Soil relative dielectric 4.5
Target depth 10 cm
For a proper assessment of the results when altering the target design, its total vertical
size has been maintained.
Air layer effect The first step is an investigation of the weight of the effect of the
internal air layer on the target signature. The principal reason is to prove the importance
of employing objects closely resembling the real devices, and not simpler surrogates.
The analysis compares a solid, homogeneous mine-like target and one with a pro-
gressively thicker air layer (Fig. 4.30).
From the graph it is possible to make the following considerations:
• A solid dielectric target shows the top and bottom reflection only, without any
variations in the signature. The low signal level is due to the small contrast
between the target and the surrounding soil.
• The presence of the internal air gap produces a significant modification of the
pattern of the signature.
• Increasing the thickness of the air layer does not alter the shape, but contributes
to the magnitude of the internal reflection peak.
When the thickness of the air layer becomes relevant, a variation in the temporal exten-
sion of the target can be noted, due to the propagation in a faster medium. However, as
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Figure 4.30: Comparison between internal air layer thickness.
the velocity of propagation in the air layer is high, even a 3 cm layer is not completely
resolvable, due an insufficient vertical resolution.
These considerations confirm that the presence of the air layer is beneficial for the
detection of minimum metal landmines with GPR, as the reflection generated by this
layer are clearly stronger than the other components of the target signature.
Activator plate effect The second aspect that has been analysed is the effect produced
by the upper activator plate. What is expected is (1) a stronger reflection due to a higher
impedance contrast, and (2) a different signature shape, probably resembling the one
previously obtained, as the lower boundary of the activator plate coincides with the
upper boundary of the air gap.
The comparison between a solid target and the described one is provided in Fig.
4.31.
The graph confirms what was expected, in particular regarding the variation in the
signature shape. Moreover, in this case the target response is longer in time, due to
the fact that the wave travels through a slower material. Finally, it is worth noting
that in this case the reflected wave experiences a reverse in polarity compared to the
correspondent homogeneous target, as a consequence of the change in the sign of the
reflection coefficients. It can be also noticed
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Figure 4.31: Comparison between presence and absence of the activator plate.
As the vertical resolution is related to the size of the feature compared to the
wavelength, a wider activator enables the wave to generate a reflection for both the top
and the bottom of the layer, as shown in Fig.4.32.
Figure 4.32: Comparison between activator plate thickness.
Except for this, no additional modifications are produced by a thicker activator plate.
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Combined effect The last results may cast some doubts on whether the additional re-
flection visible in Fig. 4.32 is generated by the air layer or by the activator plate. To
remove any uncertainties, the combined effect of these parameters has been evaluated.
In particular, the activator plate size is kept constant, while the air layer is progressively
increased to verify the responsible of the internal peak. Results are shown in Fig. 4.33.
Figure 4.33: Comparison between internal air layer and activator plate.
The resulting signatures show that the two effects are indeed almost coincident, but
a significant difference in the magnitude of the reflection exists. Whichever way one
considers the result, it is evident the need for a precise and accurate target design.
As before, the representation of the propagating field for the full landmine model
and for a solid object is provided in Fig. 4.34, in which a set of 0.1 ns snapshots has
been extracted starting from 1 ns to 3 ns.
Two main aspects can be highlighted: (1) the strongest reflection is generated
by the air layer, and (2) the effects on the shape of the wavefront. In particular, the
modifications are a function of the layer permittivity and size, therefore a complex
shape variation can be noted. Conversely, the propagation through a homogeneous
dielectric target does not affect the spherical pattern in the same complicated way, as
can be seen in the right-column frames.
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Figure 4.34: Snapshots of the E field for a landmine-like target (right column) and a solid object
(left column).
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4.4.3.4 Target depth and soil impact evaluation
Having demonstrated the impact that the target design has on its signature, the last sec-
tion is dedicated to a brief assessment of the extensibility of the approach, investigating
the effect of the target depth and soil attenuation characteristics.
To verify the reliability of the strategy two different scenarios have been simulated.
The first one describes a highly beneficial situation in which a landmine is covered by a
sandy material with an attenuation of approximately 10 dB/m, while the unfavourable
case is described by a high attenuation soil, represented by a material with a higher
moisture level and a higher clay content, with attenuation coefficient of 30 dB/m. The
two situations represent two representative environments in the landmine contamina-
tion framework. Details of the soil properties are given in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9: Target design: model set up
Parameter Value
Soil dielectric (ε) Low loss: 4.5
High loss: 20
Soil conductivity (σ ) Low loss: 0.01 S/m
High loss: 0.05 S/m
There were three guiding principles behind this design decision. Firstly, the choice of
the geophysical parameters determining the heterogeneity of the target may be hard to
define. Secondly, modelling a heterogeneous/nonlinear/dispersive material would bring
additional variables at that point would need a deeper exploitation. Lastly, a complex
environment makes the interpretation of the resulting signatures difficult, as it will be
hard to clearly separate and characterise the effects of soil attenuation and scattering
losses.
The soil effect is essentially of placing a window across the aperture, trimming
the spectrum and deteriorating the maximum resolution, which is dependent on the
maximum propagating frequency. Therefore, as the strategy is to determine the nature
of a buried object whether or not there are scattering contributions from the internal
structure, it is more useful and noteworthy to test if the internal reflections previously
characterised appear also for a more hostile environment.
Three depths have been investigated covering the typical range of antipersonnel
landmine location. In particular, a shallower situation in which the target is buried at 5
4.4. System modelling 157
cm, a depth close to the UN standard requirement (15 cm) and a third one in which a
deeply buried mine has been considered (25 cm). Fig. 4.35 shows the geometry of the
model.
Figure 4.35: Geometry of the gprMax model.
Results from the low loss scenario, characterised by an attenuation factor of approxi-
mately 10 dB/m, are provided in Fig. 4.36.
Figure 4.36: Comparison between landmine depths for a low loss scenario (α = 10 dB/m).
As expected, all the simulated signatures show the internal air layer reflection, regard-
less the burial depth, and their correlation is very high, as no significant modification
of the shape are visible. The trends of the signal are in agreement with the well-known
exponential decay related to the attenuation coefficient.
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Results from the simulation of a soil with a higher attenuation coefficient (approx-
imately 40 dB/m) are illustrated in Fig. 4.37.
Figure 4.37: Comparison between landmine depths for a high loss scenario (α = 40 dB/m).
In this case, the following considerations can be pointed out:
• The amplitude of the signatures is significantly lower and the decrease rate is
sharper than the previous case, in agreement with the ratio between the attenua-
tion value. In addition, the homogeneous texture of the modelled soil produces a
signature qualitatively similar to the one computed in Fig. Fig. 4.36.
• The internal air layer reflection appears to be the only visible contribution, due to
the loss of resolution produced by the soil texture. Theoretically, the scattering
from the layer is consistently visible regardless the target depth, and particularly
the deeper mine almost shows the air layer contribution only, demonstrating once
again that it plays a fundamental role for the detection.
The critical condition is that the limiting factor of detectability is the dynamic range
of the receiver. Therefore, it has been proved true that the internal air layer emerges
also in high loss soil situation and for deeply buried mine, but it is also true that the
detection of this contribution depends on exceeding the noise figure threshold of the
GPR system.
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4.5 Summary
In this Chapter, the fundamental EM relations which are the governing equations of
the GPR forward problem have been presented, as well as a basilar assessment of the
parameters affecting the range performance of a GPR system. The dependencies within
the main variables have been exploited in detail.
A comparison between a monostatic system and a bistatic one has been included
to appraise the advantages that the inclusion of an additional variable (the antenna sep-
aration) may have or not on the system performance. In particular, the principal modi-
fications are related to the target scattering and the experienced attenuation. Following
the same concept, a brief section has discussed the issues that a GPR system should
face when employed for demining operations, both in terms of system design and op-
erational context.
From the examination of simple modelling scenarios, the effects of the GPR pa-
rameters, target design and soil properties on the GPR responses have been examined.
Apart from the assumption involved in considering an infinitesimal source, there are no
other simplifications in the modelling procedure. Therefore, all the EM phenomena are
taken into account by the model.
In particular, given a suitable bandwidth (at least 2 GHz) and a close proximity
to the ground, the reflections generated by the internal components of the landmine
can be clearly identified, and the favourable conditions are consistent with the range
of frequencies typically employed. Further, results from numerical experiments have
revealed that the target design (external and internal) significantly alters the target radar
signature, both in terms of magnitude and pattern, highlighting the importance of this
aspect. Finally, results from the soil effects suggest that the detection of the internal
structure is possible even for a deep target in high loss environment, provided that there
is enough dynamic range for the system to record the reflection.
Chapter 5
Methodology and Results
Landmines do not distinguish the foot of
a combatant from that of a playing child.
Land mines do not recognize ceasefires
or peace agreements.
G. Strada, 1996, [7]
This Chapter presents the results of the field campaign carried out for the purpose of
the study. As described in depth in the research scope, the internal components of a
landmine are expected to act as multiple scattering elements with a certain radiation
pattern, therefore their effect should be evident and may be highlighted exploiting the
angular domain of the problem.
The adopted strategy moves progressively from a preliminary evaluation of the
magnitude of these contributions in a single mono-dimensional radar signature and in
a 2D GPR profile, towards a full 3D imaging methodology, capable of overcoming
unfavourable geometries and asymmetric target design, the two main issues that arose
from the initial measurements.
Defining the productiveness of a GPR survey as trade-off between the level of
information gathered from the data and the acquisition effort, whether survey time or
deployment, it is clear that ideally a survey should collect as much information as
possible, as quickly (or easily) as possible. Under this perspective, the Chapter ends
presenting the radar results obtained from two different bistatic geometries, each of
them with advantages and limitations, but both having the capacity of providing an
equivalent level of information at the same time lowering the acquisition effort.
A detailed description of the employed targets and the experimental settings for
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each campaign are provided, together with a summary of major findings for each sec-
tion.
5.1 Target description
The radar signature of a landmine is highly dependent on the materials used to make
the external and internal components as well as the chemical properties of the explosive
content. Landmines are objects which are difficult to obtain and replicate to carry
out a measurement campaign and therefore it was the first priority to obtain properly
constructed inert landmines to ensure the collection of landmine signatures as close as
possible to those of a real live device.
Three representative landmines, provided by the Defence Academy of the UK,
were used: a Soviet PFM-1, an Italian SB-33 and an Italian VS-50. These were com-
plete with all their external and internal components and were filled with a high ex-
plosive simulant commonly used to train UK Ammunition Technical Officers. As the
purpose of the research is to evaluate the effects of the internal structure on the radar
signature, the correspondent VS-50 simulant mine provided by Fenix Insight was also
tested. The surrogate is moulded from the actual mines in a resilient epoxy resin, ac-
curately resembling in appearance the real target but without the internal assemblies.
Dimensions and characteristics are provided in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Experimental targets description.
Target Shape Dimensions [cm] Outer material Metal content
PFM-1 Maple seed 120 x 60 x 20 Polythene Medium
SB-33 Cylindrical 8.5 x 3 Polycarbonate Low
VS-50 Cylindrical 9 x 4.5 Plastic Low
A photograph of the three landmines and the surrogate is displayed in Fig. 5.1.
The VS-50 is an anti-personnel mine which consists of a circular plastic body with
vertical ribs moulded into the circumference. The VS-50 landmine consists mainly of
three sections: a main body containing the explosive charge, a section comprising the
fuze and the arming mechanism, covered with a plastic cap, and the upper par includ-
ing the neoprene pressure pad. It is a minimal metal mine, with a ribbed, waterproof
and blast resistant plastic case. The mine incorporates an anti-shock feature which will
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Figure 5.1: Picture of the employed devices. (a) Inert Italian VS-50. (b) Inert Italian SB-33.
(c) Inert Soviet PFM-1. (d) VS-50 surrogate.
reduce the effectiveness of landmine countermeasure techniques such as fuel air ex-
plosives and explosive line charges. A downward force of approximately 10 kg for a
minimum of tenth of seconds is needed for the landmine activation. The middle section
includes the air pressure delay mechanism, composed of an anti-shock bladder to block
the detonation if the force on the pressure pad is of insufficient duration. The assembly
has the additional consequence of allowing the mine to be scattered by a ground vehi-
cle or by helicopter-carried dispensers. It can therefore be regarded as a blast resistant
mine. A picture of the internal components of the landmine is provided in Fig. 5.2.
Recorded copies of the mine were produced in Iran, Egypt and Singapore.
The SB-33 landmine is made of glass reinforced plastic, with the top surface car-
rying a neoprene flexible pressure cap, to ensure minimal deterioration of the mine
casing. It has a unique irregular shape to aid concealment and impede visual detection.
Its asymmetric internal structure includes a cylindrical stab-fuze assembly in the mid-
dle of the target, just below the pressure note, and a void section on a side, covering
only a portion of the main body. This sector allows a locking collar to rotate until the
striker is released, flipping into the detonator. As for the VS-50, a sudden pressure,
such as that generated by mine clearance machines, causes the striker to lock only the
rotating collar in position for the duration of the pressure, preventing the mine from
5.1. Target description 163
Figure 5.2: VS-50 landmine, component details. Taken from ordata.info.
detonating.
The disassembled landmine is shown in Fig. 5.3, in which one can clearly see that
the metal content is minimum. Variants of this mine have been produced by Argentina,
Greece, Portugal and Spain.
Figure 5.3: SB-33 landmine, component details. Taken from ordata.info.
The structure of the PFM-1 (also known as Green Parrot from its NATO reporting
name, or also butterfly mine) is such that the landmine cannot be easily opened and
hence it was not possible to take a picture of its internal components. The device is
a reverse-engineered copy of the US BLU-43, a scatterable air-dropped anti-personnel
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landmine designed during the Vietnam War. The mine is essentially a plastic bag con-
taining liquid explosive attached to a cylindrical detonator, activating when a deforma-
tion of the soft plastic skin of the mine forces the arming plunger to strike the detonator
(a single press of 5 kg or more will make it function). This mine is designed to float to
the ground on plastic wings, usually air delivered, hence its nickname.
The surrogate is fundamentally a solid explosive with a representative metallic
content (mild steel pin). The four devices have been selected to investigate targets with
different complexity, both internal and external.
To prove the electromagnetic consistency of the filling material, its dielectric prop-
erties were characterised by a coaxial probe measurement [255]. The same technique
was used for characterising the epoxy resin employed for the landmine surrogate.
Results of the dielectric measurements are provided in Fig. 5.4. On average, the
dielectric constant of the explosive simulant was around 2.95, while a value of 3.0 was
found for the resin.
Figure 5.4: Materials dielectric characterisation.
The high variability of the results is a consequence of the uneven surface (and
hence possible presence of air gaps) of the sample and its limited size. Considering
the values of the commonly used explosive listed in Table 4.4, both the materials are
sufficiently accurate for a reliable investigation.
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5.2 Evidence of the internal structure: radar signature
First of all, it is necessary to understand the characteristics of mines, in terms of their
shapes, case material and explosives, and their relative radar signature.The following
section describes the preliminary analysis carried out to validate the research question
and to provide an initial evaluation of the radar capabilities of detecting the internal
reflections of the target.
5.2.1 Off the ground measurements
A set of free space radar signatures have been acquired in controlled conditions at the
Defence Academy of the UK. Effects of polarisation and target inclination angle have
been evaluated for off the ground landmines to exploit the landmine signature variations
with acquisition geometries in the most favourable conditions.
Data were collected using a MS46322A Anritsu VNA transmitting a stepped fre-
quency waveform with a bandwidth of 3.5 GHz from 5 to 8.5 GHz, with a frequency
step of 0.4375 MHz. The dynamic range of the system is 115 dB, while the transmitted
power was set to -20 dBm. Time domain data was obtained by Inverse Fast Fourier
Transform (IFFT), applying zero padding to the complex frequency domain data to
calculate the time domain signals. The obtained data are therefore the results from the
convolution of the antenna impulse response and the target response.
No windowing functions have been applied to preserve the maximum achievable
resolution. The Hilbert transform was then applied to the signal to get the envelope of
the reflected signal from the object.
In addition, an experimental characterisation of the antenna effects (impulse re-
sponse and transfer function) has been carried out to verify the linear phase frequency
response and the constant amplitude over the operational bandwidth. This evaluation
has been performed by analysing the reflection from a metal flat plate located a suffi-
cient distance from the antennas plane.
Although the frequency band employed would allow very limited soil penetration
for subsurface imaging, it was selected to obtain a typical value of the ratio between
common propagating wavelengths in the ground and the size of the landmine. A central
frequency of 6.5 GHz corresponds to a wavelength λ of 4.6 cm in free space, and this
value of the wavelength can be used to compute a hypothetical downshifted system for
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typical soil characteristics.
In particular, a 4.6 cm wavelength corresponds to a system with a central fre-
quency of 2.4-3.2 GHz in dry sandy or loamy soil (εr:4-7) and 1.5-2.4 GHz in wet soils
(εr: 9-20). Considering that mostly GPR equipment employed in demining operations
works in a frequency range from 1 to 3 GHz, the achieved equivalence corresponds to
a realistic operational configuration.
Another consideration is that air is a less dense material with a very low absorption
rate, compared with typical encountered soils. This will lead to a better characterisa-
tion of the signature features, as all the expected multiple reflections coming from the
different assemblies of the target will likely be effectively recorded. The effects on
polarisation are such that the soil will have an impact in the presence of several hetero-
geneities, but homogeneous soil will not alter the wave polarisation characteristics.
Two identical horn antennas in quasi monostatic configuration and parallel polar-
isation were mounted on a LinearX precision turntable to collect polarimetric range
profiles with a 5-degree rotation step over 180 degrees. The turntable was mounted
on the vertical face of a L-shaped metallic frame to ensure a perpendicular alignment
with respect to the ground. The antennas were arranged to transmit and receive with
the same polarisation and rotating the turntable allowed measurements of the targets
with different polarisation angles (i.e different angles of the incident linear E-field with
respect to the landmine). Fig. 5.5 shows the antenna geometry.
Figure 5.5: Measurements details. From left to right: starting polarisation (HH), 45 degrees
orientation, Orthogonal polarisation (VV), 135 degrees inclined orientation.
A summary of the experimental activity is provided in Table 5.2.
The landmines under test were placed at a distance of approximately 170 cm from
the antenna plane on a styrofoam cone (Fig. 5.6). The styrofoam material was used due
to its low reflection properties to minimise the impact of the stand.
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Table 5.2: Off the ground acquisition parameters and set up.
Parameter Value
Frequency range [GHz] 5 - 8.5
Frequency step, ∆ f [MHz] 0.4375
Central wavelength [cm] 4.6
Angular range [deg] 0 - 180
Antenna dimension [cm] 9 x 12
Antenna offset [cm] 9
Antenna gain [dB] 16.5
Figure 5.6: Experimental set up with the two horns connected to the VNA and facing the land-
mine under test on the stand.
Results for all targets are analysed in detail at two different aspect angles to fur-
ther quantify the impact of target inclination on the signature. The geometry is shown
in Fig. 5.7. The choice of evaluating the radar signature at different target angle is
motivated by the fact that being a composite target with a number of internal scatter-
ers, landmine response could provide different features and characteristics. In a large
variety of environments, landmines may have been subject to alterations, such as land-
slips and flooding, which may have modified the geometry and orientation of the buried
target.
To obtain the reflected signal from the object, a measurement of the background
was taken to remove all stationary clutter from the target signature. Considering the
non-optimal measurements environment, the placement of the target was accurately
evaluated to ensure its spatial separability from room interference.
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Figure 5.7: Target aspect angles. (a) 0 degrees. (b) 45 degrees.
Analysis of the measurements environment is provided in Fig. 5.8, in which it can
be seen that (1) interference generated from the room and multipath effects are very
limited, in both range and magnitude, except for the strong reflections generated by the
front wall (approximately 6 metres distant), and that (2) these events show an almost
stationary and constant behaviour over the different antenna orientations, ensuring an
accurate background whitening step.
Figure 5.8: Background quality analysis. (a) Background only. (b) Target stand inclusion.
Finally, as an additional figure of merit the acquisition set-up was tested against a
metallic sphere with a radius of 3 cm, as shown in Fig. 5.9.
Resolving the canonical radar equation provided in Eq. 4.22 for the considered set-
up and employed equipment, and assuming a target RCS of roughly -25 dB (given by a
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Figure 5.9: Measurement set-up quality analysis. (a) Target 1D signature. (b) Target polari-
metric profile.
radius of 3 cm), the received signal level would theoretically be around -102 dB, which
is in close agreement with the amplitude of the main peak of Fig. 5.9(a), nearly -104
dB. Further on, the polarimetric analysis, Fig. 5.9, shows that no significant variations
occur when changing the antenna orientation, as the amplitude values of both the main
peak and the sidelobes are consistent throughout the whole angular space.
As the aim of this section is to provide a qualitative evaluation of the target re-
sponse depending on its geometrical properties and orientation, the recorded time do-
main signatures of the inclined target (i.e. 45 degrees) have been normalised with
respect to the maximum value of the aligned configuration (i.e. 0 degrees).
However, as a reduction of the signal level is expected when the target does not
perfectly face the antennas plane as a consequence of the different projected RCS seen
by the system, the magnitude of this amplitude difference is provided as well.
For the two described aspect angle, Fig. 5.10 presents the 1D time domain signa-
ture of the PFM-1 landmine.
Due to the simple design and absence of complex internal structure, the radar response
of the PFM-1 landmine is mainly represented by a single reflection peak, regardless the
relative geometry. Considering the physical design of the target, this contribution to its
signature arises from the cylindrical detonator assembly, as the stabiliser wing is hardly
contributing due to its limited size.
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Figure 5.10: PFM-1 landmine signature, 1D signature. (a) 0 degrees. (b) 45 degrees.
In Fig. 5.11 the radar response of the SB-33, as a function of the aspect angle is
displayed.
Figure 5.11: SB-33 landmine signature, 1D signature. (a) 0 degrees. (b) 45 degrees.
When the target includes an internal design, the structure of the device significantly
complicates its signature, in which several contributions can be highlighted. When the
target is lying horizontally (Fig. 5.11(a)), the effects of the target complexity becomes
evident, as an internal reflection is clearly visible, due to a combination of the reflec-
tions generated by the detonator and the void sector located aside of it. The presence
of internal assemblies becomes even clearer when the target is inclined (Fig. 5.11(b)),
as several multiple reflections are identifiable.
The response of the real inert VS-50 is presented in Fig. 5.12.
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Figure 5.12: VS-50 landmine signature, 1D signature. (a) 0 degrees. (b) 45 degrees.
Also in this case the internal structure of the landmine is clearly visible when
the target is aligned with the antenna plane (Fig. 5.12(a)), as multiple reflections can
be detected. Further on, it can be noted a close similarity with the numerical results
obtained with a 3GHz bandwidth (Fig. 4.23) previously analysed.
While the first peaks could be identified with the activator plate response, fully
resolved thanks to a suitable resolution, the second interface belongs to a scattering
contribution generated by some internal assembly. Considering the landmine design,
the responsible for this scattering contribution is the air gap layer behind the activator
plate. The last peak is due to the bottom of the landmine. These considerations are
no longer valid when the target is inclined: Fig. 5.12(b) shows only two reflections,
belonging to the top and bottom of the landmine, generated by a combination of the air
layer and the landmine main body. The increasing magnitude of the internal reflections
are related to the parabolic effect of convex surface, which tends to focus the radar
beam back to the antenna.
A final comment is related to the relevant amplitude of the range sidelobes which
might be a results of small variations in the target stand position during the measure-
ments, causing the background subtraction step not to completely cancel them out. The
periodicity feature is then a result of the IFFT algorithm.
To give a quantitative evidence of the possible energy losses due to a target mis-
alignment, Table 5.3 details the recorded amplitude strength of the three targets for both
configuration.
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Table 5.3: Reflections strength variability with inclination angle.
Target Aligned configuration Inclined configuration Amplitude loss
PFM-1 -114.63 dB -123.42 7.79 dB
SB-33 -117.91 dB -121.37 3.46 dB
VS-50 -117.35 dB -118.96 1.61 dB
The reduced scattering contribution recorded for the inclined PFM-1 landmine
is a consequence of (1) a smaller projected RCS, limiting the target scattering, and
(2) reduced target scattering directed towards the receiver. These considerations are
supported by the fact that the recorded amplitude of the tilted PFM-1 is lower than the
one observed for the other landmines. For the VS-50 model, instead, the regularity
of the air layer limits the impact of a target rotation, as it still represents the more
relevant contribution to the target signature. In this case, almost no differences can
be observed and this hypothesis is . As presumable from the geometry of its internal
structure geometry, a change in the aspect angle of the SB-33 landmine leads to a more
pronounced amplitude gap, compared to the VS-50.
The effect of antenna polarisation on the PFM-1 mine as a function of aspect angle
is presented in Fig. 5.13. Each signature has been normalised to its own maximum
value to help the comparison process and displayed as range profiles in the time domain.
Figure 5.13: PFM-1 polarimetric profiles. (a) 0 degrees. (b) 45 degrees.
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As expected, the polarimetric behaviour of the target is almost constant due to
its relatively simple structure. There is a main scattering contribution in the range of
the target which is overall regular also with aspect angle. When the target is inclined
(Fig. 5.13(b)) the effects of antenna polarisation become slightly evident from some
weak variations due to the different illumination of the target. However, on average the
polarimetric analysis shows high levels of correlation.
The polarimetric profiles for the SB-33 mine are presented in Fig. 5.14.
Figure 5.14: SB-33 polarimetric profiles. (a) 0 degrees. (b) 45 degrees.
Just from the first view, it is clear how the internal structure of the landmine im-
pacts the polarimetric response. In all the frames the signatures decorrelate very fast
from angle to angle. The SB-33 has a larger physical dimension than the PFM-1, hence
it is quite obvious that its response when the target is placed at no inclination angle
(Fig. 5.14(a)) will be thicker in space, but what is to be noticed is that the main contri-
butions is not constant, but some variations in the magnitude of the peaks occur. This
feature is a suggestion of the presence of inner assemblies which gives rise to multiple
reflections. The effect is even more evident when the target creates an angle towards
the antenna plane (Fig. 5.14(b)) in which both reflection distribution and magnitude
vary significantly with polarisation angle. This is a first demonstration that to gather
reliable information regardless the relative geometry of the target, a set of signature is
needed, rather than a single trace. What is to be noticed is that at certain angles the
contributions from the internal assemblies (the cylindrical detonator and the void sec-
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tor) lose their singular identity and the resulting signature does not include a number of
single reflections but a mixture of them. In practice, this means that even changing the
orientation of the antennas, one can run the risk of wrongly determining the nature of
the buried anomaly.
Figure 5.15 presents the acquired profiles for the VS-50 mine.
Figure 5.15: VS-50 polarimetric profiles. (a) 0 degrees. (b) 45 degrees.
The same considerations made for the SB-33 mine hold here, as the internal struc-
ture affects the polarimetric trend in a clear and noticeable way. The profile in Fig.
5.15(a) is less heterogeneous compared to its SB-33 equivalent due to the presence,
just below the activator plate, of a large number of air gaps, which modify the signature
and balance out the illumination changes. When these gaps are not dominant over the
signature, when the target is rotated, Fig. 5.15(b), the profiles return to describe a more
complex polarisation dependent behaviour.
5.2.2 Buried targets measurements
To validate the highlighted features in a more realistic setting, the same acquisitions
were carried out burying the landmines in a sand pit. The test bed, located at the
Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham, is a confined bay composed of
several quadrants, Fig. 5.16(a), and filled with a sharp sand material characterised by a
very low clay content and a gritty texture (Fig. 5.16(b)). The material is representative
of several mine-affected regions of the world.
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Figure 5.16: Defence Academy test bay overview. (a) Overview. (b) Highlight on the filling
material.
From a radar perspective, the conditions were favourable, as the material was rel-
atively homogeneous and free of clutter, with an average particle size of less than half
centimetre. A background-only profile is shown in Fig. 5.17(a).
Figure 5.17: Defence Academy test bay soil properties. (a) Background profile. (b) Estimated
wave velocity.
Despite the environment humidity, the sand maintained a velocity, computed from
hyperbola fitting in Fig. 5.17(b), of 14 cm/ns and a consequential relative dielectric
constant of 4.5. Soil attenuation properties are such that it is possible to detect the
bottom of the pit, approximately at a depth of 120 cm, with an attenuation coefficient
around 10 dB/m.
The equipment employed was an IDS Aladdin (IDS Georadar srl) georadar plat-
form, a shielded ground coupled dipole antenna, spaced 6 cm, with a central frequency
and bandwidth of 2 GHz. These parameters bring a minimum wavelength of 4.5
cm, therefore a consistency with the free space measurements has been successfully
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achieved, in terms of wavelength to target size ratio. Obviously, the existing differ-
ence between the two employed bandwidths exists and will affect the overall resolution
capability.
The equipment is composed by two pairs of orthogonally polarised dipole anten-
nas, as shown in Fig. 5.18(a), located such that the reflection centre corresponds for
both couples and coincides with the geometrical centre of the unit.
Figure 5.18: Employed GPR equipment. (a) GPR scheme. (b) Complete platform.
The radiation characteristics, i.e. the emitted waveform and the radiated spectrum
are shown in Fig. 5.19(a) and (b) respectively.
Figure 5.19: GPR equipment radiation characteristics. (a) Emitted waveform. (b) Emitted
spectrum.
The sensor head, which is essentially a passive component weighting approxi-
mately 2 kg and with a size of 12 by 12 cm, is connected to a central unit (Fig. 5.18(b))
responsible for the generation, transmission and reception of the signal.
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To perform an accurate platform rotation a mechanical turntable was placed below
the antenna Fig. 5.20.
Figure 5.20: Measurements details. From left to right: starting polarisation (HH), 45 degrees
orientation, Orthogonal polarisation (VV), 135 degrees inclined orientation.
The three targets were buried at a depth of approximately 13 cm, which represents
the standardised clearance depth for humanitarian demining operations.
Data were collected with the reflection centre of the antenna right in the middle of
the target and following the previous strategy: a 180 degrees rotation, with an angular
sampling of 5 degrees, and targets buried at two different inclination angles (Fig. 5.22).
The experimental setup is detailed in Table 5.4 and Fig. 5.21.
Figure 5.21: Experimental set up with the GPR equipment and the mechanical turntable below
the platform.
The processing chain applied to the data consisted of a linear frequency filtering
and a spherical exponential compensation gain function, matched to the soil character-
istics, to recover the amplitude losses.
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Table 5.4: Sand pit acquisition parameters and set up.
Parameter Value
Frequency range [GHz] 1 - 3
Frequency sampling, 1/∆t [GHz] 17
Central/Minimum wavelength [cm] 7 / 4.5
Angular range [deg] 0 - 180
Time window, ∆T [ns] 20
Antenna offset [cm] 6
Figure 5.22: Target aspect angles. (a) 0 degrees. (b) 45 degrees.
The A-scan signature of the PFM-1 landmine is provided in Fig. 5.23. Considering
the design of the device, the radar signature is dominated by the scattering produced
by the cylindrical fuze, represented by the narrow high amplitude peak. The same
component is responsible for the reflection recorded when the target is inclined, even if
more than a single contribution is visible. These multiple reflections are probably due
to a ringing effect generated by the metallic part of the landmine.
Figure 5.24 shows the collected signature of the SB-33 landmine. In this case, a
very close correspondence with the free space results has been achieved, for both the
inclination angles. Despite the propagation through a lossy material, the effects of the
inner design of the target is recognisable as an additional reflection occurring after the
first peak, though its relative amplitude is significantly lower (especially compared to
the results in Fig. 5.11). The higher amplitude of the internal reflections of Fig. 5.24(b)
is due to the higher contrast with the air gap inside the landmine.
Finally, results from the VS-50 investigation are shown in Fig. 5.25
A notable close correlation with the laboratory experiments can be highlighted,
thanks to the regular design of the landmine, especially for the inclined configuration
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Figure 5.23: PFM-1 landmine signature, horizontal polarisation. (a) 0 degrees. (b) 45 degrees.
Figure 5.24: SB-33 landmine signature, horizontal polarisation. (a) 0 degrees. (b) 45 degrees.
in which case, consistently with what has been individuated in Fig. 5.12(b), the effect
of the air layer vanishes.
As before, the validity of the feature has been addressed through a set of polarimet-
ric measurements. The PFM-1 landmine results, depending on the antenna orientation
and aspect angle are shown in Fig. 5.26.
As expected, due to the soil absorption the signature presents lower information
content than the free space equivalent (Fig. 5.13), but the overall trend is consistent
between the two experiments. A single reflection is detectable when the target is placed
at an aspect angle of 0 degrees, and the same trend can be highlighted between the two
trials. In particular, the response of the cylindrical fuze to a change in the antenna
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Figure 5.25: VS-50 landmine signature, horizontal polarisation. (a) 0 degrees. (b) 45 degrees.
Figure 5.26: PFM-1 polarimetric profiles. (a) 0 degrees. (b) 45 degrees.
orientation follows the polarimetric behaviour of linear metallic targets. The difference
from the free space measurements is likely be a consequence of the larger pattern of the
dipole antennas, which is dominated by the presence of the metallic assembly. When
the target is rotated, Fig. 5.26(b), two events can be clearly identified, confirming the
hint made from the mono-dimensional data on the ringing effect. This consideration
is based on the fact that the two events follow almost exactly the same pattern, which
would be unusual in case of two different scattering contributions. A consistent trend
with the free space trial can be noticed, as the signature intensity decreases in the range
45 to 90 degrees.
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Figure 5.27 describes the results from the analysis of the SB-33 device.
Figure 5.27: SB-33 polarimetric profiles. (a) 0 degrees. (b) 45 degrees.
The same consideration can be outlined for the second device, characterised with a
highly heterogeneous and composite design, with some exceptions. A single reflection
is visible when the target is oriented at 0 degrees towards the antennas, with nothing
related to the internal structure. As evident also in Fig. 5.14(a), the bulk of the contri-
bution is located in the 0 to 90 degrees range. A rotation of the target produces a richer
response, as three well-defined events have been recorded. These belong to the upper
surface, probably to the air gaps inside the landmine or the fuze assemblies (refer to
Fig. 5.3 for the structure of the SB-33) and the bottom reflection, respectively. The
latter reflection, obviously, has almost half of the magnitude of the other two, with the
air interface being the higher and more stable one. These multiple scattering was visi-
ble when measuring the target in air (Fig. 5.14(b)), even if the presence of the internal
reflections and a wider pattern complicated the identification of the three events.
Polarimetric profiles of the VS-50 are presented in Fig. 5.28.
The investigated device has an internal design (Fig. 5.2) characterised by the pres-
ence of a homogeneous layer of air gaps just below the activator plate: this is clearly
visible when it is directly below the GPR platform as the stronger reflection in Fig.
5.28(a). In an opposite way to the signature of the SB-33, in this case the number of
detectable interfaces is higher for an aspect angle of 0 degrees than with for the inclined
configuration. This is due to the fact that the air layer is located in the upper part of the
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Figure 5.28: VS-50 polarimetric profiles. (a) 0 degrees. (b) 45 degrees.
target, thus becoming of secondary importance when the target is rotated. The SB-33,
instead, has a bulk of air located beneath the target, hence still predominant even when
the landmine is inclined.
5.2.3 Comments
The preliminary analysis carried out in this section has demonstrated two main points:
• Scattering phenomena generated by the internal assemblies of the target do have
a noticeable effect on the target radar signature, thus demonstrating that the pres-
ence of such features can be properly recorded. There is also a consistent be-
haviour comparing the radar results and the actual design of the landmine.
• Internal components do not behave as the other parts of the mine, thus a change
in the illumination pattern orientation is sufficient to highlight these phenomena,
providing deeper information on the investigated object.
From a radar detection perspective, the presence of internal assemblies is bene-
ficial as these mines, and zero metal mines in general, contain significant air gaps to
allow movement behind the pressure plate. This affects to some degrees their strength
and the features of their signature. For this reason, the possibility of detecting inter-
nal reflections or scattering from multiple assemblies could represent an important key
point for target discrimination.
Effects of aspect angle on reflections distribution have been evaluated and proved
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to be a further element to exploit. The results have shown that both the internal structure
and the outer design give a varying contribution to the overall response, depending on
the geometry relative to the antennas.
The VS-50 landmine, which includes a number of air gaps creating a thin, homo-
geneous layer in the upper part of the device, is a clear demonstration of the effects
of target inclination: these voids are predominant when facing the antennas, while a
rotation of the target will cause the layer to play a secondary role and vanishing.
The situation changes when investigating buried targets, as the absorption effects
significantly alter the level of details and information gathered by the signature analysis.
A comparable trend was found, as the spatial distribution and location of the main
reflections were consistent between the two trials. Differences have been noticed in
the density of the reflections for the soil buried targets. While in free space the impact
of internal assemblies and structures on the signature was clearly visible and easy to
characterise, burying the target into a lossy ground allowed nothing but the strongest
reflections to be successfully collected at the surface. Internal reflections are still de-
tectable for the VS-50 and the SB-33, due to the presence of a relatively large air gap
inside the structure but only in favourable geometrical conditions.
Finally, the comparison between the numerical simulations and the experimental
results shows a close agreement, as shown in Fig. 5.29.
Figure 5.29: Comparison of simulation and measurement. (a) Numerical result. (b) Experi-
mental result.
From the two graphs the similarity between the two results is visible, as the tem-
poral occurrence of the reflections and their pattern are highly correlated.
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5.3 Evidence of the internal structure: radar profiles
The analysis of the mono-dimensional signatures have shown some deficiency in de-
tecting the internal scattering contributions, in particular for targets presenting an irreg-
ular structure, as for the case of the SB-33. Consequently, even if results have proven to
be reliable, confidence must be augmented, and the logical option for obtaining a higher
information content is to increase the dimensionality of the problem, i.e. exploiting also
the spatial dimension.
5.3.1 Trials description
A set of GPR profiles has been acquired in the test pit at the Defence Academy (Fig.
5.16) employing the same GPR equipment, with the three landmines buried at 13 cm
and facing the surface and the GPR profile crossing the middle of the target (Fig. 5.30).
Figure 5.30: 2D GPR profiles, acquisition details. Profiles location is indicated with the dotted
arrow.
In this case, to guarantee a precise profile collection, a soft pad, the PSG (Pad
System for Georadar) was placed below the radar equipment, as shown in Fig. 5.31(a).
The surface of the pad is designed with parallel tracks that are a few millimetres high, so
that the GPR antenna can slide over them ensuring a constant antenna orientation during
the whole survey. The same pattern is attached to the bottom of the GPR platform so
that it could be easily slotted in the tracks (Fig. 5.31(b)).
The acquisition is controlled by an odometric wheel directly connected to the sen-
sor, Fig. 5.31(c), equally constrained in the pad tracks.
The pad plays the additional role of compensating smooth surface topography in
order to maintain the equipment always in contact with the surface. Table 5.5 lists the
acquisition parameters.
A pictorial description of the survey is provided in Fig. 5.32.
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Figure 5.31: 2D GPR profiles, acquisition configuration. (a) GPR platform and survey pad. (b)
GPR platform bottom. (c) Odometric wheel.
Table 5.5: 2D GPR acquisition parameters and set up.
Parameter Value
Frequency range [GHz] 1 - 3
Frequency sampling, 1/∆t [GHz] 17
Inline sampling, ∆x [cm] 0.4
Time window, ∆T [ns] 20
Profile length [cm] 50
Profile length [samples] 125
Considering the nature of the targets and what has been found characterising their
signature, internal reflections are supposed to plainly appear only for the VS-50 land-
mine, while no evidence for the PFM-1. The SB-33 represents the principal ambiguity,
as it has an asymmetric structure and its signature (Fig. 5.24(a)) does not presents any
contribution from its internal design.
GPR profile obtained from the PFM-1 landmine is shown in Fig. 5.33
As expected, the acquired scan of the target is characterised by a single hyperbola
(marked A), confirming what was previously highlighted. In addition, as the respon-
sible of this reflection is the metallic detonator assembly, a ringing event is visible
(marked B) as a delayed version of the main contribution, closely resembling its pat-
tern as has been pointed out in the previous section.
Figure 5.34 presents the B-scan results for the VS-50 device.
In this case there is a clear indication of the presence of the internal structure: after
the reflection generated by the top of the landmine, marked A, the effect of the void ring
covering the main body of the landmine is an additional hyperbola with a thicker shape
and higher amplitude (marked B). The last event, marked C, is the bottom of the target.
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Figure 5.32: 2D GPR profiles, acquisition photographs.
Figure 5.33: 2D GPR profiles, PFM-1 landmine.
For such a design, a single profile is sufficient for identifying the target and to recognise
its internal design.
Finally, the profile acquired over the SB-33 is displayed in Fig. 5.35.
In this case a single reflection event is detectable (marked A) and no hypothesis can
be made on the presence of internal assemblies, in contrast to what is the actual design
of the device. The non uniform internal design therefore produces a radar results which
would provide a misleading basis for identifying the target, as no information on the
internal structure is evident. Whilst the outcome validate the results obtained from the
signature characterisation previously made, it can be concluded that a single profile is
not able to provide reliable performance. Compared to the previous case, the diffraction
curve which appears on the radar profile does not present a perfect hyperbolic pattern
due to a more flattened shape of the SB-33 landmine.
5.3. Evidence of the internal structure: radar profiles 187
Figure 5.34: 2D GPR profiles, VS-50 landmine.
Figure 5.35: 2D GPR profiles, SB-33 landmine.
5.3.2 Validation of results
To confirm the highlighted features and to ensure that the detected additional reflec-
tions effectively represent the target internal structure, the VS-50 surrogate shown in
Fig. 5.1(d) was also investigated. As described, the main difference between the two
objects is that the surrogate does not include any internal assemblies, while the dielec-
tric properties are closely correlated.
This essentially means that, being the survey scenario equal, any possible dis-
agreements in the GPR results can be associated to a dissimilarity in the internal design
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of the device, as the outcomes would otherwise be closely comparable.
The two GPR profiles are presented in Fig. 5.36. The profiles have been nor-
malised by the joint maximum value.
Figure 5.36: 2D GPR profile, target comparison. (a) Inert VS-50. (b) Surrogate VS-50.
First of all, it can be noticed that the magnitude of the response of the inert VS-
50 is higher than its surrogate. This is due to the neoprene pressure pad which has
a dielectric constant of approximately 9, while for the resin the value is roughly 3,
producing a stronger impedance contrast. Secondly, and most important, the two results
validate the suggested target characterisation, as it is evident the additional reflection
generated by the internal air layer, feature which does not appear in the surrogate target
(as expected).
In addition, as one of the critical limitation of the 1D signature is detecting the
internal contribution when the target is not horizontally laying, a 2D profile has been
acquired changing the inclination angle of the target to assess the robustness of the
method. Resulting radargram is shown in Fig. 5.37
It can be seen that it is still possible to recognise the internal structure contribution,
clearly with a different pattern and shape. Hence, this restriction can be overcome by
increasing the dimensionality of the problem.
5.3.3 Comments
The analysis of the GPR profiles and the latter comparison with the target surrogate
have first of all confirmed the hypothesis and suppositions made when characterising
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Figure 5.37: 2D GPR profile, inclined VS-50.
the multiple reflections visible in the A-scan signature response: these scattering com-
ponents are induced by the presence of the air layer inside the target, providing a more
readable proof of the suppositions.
Concerning the information content, it may be said that, compared to what can
be extracted from the target signature, there is little benefit in acquiring a 2D profile
as it still suffers from not producing consistent performance. The case of the SB-33
landmine is explicative: when the internal structure of the target has a non uniform
shape, the single profile might not be able to clearly image its scattering contribution.
5.4 Evidence of the internal structure: radar images
Following the outcome of the previous campaign, to mitigate the recognition challenge
a properly sampled 3-D dataset is needed, allowing the extraction of advanced physical
and geometrical information of the buried target, as well as eliminating ambiguities due
to challenging target properties. As a consequence, only the two inert landmines that
include a structure, i.e. the SB-33 and the VS-50 have been evaluated, together with
the VS-50 surrogate to further validate the results.
5.4.1 Trials descriptions
To ensure a proper data density and regularity, in order to obtain unaliased 3-D subsur-
face images, acquisitions were carried out once again employing the PSG. As a result of
the acquisition set-up, the collected profiles (Fig. 5.38) have been linearly interpolated
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to create the subsurface volume.
Figure 5.38: 3D GPR, acquisition details.
The two inert landmines and the surrogate were acquired simultaneously, buried at
approximately 13 cm and horizontally laying. Acquisition parameters and data details
are listed in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6: 3D GPR acquisition parameters and set up.
Parameter Value
Frequency range [GHz] 1 - 3
Frequency sampling, 1/∆t [GHz] 17
Inline sampling, ∆x [cm] 0.4
Crossline sampling, ∆y [cm] 0.8
Time window, ∆T [ns] 20
Acquired area [cm] 80 x 80
Acquired area [samples] 200 x 100
Results are shown in terms of a set of time slices, essentially a series of C-scans
of the volume taken at a specified time instant (Fig. 5.39). This allows an easy investi-
gation of the target reflections. Except for a time calibration to correct for jitter effects,
a linear filtering operation to remove out-of-band noise and a spatial window, no other
processing steps were applied to the data.
The time difference between subsequent slices is approximately 0.05 ns, given
the frequency sampling of 17 GHz, which corresponds to a range difference of 0.65
cm. Obviously, this value can be computed only for a propagation in a homogeneous
material, otherwise the relationship cannot be verified as the conversion becomes non
linear. For this reason, the time indication provided on the presented time slices only
represents their temporal occurrence.
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Figure 5.39: Radar time slice extraction.
Amplitude of the slices is displayed in a blue-yellow-red colourmap and nor-
malised by the overall maximum value to the range [0-1].
GPR slices for the inert SB-33 landmine are provided in Fig. 5.40.
From a preliminary analysis, several considerations can be pointed out and, de-
pending on the considered slices, it can be confirmed the capability of GPR of sensing
the presence of internal reflections, as the collected frames exhibit different features
which may be associated to distinct scattering events. What would have been expected
from a solid objects would be a homogeneous pattern, net of absorption effects, and a
close agreement between the thickness of the target and the number of slices including
the target contributions.
Analysing the slices included within the target boundaries, represented by the first
reflection generated by the pressure plate and the bottom of the landmine, Fig. 5.41
shows the selected sections.
If one analyses the two slices within the top (pressure plate contribution, Fig.
5.41(a) and the bottom (bottom cover contribution, Fig. 5.41(d) of the target, valuable
information can be gathered.
The slice of Fig. 5.41(b) shows a uniform high reflectivity area centred on the
middle of the target, indicating a regular scattering element smaller than the target and
located in the centre of it. The hint on the contour of the feature arises from the fact that
the maxima of the reflections are concentrated in a single location, with the amplitudes
gradually decreasing following the typical hyperbolic behaviour.
Instead, the reflections distribution of Fig. 5.41(c) identifies a semi-circular shape,
possibly generated by a number of scattering events near the outer border of the target.
As before, the suggestion of an extended scattering element, rather than a single point
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Figure 5.40: Inert SB-33 landmine time slices. Order from left to right, top to bottom.
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Figure 5.41: Inert SB-33 landmine time slices, internal structure highlight. (a) Upper section -
pressure pad. (b) - (c) Internal structure. (d) Bottom part.
scatterer, comes from the analysis of the amplitude pattern.
Essentially, the internal structure of the detected target, as hinted from the raw
radar data, can be considered consisting of a central element, possibly regular, and a
scattering region embracing it and covering a rounded sector of the landmine. This is
consistent with the design of the SB-33 and, recalling the previous results, the fact that
this feature is located in a certain area of the target makes the internal structure hard to
detect in a single 2D radar profile.
To further validate these comments and to better identify the described features,
an overlay of the radar slices and the optical picture of the landmine is shown in Fig.
5.42.
The central scattering feature highlighted in the radar slice is confirmed to be the
fuze and striker assembly, which has a cylindrical shape and contains the entire metal
content of the landmine, motivating also the high radar reflectivity. The radar anomaly
of Fig. 5.41(c) fits particularly well with the void quarter of the landmine, positioned
aside of the fuze and encompassing it, both in terms of location and shape. Finally, the
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Figure 5.42: Optical overlay of the radar results, inert SB-33 landmine. (a) Upper section -
pressure pad. (b) - (c) Internal structure. (d) Bottom part.
overlay provides also a further correspondence for the circular evidence of Fig. 5.41(d),
which was initially associated only to the bottom cover of the landmine. Superimposing
the two images, one can note that the bolder part represents the detonator capsules,
which is essentially a void cylinder.
Figure 5.43 presents the collected radar slices for the inert VS-50.
In this case, the overall pattern of the slices is different, as (1) the main target con-
tributions are described by a higher number of slices, compared to the SB-33, and (2)
the contribution seems to disappear for a couple of slices and then appears again before
the end of the target, suggesting the presence of a highly reflective layer occurring after
the top of the landmine. As before, Fig. 5.44 presents a highlight of the target slices.
The neoprene activator plate is clearly identifiable with the early reflections (Fig.
5.44(a)), as well as the bottom of the landmine (Fig. 5.44(d)) as the last collected reflec-
tions. Regarding the pressure plate, it can be noticed a significant amplitude difference
between Fig. 5.44(a) and Fig. 5.41(a), despite being moulded from the same material:
this is due to its higher density and thickness, which also justifies the fact that in this
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Figure 5.43: Inert VS-50 landmine time slices. Order from left to right, top to bottom.
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Figure 5.44: Inert VS-50 landmine time slices, internal structure highlight. (a) Upper section -
pressure pad. (b) - (c) Internal structure. (d) Bottom part.
case it can be completely resolved (Fig. 5.44(b)).
What is worthy of note is the detection of a highly reflective area beneath these
boundaries, with a slightly larger extension compared to the pressure pad contribution.
As this layer lies within the target volume, and it has different characteristics (shape and
amplitude) compared to the first frame, it can be considered as a contribution generated
by the internal structure of the landmine, recalling also the landmine physical structure
and what has been found analysing the 2D profile.
This conclusion arises from two main considerations: (1) the amplitude of the re-
flections is higher than the previous ensemble, suggesting a higher dielectric contrast,
and (2) the spatial extension is relatively regular with an amplitudes distribution al-
most uniform. Both hints are consistent with the air layer below the activation plate,
representing the blast resistant assembly. Obviously, the dimension of each air hole
is not sufficiently large for the equipment to be able to individually contour the single
contributions.
The effects of the sectioned void ring can be recognised through a comparison
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with Fig. 5.41(c). The two slices both described the effect of an air gap, but if for the
SB-33 the pattern is more homogeneous, the slice extracted from the VS-50 shows a
more milled pattern. This different appearance can be related to the fact that in the first
case there is a single empty area while the latter scattering contribution is generated by
a combination of multiple scattering.
The optical overlay is shown in Fig. 5.45.
Figure 5.45: Optical overlay of the radar results, inert VS-50 landmine. (a) Upper section -
pressure pad. (b) - (c) Internal structure. (d) Bottom part.
Thanks to a more regular design, in this case the overlay is clearly more readable
and the previous considerations can be easily verified. What can be noted is the cor-
relation between the last frame, Fig. 5.44(d), with the outer part of the mine base. It
should additionally be noted that there is a precise equivalence between the physical
dimensions of the landmine sections and the extension of the radar reflections.
5.4.2 Validation of results
Following a similar structure, the obtained results have been verified through the com-
parison with the VS-50 landmine surrogate, shown in Fig. 5.1(d). What is expected
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from the surrogate is an ensemble of radar images in all respects consistent with the
real inert objects and characterised by a homogeneous behaviour from slice to slice,
with no multiple and/or internal reflections.
In addition, also the absence of the rubber activator plate in the target surrogate
might have an impact on its radar response, as modelled in the previous Chapter and
pointed out above.
The correspondent slices collected from the VS-50 surrogate are presented in Fig.
5.46.
Coherently with the previous considerations, the target exhibits a homogeneous
behaviour throughout its volume, without any evidence of contributions from internal
reflections. The comparison validates the hypothesis made on the nature of the reflec-
tions of Fig. 5.44(c) as the only differences between the two employed targets lies in
the air layer below the activator plate.
As a figure of merit of the achieved resolution performance, and as a demonstra-
tion of the effect of the pressure pad, a correspondence between the inert VS-50 and
its surrogate equivalent cannot be found considering the target extension, as the lat-
ter appears in a fewer number of slices. This is due to the neoprene pad which is a
material with a velocity which is approximately 60% slower than the surrogate resin.
Considering a relative dielectric constant of 3 for the epoxy resin of the surrogate,
which produces a range difference between slices of approximately 1 cm, and six as
the number of slices embracing the target volume, the estimated height is very close to
the physical one (5 cm).
Figure 5.47 and Fig. 5.48 show the focus on the target depth slices and the optical
overlay, respectively.
A valuable consideration that rises from the comparison between the two targets is
that in comparison with an air gap, a small metal inclusion has a very weak effect on the
target response. Therefore, the presence of an air gap notably facilitates the detection
of buried plastic cased landmines with GPR.
Finally, to provide a qualitative comparison among the investigated targets, the
ensemble of the characterised GPR depth slices have been arranged in a 3D volume
visualisation, Fig. 5.49.
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Figure 5.46: Surrogate VS-50 landmine time slices. Order from left to right, top to bottom.
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Figure 5.47: Surrogate VS-50 landmine time slices, internal contributions highlight. (a) Upper
section - pressure pad. (b) - (c) Internal structure. (d) Bottom part.
Figure 5.48: Optical overlay of the radar results, surrogate VS-50 landmine. (a) Upper section
- pressure pad. (b) - (c) Internal structure. (d) Bottom part.
5.4.3 Constraints on GPR imaging
The quality of the produced images comes at the price of acquiring very dense and
regular data. Even if it may be expected that the structure of the VS-50 could still be
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Figure 5.49: 3D visualisation of the radar depth slices. (a) Inert SB-33. (b) Inert VS-50. (c)
Surrogate VS-50.
imaged also from degraded data, this will be definitely untrue for the SB-33.
The need for autonomous devices with higher mobility is a continuous research
topic for GPR applied to landmine detection. However, to obtain a clear and readable
image, a 3-D GPR acquisition should be carried out, meaning that precise and fine
spatial samplings are needed. This logically affects the positioning devices, as it has to
operate synchronously with the GPR and its accuracy should be definitely less than the
GPR sample spacing.
Strictly theoretically, there is a bound beyond which the acquired data will be
corrupted and aliased, making the acquisition ineffective. As described in the first
Chapter, data gathered with an inline and crossline distance of λ/4 provide the max-
imum available information level. When the spacing of acquisition points is greater
than the Nyquist interval, one can expect a distortion of the quality and an increase in
the number of artefacts in the final image. In particular, data will not adequately define
diffraction tails or steeply inclined reflectors. If one includes also the fact that the vol-
ume should be acquired with a very high accuracy, it will be easy to understand why
the 3D GPR technology is still far from being widespread.
The quarter-wavelength criterion represents the most restrictive requirement, cor-
responding to the most unfavourable situation when a very shallow target is struck
laterally by a surface wave. In such a hypothesis, the signature of the target is repre-
sented by two steep lines departing from the location of the target, the inclination being
inversely proportional to the medium velocity. Instead, when the object is buried it will
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appear as a diffraction hyperbola (Fig. 5.50).
Figure 5.50: Diffraction curves expected on a radar profile.
The following experiments have been performed in order to quantify the level of
data sparsity that allows a proper target reconstruction. The dataset employed was
acquired at the former Multi-Sensor Mine-Signature (MsMs, Fig. 5.51(a)) test site,
located at the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC), Ispra, Italy. The
main peculiarity of the site was that for each material plot, an ensemble of targets were
buried at different depths. The investigated target was a large anti-personnel landmine
(diameter of 11 cm) surrogate and the burial depth of the selected target was 5 cm and
15 cm. The target, visible in Fig. 5.51(b), is designed to resemble mines in respect of
their signatures and is moulded in silicone rubber. A low loss loamy material, with a
relative dielectric ε = 4 and a resulting velocity of 15 cm/ns has been investigated.
Figure 5.51: JRC test site details. (a) Test lane. (b) Investigated target, blue circled.
A 3D volume was collected using a shielded 1-GHz RAMAC/GPR equipment,
manufactured by Mala Geoscience, and employing the pad system previously described
(Fig. 5.52). The antenna consists of two bow-tie dipoles oriented perpendicular to the
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survey direction and separated 9 cm. Details on the acquired data and the acquisition
parameters are provided in Table 5.7.
Figure 5.52: JRC acquisition details.
Table 5.7: Data sparsity acquisition parameters and set up.
Parameter Value
Frequency range [GHz] 0.5 - 1.5
Frequency sampling, 1/∆t [GHz] 11
Central wavelength [cm] 15
Inline sampling, ∆x [cm] 0.8
Crossline sampling, ∆y [cm] 0.8
Time window, ∆T [ns] 15
Antenna offset [cm] 9
Considering a maximum frequency of 1.5 GHz, the dielectric properties of the soil
gives a quarter wavelength criterion equal to 2.5 cm.
Initially the data were collected with very dense spatial sampling, then they were
progressively decimated by the same factor in the inline and crossline directions to
obtain the minimum acceptable data density to preserve the features of the target. As
the aim of the campaign was to investigate the maximum allowable sample distance
to preserve a proper geometrical reconstruction, the processing chain included also a
data migration step, performed via hyperbola focusing. A sketch of the methodology is
provided in Fig. 5.53.
Also in this case, results are shown through depth slices. Collected scans for the
landmine buried at 5 cm are shown in Fig. 5.54.
As expected, the necessary sampling rate to ensure a proper target reconstruction
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Figure 5.53: Data sparsity analysis: grid decimation example.
Figure 5.54: Decimation results, landmines at 5 cm. Grid spacing: (a) 1.6 cm. (b) 3.2 cm. (c)
4.8 cm. (d) 6.4 cm. (e) 8 cm. (f) 12 cm.
is sparser than the commonly adopted quarter wavelength. The distance between sub-
sequent samples can be relaxed of an approximate percentage of 20%, Fig. 5.54(b).
Due to frequency dispersion effects of the medium that cause a downshift of the
central frequency, the target is still detectable even beyond the defined limit, but the
degradation of the resolution is evident. In addition, one should consider also a further
quality decay produced by noise and soil effects, which in this case are both negligible.
From Fig. 5.54(c) onward, a change in the geometrical reconstruction of the target
shape can be noticed.
Applying the same methodology to a deeper target, buried at 15 cm, the difference
between the Nyquist criterion and the actual grid spacing increases (Fig. 5.55).
In this case, the same information content can be obtained with a grid spacing
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Figure 5.55: Decimation results, landmines at 15 cm. Grid spacing: (a) 1.6 cm. (b) 3.2 cm. (c)
4.8 cm. (d) 6.4 cm. (e) 8 cm. (f) 12 cm.
which is almost two times the λ/4 criterion, Fig. 5.55(c). As before, the geometrical
focusing is still capable of retrieving the target properties even with a very sparse grid,
but the shape is unacceptably corrupted.
Obviously, with no a priori information on the buried target, it is reasonable to
consider the most restrictive case.
Addressing the second requirement of 3D GPR acquisition, a positioning error
was introduced by substituting the acquired linear sample with a neighbouring trace
according to a random criterion. As the purpose of the experimentation is to appraise
the maximum affordable positioning error, the data were decimated following the out-
comes of the density reduction step to obtain the maximum acceptable sample interval
and to create the worst possible scenario.
The synthetic positioning error, introduced on raw data (before the migration pro-
cess) to effectively simulate a degraded acquisition, was computed by substituting the
acquired sample (the nominal one) with an adjacent sample according to a definite but
random criterion. The irregular grid has been created by randomly generating for each
nominal sample a numeric flag indicating the axis and direction of the sample to replace
the existing one. The chosen statistical distribution is a random uniform distribution,
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with a seed probability of 0.20 for each ill-positioned trace (4 in total) and 0.20 for the
nominal sample (Fig. 5.56(a)). The histogram of the distribution sequence is shown in
Fig. 5.56(b).
Figure 5.56: Regularity degradation. (a) Sample replacement scheme. (b) Random distribution
for traces substitution.
It can be seen from the sample distribution that for each nominal sample, there is
an equal probability of replacing it with the forward, backward, leftward, and rightward
neighbour or maintain the correct one. Such a distribution was chosen to simulate the
most unpredictable situation in which: 1) the accuracy degradation is not polarized
along a preferential direction and 2) no prediction of the possible spatial distribution of
the acquisition error can be made in advance.
The same error distribution was applied considering a different error radius (δ in
Fig. 5.56(a)), which defines the distance with respect to the nominal position of the
sample to be substituted, according to the mentioned geometry. Values for the radius
are listed in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8: Data sparsity acquisition parameters and set up.
Target depth Radius, δ Distance from the nominal sample
5/15 cm 1 0.8 cm
2 1.6 cm
3 2.4 cm
4 3.2 cm
5 4 cm
A sketch of the resulting irregular grid is shown in Fig. 5.57.
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Figure 5.57: Synthetic acquired grid after irregularity superimposition
Processed slices for the landmine buried at 5 cm with varying error radius are
presented in Fig. 5.58. Amplitude is displayed in a blue–yellow–red colour map and
normalized in the range [0–1] with respect to each relative maximum value.
Figure 5.58: Irregularity results, landmines at 5 cm. Error radius δ : (a) 0 cm. (b) 0.8 cm. (c)
1.6 cm. (d) 2.4 cm. (e) 3.2 cm. (f) 4.0 cm.
Considering that the first frame, Fig. 5.58(a), is the original regular data, it can
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be seen that a pronounced degradation of the focusing performance arises from Fig.
5.58(c) onward, giving a maximum error radius of 1.6 cm. This value corresponds
to half of the linear sample distance, suggesting that as long as the trace is included
in the boundaries of the same information cell, no loss of information occurs and the
reconstruction process is capable of correctly retrieving the spatial information.
Increasing the magnitude of inaccuracy causes processing artifacts faults which
reduce the image quality. Obviously, the target is still detectable, thanks to the homo-
geneity of the host material, but the noise level could decrease the confidence in the
recognition process.
Figure 5.58 presents the correspondent results for the deeper target.
Figure 5.59: Irregularity results, landmines at 15 cm. Error radius δ : (a) 0 cm. (b) 1.6 cm. (c)
2.4 cm. (d) 3.2 cm. (e) 4.0 cm. (f) 4.8 cm.
In this case, given a maximum sampling distance of 4.8 cm, the radius beyond
which the resolution starts to deteriorate is equal to 2.4 cm (Fig. 5.59(c)), confirming
the outcomes found for the shallower target. Following the previous considerations,
the target can be identified in each of the slices of Fig. 5.59, even without hints on the
presence of a target, but a degradation in the shape of the reconstructed landmine and
in the focusing performance is clearly noticeable.
To quantitatively assess the effect of the magnitude of the positioning error, the
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correlation between the regularly acquired slice and the irregular ones has been com-
puted. The analysis of the images correlation for both the investigated targets is pro-
vided in Fig. 5.60.
Figure 5.60: Irregularity results, image correlation analysis.
For the deeper target, given a larger affordable spacing, the ultimate limit of the
irregularity corresponds to a radius of 2.4 cm, consistent with the spacing of 4.8 cm of
the regular data. This is identifiable as an increase of the inclination of curve after a
radius of 3. The same applies to the shallower target, for which the limit is definitely
more evident. No significant losses of accuracy are evident elsewhere.
5.4.4 Comments
The set of extracted slices has allowed a precise and detailed definition of the internal
composition of the targets, considering also the absence of data processing. Such a
resolution means that the frequency content of the collected data, especially its higher
portion, has been preserved, and this performance has been achieved mostly through
the employment of a ground coupled GPR system, but also thanks to the low frequency
absorption effects of the surrounding material. Obviously, the presence of inhomo-
geneities, multiple clutter scattering or soil texture variations, will dampen the collected
energy and complicate a proper recording of these reflections.
The collected high resolution GPR slices showed that the internal design of the
5.4. Evidence of the internal structure: radar images 210
landmine can be properly imaged and characterised, confirming the applicability of the
approach. The internal assemblies of the landmines under test were identified with a
high degree of confidence, even from raw radar data. In addition, the superimposition of
the radar slice to the picture of the unscrewed target provided a very close correspon-
dence between the radar images and the actual structure, both in terms of anomalies
location and spatial extension accuracy.
A notable conclusion is that the achieved precision can be a significant value for
target recognition algorithm based on image matching. Furthermore, this capability
may overcome the need for extensive data collection, as the level of accuracy is such
that the correlation can be performed even with sketches and diagrams.
Another valuable consideration stems from the comparison between the inert VS-
50 and its surrogate, and it is the evidence that for the detection an air gap has a pre-
dominant effect over a small metal inclusion.
However, this quality does not come without a price. Profiles spacing in the order
of couple of centimetres maximum are usually adopted to ensure a proper target re-
construction and to avoid artefacts in the subsurface image. Considering that landmine
detection and removal is a time-consuming business, and that the survey time is directly
related to the data density, a decrease in the number of collected points will result in a
shortening of the acquisition time. In addition, another challenging task given a high
spatial sampling rate is a consequently high accuracy in linear samples positioning.
These two requirements may run the risk of not being fulfilled in particular situa-
tions, as for examples the presence of obstacles or obstructions and an uneven surface
topography.
The evaluation of the maximum affordable grid spacing and sample regularity,
both intentionally altered creating a sparse acquisition grid, has shown that, even for
small targets such landmines, there is space for reducing amount of data that need
to be collected to maintain a suitable level of resolution. The experimental results
taken together highlight that the same reconstruction performance that can be obtained
with an uneven and coarser sampling grid, lowering the demanding and challenging
requirements of samples precision.
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5.5 Bistatic characterisation of landmine signature
The results generated by the 3D survey can comprehensibly justify the adoption of such
strategy, as the produced images speak for themselves, but in the light of increasing
the efficiency of GPR technology, a way to provide the same level of information but
reducing the effort for data acquisition should be evaluated.
Easily understandable, the alternative methodology should go through a dimen-
sionality reduction, as otherwise there will be no advantages, considering the clarity
of the imaging results. At the same time, it should be as independent as possible to
the geometrical variables, such as landmines inclination angle and internal design, as a
deviation from a standard set-up could affect the detection performance.
As described in the research scope, a possible strategy that could gather the same
level of information is the collection of a set of signatures changing the separation
between the transmitter and the receiver, i.e. exploiting the angular domain of the
problem.
The following section describes the related experimental campaign carried out to
investigate the potential of a bistatic approach for buried target characterisation and
identification.
5.5.1 Trials descriptions
A set of bistatic signatures from the three different inert landmines and the target surro-
gate has been acquired in the test sand pit located at the Defence Academy (Fig. 5.16)
following the same arrangement of the previous experimental campaigns.
The GPR equipment employed for the measurements consisted of the IDS Aladdin
radar and an additional IDS THRHF radar, both provided by IDS Georadar srl. The
two impulsed devices carry dipole antennas spaced at 6 cm with a central frequency
and a bandwidth of 2 GHz and 3 GHz, respectively, pictured in Fig. 5.61. The two
antennas were connected to the same central unit to allow a separate and synchronised
configuration. The lower frequency equipment was chosen as a receiver to maintain
uniformity with the previous campaigns and to take advantage of the finer sensitivity
of the higher frequency equipment components.
To investigate the capability of a bistatic geometry to match the information con-
tent produced by a high resolution image, two different schemes have been evaluated,
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Figure 5.61: Bistatic characterisation, equipment details. From left to right: 2 GHz equipment,
3 GHz equipment and central unit.
respectively the common receiver (CR) and the common mid point (CMP) scheme.
The choice of a common receiver, rather than a common source method was made for
convenience only, as the two acquisition strategies are reciprocal. Photographs of the
acquisition are provided in Fig. 5.62.
Figure 5.62: Bistatic characterisation, acquisition photographs.
A series of CR profiles were acquired each time moving the receiver toward the
target, as sketched in Fig. 5.63, so that also the CMP signature could be extracted from
the data. This was made in order to avoid possible variations in the measurement set-up
and consequential loss of consistency among all the results provided in the work. To
guarantee precise profile matching and accurate acquisition, the soft pad was placed
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between the radar equipment and the soil.
Figure 5.63: Bistatic characterisation, common source acquisition scheme.
Starting with both the equipment located at a distance of approximately 30 cm
from the target location, the transmitter was moved at a 0.4 cm step, controlled by the
odometric wheel attached to its side, until reaching a sufficient distance to consider
the target contribution vanished. Then, the receiver was advanced by 1 cm and the
scheme was replicated. The last collected profile corresponds to the receiver located
exactly over the target. Generally, no significant differences are expected between the
two techniques in terms of gathered information, even if some logistical advantages
and disadvantages are evident, as described in Chapter 1.
The process of arranging the CMP sounding from a set of CR profiles is illustrated
in Fig. 5.64.
Figure 5.64: CMP signature extraction.
Acquisition parameters and data details are summarised in Table 5.9.
Bistatic signatures of landmines are presented in the commonly employed range
versus offset format, which provides a very clear illustration of eventual amplitude vari-
ations with offset. In this case, to preserve integrity and to provide a proper comparison,
the only processing step computed on the data consisted in the frequency filtering.
The results of the bistatic characterisation of the PFM-1 landmine is provided in
Fig. 5.65, for both the described geometries.
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Table 5.9: Bistatic acquisition parameters and set up.
Parameter Value
Frequency range [GHz] Transmitter: 1-3, Receiver 1.5 - 4.5
Frequency sampling, 1/∆t [GHz] 17
CR inline sampling, ∆x [cm] 0.4
CR profile length [cm] 50
CR profile number 30
CMP offset sampling, ∆o f f [cm] 1
CMP offset range [cm] 6 - 33
Time window, ∆T [ns] 30
The two results show similar content, though some differences, especially in the
quality of the output are visible. A single reflection is visible (marked A), with a spatial
extension directly linked to the physical dimension of the target, and no further events
are detectable. Considering the high amplitude and the constant behaviour, the reflec-
tion can be attributed to the metallic detonator, confirming what has been found in the
signature analysis. Given the nature of the target, this was expected. In addition, both
frames show the ghost replica of the target generated by the earlier strong reflection, as
previously pointed out.
The situation should change when the illuminated target includes internal assem-
blies, as controlling the incident angle of the wave and the vertical position of the
reflection plane, the antenna separation might better highlight the additional internal
scattering feature.
The CR profile and the CMP profile of the VS-50 are shown in Fig. 5.66(a) and
(b) respectively.
In this case, three events are detectable, and these have almost the same spatial ex-
tension. While the upper and lower reflections are due to the top and the bottom of the
landmine (marked A and C, respectively), the middle one is generated from the internal
scattering point. Its constant trend over the separation range means that as long as the
target is illuminated, this components will contribute to the radar signature. Consid-
ering the design of the target and the previous results on the target signature analysis,
the detected reflections can be associated with the activation mechanism behind the
pressure plate, which covers the whole landmine extension. This contribution is the
same recognised from the 3D campaign as a homogeneous, high amplitude reflections
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Figure 5.65: Inert PFM-1, bistatic characterisation. (a) CR profile. (b) CMP profile.
occurring below the early recordings of the target.
Fig. 5.67 presents an interpretative diagram for a better identification of the fea-
ture.
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Figure 5.66: Inert VS-50, bistatic characterisation. (a) CR profile. (b) CMP profile.
The last investigated landmine is the SB-33, which presents an irregular internal
design, including different components with different shapes. Its range versus offset
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Figure 5.67: Inert VS-50, bistatic signature. Interpretative diagram.
results for both acquisition methodologies are provided in Fig. 5.68.
In a similar manner to the VS-50, more than one reflection is evident, therefore a
preliminary indication of a target with a composite structure can be obtained. However,
the middle reflection (marked B) is spatially longer than the top (marked A) and bottom
one (marked D), demonstrating that the scattering event is not homogeneous over the
target space. This reflection is due to the void located aside the detonator (identifiable
with reflection C) which is located in a particular section of the target. In this case, the
advantage of a bistatic approach is clearly visible, as this reflection is stronger under a
particular angular range, differently from the other reflections.
If one considers the results presented in Fig. 5.11, this results represents a notable
improvement. A descriptive cutaway is presented in Fig. 5.69
The last aspect is related to the target size. The diffraction hyperbola generated
in a raw monostatic radar image depends mostly on the target size, orientation and
depth, as well as the surrounding soil properties. Hence, a measure of the target actual
extension is hard to guess from its hyperbolic representation. Progressively separating
the transmitter and the receiver, instead, at some point will cause the target to leave the
illumination region of the antennas. Substantially, the acquisition procedure reduces
the hyperbola tails extension, as both the equipment are moving away from the target
centre, and limits the collected target contributions. Taking as a reference the first or
the last contribution from the target, i.e. the top or the bottom reflection, the target size
can be easily inferred with a certain level of accuracy even from raw data.
Proof of this is provided in Fig. 5.70. Estimation accuracy can be evaluated by a
comparison with the actual dimensions (Table 5.1).
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Figure 5.68: Inert SB-33, bistatic characterisation. (a) CR profile. (b) CMP profile.
This feature represents probably the principal difference between the two bistatic
methodologies, as it is evident the better accuracy achieved with a CMP scheme.
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Figure 5.69: Inert SB-33, bistatic signature. Interpretative diagram.
Figure 5.70: Target size estimation. (a) Inert PFM-1. (b) Inert SB-33. (c) Inert VS-50.
5.5.2 Validation of results
As before, the surrogate VS-50 was investigated to prove the methodology. Recalling
the previously made considerations, the bistatic signature of the surrogate should be
almost constant regardless the bistatic angle, as (1) no internal structure is included,
and (2) the metallic content does not provide a detectable contribution.
Due to the unavailability of the test site at the Defence Academy, the following
acquisitions have been carried out in a conventional sand pit. Although a different
texture and a higher level of humidity, the two materials have proved to show very
similar propagation characteristics.
As no meaningful differences have been noticed between the two bistatic strate-
gies, for validation purpose only the CMP signature of the landmine surrogate will be
presented and commented. The collected signatures are described in Fig. 5.71.
As can be noticed, a single reflection (marked A) appears, with a spatial duration
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Figure 5.71: Surrogate VS-50, CMP signature.
approximately equal to the target size and very close to its inert counterpart. Also in
this case, the metal inclusion does not impact the signature.
Finally, recalling one of the limitations highlighted for the 1D signature analysis,
to assess the reliability of the performance of a bistatic approach, an additional inves-
tigation has been performed changing the target inclination angle, variable that has a
notable impact on the detection of the internal reflection.
Results from the inclined inert VS-50 and surrogate are shown in Fig. 5.72(a) and
Fig. 5.72(b) respectively.
The collected CMP signatures demonstrate that the effect of the internal structure
is robust to the target inclination, as all the three events previously detected (Fig. 5.66)
are still identifiable, even though the reflections no longer appear constant, due to the
change in the relative geometry. Compared to Fig. 5.12 and Fig. 5.25, it is evident
the improved performance as in the mentioned situations, the internal scattering con-
tribution was not detected. On the contrary, no significant variations are visible for the
surrogate. In conclusion, no internal reflections are missed and no misleading reflec-
tions are produced.
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Figure 5.72: Bistatic signature comparison, inclined targets. (a) Inert VS-50. (b) Surrogate
VS-50.
5.5.3 Comments
From a target characterisation perspective, the outcomes have demonstrated that a
bistatic acquisition methodology could yield as much information as a time consuming
3D GPR campaign, with the great advantage of being less expensive and demanding.
In particular, when the target does not include any internal assemblies, as for the
PFM-1 landmine, no additional reflections are detectable, while when the object is
characterised by a more complex design the contributions of these components are
identifiable and a clear match to the actual design can be supposed.
Data have been acquired through two different bistatic geometries to provide a
comprehensive evaluation of the technique. In particular, a common receiver (CR)
and a common mid point (CMP) scheme were employed, using two different GPR
equipment connected to the same central unit to ensure synchronisation.
The two proposed schemes were both able to properly characterise the investi-
gated target, without significant differences between the acquisition geometries. This
aspect is probably due to the width of the antenna pattern combined with the reduced
dimension of the internal components of the landmine. The discriminant properties is
related to the acquisition logistic only.
The results from the three devices under investigation have shown that, despite
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a reduction in the dimensionality of the data, a close agreement between the physi-
cal structure of the internal assemblies and the radar imaging is maintained, especially
considering the spatial extension of the reflections. In addition, what has been inferred
from the bistatic results is consistent and analogous to what was previously suggested
from the analysis of the 3D experimental campaign outcomes, demonstrating that the
same information content was successfully achieved and that such details are suffi-
ciently informative to ensure a correct target characterisation. Finally, a benefit of such
an acquisition scheme was found to be a precise estimation of the buried target di-
mension. For all the three objects a close correspondence with the physical size was
reached.
Even if the intelligibility of these results is lower than the immediate understand-
ing gathered from the radar images, it should be take into account that in this case the
identified features have been extracted from a single profile, therefore the performance
and suitability of the methodology should be compared to the 2D results previously
presented.
Following the same analysis scheme, the method was validated employing the VS-
50 surrogate, for which the same considerations apply. In addition, the methodology
has been tested also in the case of an inclined target, proved to be a critical variable
and a source of missing detection. Also in this case, a bistatic approach shows reliable
performance and robustness to variations in the geometry of the scenario.
5.6 Summary
The content of this Chapter can be strictly summarised through two main concepts:
• The GPR methodology is capable of recognising and extracting the internal scat-
tering contribution from the target radar signature.
• Survey strategies significantly impact the robustness and interpretability of the
results, as well as the detection performance.
In particular, a single 1D signature suffers from not being consistent when there
is a change in the target inclination angle and when the internal design of the device is
irregular, and even the inclusion of the polarimetric variables does not ensure reliable
outcomes. Increasing the dimensionality of the problem, hence acquiring a 2D GPR
profile of the object, can solve the issue of adverse geometries but it is not able to
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properly characterise targets with complex internal structure.
If one expresses the efficacy of a GPR survey as a ratio between the amount of
information that can be extracted from the data and the acquisition effort (time or re-
sources as well), the two approaches that ensure an exhaustive detection, i.e. a 3D
survey and a bistatic one, follow distinctive strategies and it is plainly inferable that a
time consuming acquisition is justifiable only if the produced results bring a remarkable
information content.
Even if this relation cannot be mathematically expressed, as it is not possible to
define a unique connection among all the involved parameters, some considerations can
be developed.
As previously stated, the choice of performing a 3D acquisition produces clear and
straightforward information for the characterisation of the buried target, but the time re-
quired for the data collection cannot be neglected. As a general rule, a long acquisition
time could be acceptable; however, a time consuming survey means that resources,
from power consumption to equipment usage and human attention, are required. Data
dimension, i.e. the volume in terms of number of inline and crossline profiles of the
acquired data, means resources as well. If for traditional GPR applications these pa-
rameters could be easily reached and handled, in this framework they play an important
role for determining the suitability of a surveying technology.
The information level brought by the results is closely related to the quality of the
acquisition phase, as no processing step can solve the loss of information due to erro-
neous data collection. But in this case data processing and interpretation are activities
that do not necessarily have to be performed during the acquisition process (i.e. there
are no constraints on real time and on field data processing). For that reason, the key
point is to be able to gather all the possible information in whatever form.
It is clear, therefore, that the GPR imaging approach tends to solve the ratio by
maximising the interpretation ability while sidelining the acquisition phase. On the
contrary, the bistatic characterisation strategy renounces to an evident readability in
order to minimise the data collection expenses.
Chapter 6
Concept for a bistatic system
I believe it is possible for ordinary
people to achieve extraordinary things.
Jody Williams, 2006, [44]
Following the outcomes of the research, several considerations can be pointed out in
the light of the development of a GPR system for landmine detection.
First of all, as described in the previous Chapter, a preliminary distinction should
be made depending on the desired output. If the scope is to produce a high resolution
image of the subsurface, the fulfilment of the spatial sampling requirements would be
needed. Recalling the provided definition of system efficacy, conveniently defined as a
ratio between the information content of the data and the survey effort, in this case the
ratio is optimised by increasing the information content. However, the acquisition effort
still represents an obstacle. Mechanical scanner with automated data acquisition can
reduce the amount of labour that is needed to acquire the data, but the total acquisition
time is still limited by the performance of the radar and the time needed to reposition
it. Even if the acquisition time is not as critical as the detection capability, this value
becomes unacceptably high if one considers that this effort is required regardless the
presence of not of a buried anomaly.
A bistatic survey strategy, instead, has proven to be able to overcome the problem
of a time consuming survey, maintaining the same conceptual level of information of
a 3D one. In particular, the strategy has demonstrated its valuable contributions pro-
viding information not only on the presence of internal reflections, which is a matter
of resolution rather than acquisition geometry, but also showing a suitability for char-
6.1. Motivations and platforms 225
acterising the design of the landmine structure. Moreover, all that can be extracted is
evident in a single profile, therefore the acquisition effort can significantly benefit from
the strategy. In this case, the time needed for the data recording depends on the desired
data stacking only.
It is evident that following this strategy, the previously defined efficacy ratio is
optimised by significantly reducing the survey time, accepting a less straightforward
result, in terms of immediate understanding. It is furthermore clear that, to achieve an
adequately time-saving performance, a certain amount of mechatronic and automation
is needed. Finally, the system needs to be designed as much autonomous as possible,
to improve the safety of personnel along with efficiency, productivity and flexibility.
This Chapter will firstly introduce motivations behind the development of land-
mine detection equipment, covering both technological and economical issues and then
a conceptual idea for an efficient and affordable bistatic GPR for landmine detection,
following the field trials experience and the obtained results. Clearly, the adoption of
a dense bistatic acquisition scheme precludes the use of an hand held platform, as (1)
such an equipment will hardly support the sensor head, (2) it will be hard to maintain
the same set-up for all the survey, and finally (3) the weight of the equipment could
negatively impact the performance of a human-based survey. Therefore, an automatic
scanning platform may be the most reasonable choice. The benefits of mounting a mine
detector on a remotely controlled vehicle must be balanced against the added cost and
possible reduction in efficiency. A cost analysis should be conducted to determine to
what extent remotely controlled vehicles are justified and evaluate their suitability for
the application.
6.1 Motivations and platforms
Critics often present the ”man with hand-tools” as an unsophisticated cave-man tech-
nology. In fact, it is more sophisticated than any artificial device yet available. No
matter how many millions of dollars are thrown at robotics, it will be a very long time
before machines equal the sophisticated array of data gathering and processing equip-
ment that is a human being.
The common belief is that the solution for increasing the impact of mine clearance
activities lies in building a better sensor. Assume then that a sensor is capable of pro-
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ducing a 99% accuracy rate and it is then fixed to a hand held device as is done with
the metal detector. The most significant accomplishment then is the speed needed to
determine whether a mine exists or not.
Unfortunately, it is still a dangerous operation for the deminer that uses the hand
held sensor. In 2017, there were 60 casualties among deminers in 14 countries (18
deminers were killed and 42 injured), a decrease from 2016, when there were 102
casualties identified (Fig. 6.1 (a)). On an average, 99 casualties among deminers per
year have been recorded since 1999 [256]. Even if these numbers might seem limited,
they are still unacceptably far from zero, and the statistics do not seem to indicate a
decrease in the number of incidents.
Figure 6.1: Humanitarian operations casualties statistics. (a) Casualty demographics reported
in 2017 [10]. (b) Accidents classification (2000-2005), Courtesy of noland-
mines.com
The ratio of accident classification during demining operations, shown in Fig. 6.1,
gives the following insights: the most common activity by a long way is excavation,
either investigating a metal detector signal or conducting area excavation by removing
the ground surface. The next most common accidents are missed mine accidents when
a deminer steps on a missed mine or pressure sensitive munition. Then, far below this
are handing accidents which occur when moving, disarming or destroying a mine.
Even with training, mine disposal experts expect that for every 5,000 mines
cleared, one worker will be killed and two workers will be injured by accidental ex-
plosions. Thus, it would be fair to say that having an unmanned platform to carry the
sensor and use it would be ideal for this problem.
Dirty, dangerous and dull tasks, all of which are found in landmine detection, can
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be greatly aided by remotely operated platform. It is very desirable to remove the op-
erator from the vicinity of the landmine and from the repetitive, boring operations that
lead to loss of attention and potential injury. An ability to automatically detect mines
over large areas would make a significant contribution to military and humanitarian
demining. Such a capability could be used to delimit suspected mined areas, conduct
mine clearance, or assist in quality assurance operations. Equally important is to iden-
tify areas that are not affected by landmines as these permit direct productive land use.
A considerable area of the total mine suspected area is not mine contaminated or only
to a small extent.
Conversely, the methods most commonly used in manual demining today are
based on handheld detectors, a successful approach that has changed little in the last
sixty years. An operator sweeps a landmine detector from side to side as the operator
moves forward to cover ground (Fig. 6.2). The detector head is held close to the sur-
face, at a suitable height without hitting the ground or any objects on it. If required, the
operator can pass the detector head a number of times, in a number of directions, over
the same piece of ground to confirm the detection.
Figure 6.2: Example of manual area sweeping. Taken from [100].
The operator can vary the width of sweep to suit a particular situation, and is
usually not limited by terrain. Unfortunately, the manual method is slow, hazardous,
manpower-intensive, and stressful to the operator who, as a result, can perform this
task only for short periods at a time, with a highly variable proficiency. In addition,
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exploiting multiple looks and precisely repeated overpasses of a target is difficult in a
hand-held system without sensitive and bulky instrumentation which adds to the burden
placed on the operator.
The implementation of a GPR sensor in a handheld system is restricted by weight
(typically in the range 2 to 5 kg) and size as the ground is surveyed manually. Generally,
a handheld system includes a relatively simple GPR with a single pair of transmit-
receive antennas and relatively simple data processing, along with a metal detector
coil.
The main alternative to the handheld devices are the vehicle-mounted ones, which
can be mounted on various types of vehicles and may be used where the terrain allows
the movement of the carriers. Clearly, there is a logical tendency on developing stand-
off systems which can spot the presence of a buried objects from safe distance, up to
tens of metres. However, GPR performance suffers from not being in proximity of the
surface and there are several constraints that need to be taken care before designing any
vehicle-mounted system which makes the system expensive.
GPR of this type are divided into the two groups: downward-looking devices and
forward-looking ones. The latter is obviously preferable operationally as it removes
the need for the vehicle to have overpass capability. There is theoretically a restriction
on system performance for forward looking radar considering that at incidence angles
less than the Brewster angle and for vertical polarisation, transmission losses at the
ground interface are relatively small, but at larger incidence angles the losses increase
more rapidly. Therefore a radar looking forward will no longer be able to detect buried
targets in the ground. Conversely, there is potentially no such restriction on the other
configuration. Examples of vehicle mounted GPR equipment are shown in Fig. 6.3
(Courtesy of respective owners).
Arrays are typically between 1 and 4 m in width and can operate at speeds up to
tens of km/h. In general, vehicle based GPR systems allow for higher quality of the
acquired data and much higher processing power than that in handheld systems. As
the interpretation of the 2D GPR images is not trivial, the use of 3D processing and
visualization techniques in landmine detection has been widely increased thanks to the
employment of GPR arrays.
To date, vehicle based systems concentrate on anti-tank landmines because it is
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Figure 6.3: Examples of vehicle mounted GPR systems. (a) 3D-Radar DX. (b) Niitek VISOR.
(c) Cobham AMULET. (d) Ingegneria dei Sistemi MINERVA.
difficult to achieve appropriate cross range resolution at realistic budgets. A further
aspect to be considered is the antenna element spacing, as this needs to be adequate to
provide proper resolution of the investigated target, as the effect of spatial undersam-
pling on the radar image degrades the image quality. Moreover, as the array elements
are generally fixed in position, changes in ground topography affect the path propaga-
tion and influence the collected signals. As an example, the Wichmann/NIITEK GPR
system currently employed by the US Army adopts a channel spacing of approximately
5 cm.
Several attempts have been made to detect minefields from airborne platforms
[257], employing both airships (as for the MINESEEKER, [258, 259]) and unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs, see for example the TIRAMISU project [260]).
Small, lightweight UAVs (less than 3 kg) are being introduced for airborne Syn-
thetic Aperture Radar (SAR)-based terrain observation, avoiding the need of large air-
crafts, especially for monitoring small size areas. Improvements in UAV technology
have made possible the development of UAV-assisted landmine detection systems, as
they exhibit disruptive advantages such as:
• Higher scanning speed compared to existing solutions in the market based on
autonomous robots.
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Figure 6.4: Examples of airborne GPR systems. (a) A-60 airship equipped with camera and
radar detector. Courtesy of Mineseeker foundation. (b) Multicopter Microdrones
equipped with camera and infrared detector. Courtesy of TIRAMISU.
• The possibility of inspection of remote areas, inaccessible with other systems.
• Higher safety throughout the scanning process, since contact with soil is avoided.
While range resolution is given by the radar bandwidth, cross-range resolution is
limited by by positioning and georeferring accuracy [261]. As a consequence, these
systems have been proved to be effective for detecting buried targets larger than 25-
30 cm, and/or exhibiting significant contrast with the medium (e.g. metallic targets
buried in clay or sand) [262]. In addition, as the aperture of any airborne sensor is not
sufficient to detect AP mines, the resultant radar image, which is the convolution of the
antenna footprint with the target cross-section, might not be able to detect targets with
small radar cross-section.
Logically, these efficiency and performance limitations have strongly affected the
usage of airborne GPR technology.
Drones are currently employed for their high resolution imagery, as they can effi-
ciently assist the post-release development monitoring and demining operations plan-
ning. In addition, the capability of generating digital surface models can be useful in
determining suitable access routes for demining machines. Hyperspectral imaging is
another application employing aerial platforms, with the aim of detecting different tem-
perature variations pattern in order to spot the presence of landmines. It is clear that
both purposes are mostly related to surface or above ground object detection.
Detecting and removing landmines seem to be a perfect application for ground
robots. Having an effective mine detection technology demands to develop mechanised
and robotised solutions properly sized with suitable modularised structure and well
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adapted to local conditions of minefields can notably improve operations efficiency
and flexibility. Such intelligent machines can speed the clearance process when used
in combination with mine detection tools. A robotised solution is useful in quickly
verifying that an area is clear of landmines. Essentially, these systems emulate the
downward-looking vehicle mounted GPR approach, where a vehicle is often replaced
with an accurate scanning platform. The popularity of the approach is explained by the
fact that if technically feasible it represents the best possible conditions from the radar
point of view.
Robots have been suggested for the problem of landmine detection but has been
met with controversy, the principal issue related to a general lack of awareness of the
problem, that has led in the majority of cases to inappropriate solutions that never make
it to the minefield. Most robotic equipment thus far developed have been extremely
expensive: expensive to build, to run and to maintain. Another reason for lack of suc-
cessful solutions is the complexity of the machine. Finally, one should always consider
the deminers understandable demand for complete safety and coverage, and at least a
significant confidence in the technology on which their lives depend.
As can be hinted, the problem is mainly the delivery of technology, rather than the
technology itself.
Although less mature than hand-held detectors, vehicle-based, remotely-
controlled (either stand-alone or combined) detection systems are able to provide
wider coverage and reduce risks for human safety. Examples of developed prototypes
are shown in Fig. 6.5.
There have been important advances related to technology for mine detection and
removal over the past decades, even though none of the current robotics platforms seem
to have reached production on a larger scale (except for military EOD/IEDD tasks).
6.2 Concerns regarding technology
There are a number of concerns regarding the development and use of technology for
humanitarian demining operations. In particular, the most can be outlined as follows:
• Cost: Many people involved in humanitarian mine action are ambivalent about
the use and development of more mine action technology. While they appreciate
the benefits that accrue, particularly in the areas of speed and safety, a common
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Figure 6.5: Example of robotic platform for humanitarian demining. (a) Gryphon (Tokyo Insti-
tute of Technology). (b) tEODor (Royal Military Academy of Belgium). (c)ARES
(University of Lisbon). (d) SILO-6 (DYLEMA project).
feeling is that if all the R&D money spent on developing new technologies were
simply applied to existing methods, then more mines would have been cleared
in a shorter time. In addition, it is apparent that it is mostly NGOs who tend
to question the cost/benefit balance of technology. The NGOs’ attitudes may be
influenced by the fact that they are concerned about decreasing funding available
for their operations and see technology R&D as competition for those funds.
• Socio-economic impact: Receptivity to the use of technology in particular coun-
tries may be affected by the place of demining in local economies. The people
using these tools and performing demining tasks are for the most part locally en-
gaged, and considering that many countries where demining is currently being
undertaken have economies severely stressed by recent conflict, a steady paying
job, even an inherently dangerous one, is a desirable commodity. Hence, some
NGOs may hesitate to introduce new technologies.
As with any environment there is a significant demand for incremental improvements to
existing technology. As demining organisations gain experience, they inevitably iden-
tify ways to do things better, both in terms of practices and use of technology. However,
an important limitation on this demand is the cost-benefit analysis of the incremental
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improvement. The issue is how the cost of the new/improved piece of equipment com-
pares with the marginal improvement (rate of demining, safety, accuracy) that can be
expected by employing it. Finally, radical advancements can be supposed in a few key
areas of demining operations, such as area reduction and close-in mine detection.
This suggests that technology already developed that demonstrates a capacity to
help demining teams work more quickly and efficiently has a chance of being used,
subject to the constraints of this market. It also suggests that the development of new
technology to address humanitarian demining may find itself without a market, unless
it can be developed quickly.
The humanitarian market for metal detectors is estimated to be annually around
$10 million, with an average sales price of $2,500 per unit. Non-governmental organi-
sations in the field of demining have limited budgets to purchase new technology, which
sets the bar for the sales price for new detectors. The market is also too small to sup-
port the high costs of developing advanced technologies [263, 264]. Therefore, a basic
comparison of these costs can be polarised by the fact that, being mostly carried out
with locally employed people, the actual cost per day for demining operations is visibly
lower than the cost needed for the development and deployment of new technologies.
However, if one considers the total life time of the equipment, the costs directly and
indirectly related to the manual operations might probably be higher.
6.3 Sensor fusion
As a general rule, the system must have the capability that far fewer of the fragments of
metal need to be excavated and the level of confidence in the overall process must be so
high that larger fragments are left in the ground, but every mine is detected and disposed
of. Recalling that the so called false alarms arise from physical features in the ground
that are not caused by noise but clutter, it is clear that the ongoing software challenge is
to devise algorithms that enable mines to be distinguished from other non-mine targets
that are detected by the first stage of processing. According to the GICHD, in many
cases up to 98% of an area said to be mined is in fact mine-free. For instance, between
1992 and 1998, humanitarian demining in Cambodia excavated over 200 million items,
less than 0.3% of which were antipersonnel mines or other explosive devices.
Sensor fusion methods have been well researched for landmine detection in the
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last few decades in order to improve demining operations. Most sensor fused systems
for AP landmine detection comprise the MD and GPR, representing the most mature
solution in terms of technology development, and in some cases consist of a third sensor
which is commonly an IR imaging sensor or some form of camera. Metal detector and
GPR are not strictly orthogonal sensors, as they both give the largest response signal
in the presence of metal in the ground. But with the GPR one can observe that buried
objects may cause certain signatures, which can be traced over a certain depth range.
These are caused by reverberations of radar waves inside the object, due to air gaps,
pronounced contrasts in permittivity or metallic parts.
As an example, performance improvements of the VMR3 Minehound compared
to single MD equipment are shown in Fig. 6.6.
Figure 6.6: Productivity increases due to dual sensor equipment compared to MD only. Taken
from [265].
As reported in several field verifications [101], using a metal detector as a primary
detector and using GPR to check all the alarms produced by the metal detector can
have a dramatic impact on false alarm rates. A low-cost GPR could have significant
impact as a confirmation tool, while being within the budgets of most humanitarian or-
ganisations. A low-cost, dual-sensor metal detector and GPR, or a low-cost standalone
GPR, would improve productivity within a year or two of widespread implementation.
This improved productivity and reduction in person hours needed to clear contaminated
minefields would cover the cost of the initial investment. Over the years, this would
reduce the cost per cleared square metre.
Finally, the incorporation of metal detection allows the new work to build upon
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what has gone before.
6.4 Conceptual design
From what has been desribed in the previous Chapters, the logical implementation of a
bistatic GPR takes the form of antenna arrays, in which each channel can be configured
in order to acquire a bistatic signature of the detected target. Clearly, this means that
the primary constraints are related to the physical system geometry:
• Maximum offset: how wide the array should be to ensure all contributions from
the target are collected.
• Maximum sampling: how wide the spacing between channels should be to en-
sure all information from the target are collected.
The first item is basically a matter of soil attenuation (i.e. the maximum achiev-
able bistatic range), and target dimension (i.e. the maximum spatial extension of the
object radar contributions). Following the results of the field trials, one might consider
the equipment size to be approximately 50 cm, allowing an effective recording of suf-
ficiently extended and dense bistatic signatures. Moreover, these range of sizes can be
suitable for unmanned platforms mounting.
The latter feature represents a more complex item to be addressed, as it is a com-
promise between the Nyquist sampling requirements and the effective physical (and
electrical) dimension of the antenna elements, as in this case, the channel spacing cor-
responds to the offset sampling. A fixed array therefore would require a large number
of elements, which themselves might be larger than the required spacing, causing the
resulting equipment to be excessively under sampled. Even if interpolation can help,
usually the minimum separation between the receiving and transmitting antennas has
to be equal to the maximum size of the antenna, in order to limit the unwanted electro-
magnetic interaction between them.
In particular, to take into account the reduction in the bistatic signature extension
when the target is inclined (as shown in Fig. 5.72), the maximum tolerable spacing
might be in the order of a centimetre. To date, minimum spacing of massive array
systems is not less than 5 cm, reaching tens of cm for large scale applications.
To visually evaluate the effects of reducing the CMP profile density is shown in
Fig. 6.7, in which the previously obtained results for the VS-50 landmine have been
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decimated to synthetise a sparser sampling.
Figure 6.7: Effects of offset sampling on landmine signature. (a) Sampling 1 cm. (b) Sampling
1.5 cm. (c) Sampling 2 cm. (d) Sampling 2.5 cm.
It is evident the effects of reducing the number of collected bistatic signatures, as
there is a severe loss of information when the spacing is higher than 2 cm. Practically,
this means that there are limited possibilities in reducing the data density. In addi-
tion, it should be considered that the field experiments were carried out in favourable
conditions, therefore the visible degradation may increase in case of more complex
conditions.
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A centimetric-spaced equipment can be ideally achieved by a reconfigurable sys-
tem, in which a large number of very closely spaced elements can be dynamically
activated and deactivated. However, even mitigated, the risk of having unwanted cross
talk and mutual interference still exists. In addition, accurate synchronisation might
become harder to obtain.
The idea behind the conceptualisation a bistatic equipment can be found in the
strategy adopted for the experimentation, i.e. having two different GPR equipment
independently managed. It is clear that in this case, if the aim is to implement an
autonomous platform, a key parameter is to maintain a reduced weight.
A raw diagram of the described equipment and concept is provided in Fig. 6.8.
Figure 6.8: Raw diagram of automatic bistatic scanning GPR.
This essentially means that the bistatic data recording would require some sort of
electro-mechanical components to systematically and precisely increase the distance
between the transmitter and the receiver and to perform the series of periodic motion
simultaneously. This mechanical effort is balanced by the fact that a single equipment
has to be included in the sensor head, reducing the electronic and computational com-
plexity of the system. The principal requirement is that the sensor head shall include
only passive elements to keep a low weight and facilitate its mobility. In this way, the
weight would not exceed the typical values for hand held equipment.
The employment of multiple and separated rows of elements to avoid the inclusion
of automation will negatively impact the physical dimension of the equipment, as it
would be wider and larger to accommodate the required number of channels.
Two assumptions are accepted in almost every landmine detection operations: the
need of very high frequencies and the necessity of keeping the antennas away from the
terrain surface. The first assumption is motivated by the goal of being able to classify
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the targets according to their accurate geometric reconstruction, while the second as-
sumption is a standard accepted approach for safety reasons. For effective operation,
particularly at the highest frequencies, it has been shown that it is highly desirable to
have the radar antennas in close proximity to the ground. Reactive coupling and system
sensitivity is rapidly lost as the antenna is raised, but it is also potentially dangerous to
search a minefield with the antenna resting on the surface.
Following these considerations, one of the critical points is whether the platform
should be in direct contact with the surface or whether it can be operated at a stand-off
distance. In this case, the discriminant feature is the possibility of detecting the internal
reflections of the target.
An experimental evaluation of the height effects on the detection performance of
GPR has been performed, to verify also the numerical results shown in Fig. 4.29 in
which it seemed that the reflections generated by the internal air layer appears in the
radar signature for the first tens of centimetres.
In particular, a series of coincident 2D profiles have been acquired over the repre-
sentative VS-50 landmine, each time inserting a styrofoam tiles between the radar and
the soil surface to change the antenna height above the soil. Details are provided in
Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Antena height evaluation parameters and set up.
Parameter Value
Frequency range [GHz] 1 - 3
Frequency sampling, 1/∆t [GHz] 17
Inline sampling ∆x [cm] 0.4
Time window, ∆T [ns] 15
Antenna offset [cm] 6
Antenna height [cm] 5 - 10 - 15
The landmine was buried at a depth of 13 cm as previously made, horizontally
laying. Photographs of the acquisition are shown in Fig. 6.9.
To highlight the target contribution, in this case a background removal step was
applied to the data [266]. In particular, the subtraction has been applied through the
application of SVD algorithm and eigenvalues/eigenvectors suppression, in order to
selectively removes the flat horizontal reflections from the GPR profiles [267]. The
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Figure 6.9: Antenna height evaluation, acquisition details. (a) Survey setup. (b) Height 10 cm.
(c) Height 15 cm.
resulting GPR profiles are presented in Fig. 6.10.
Figure 6.10: Antenna height evaluation results. (a) Height 5 cm. (b) Height 10 cm. (c) Height
15 cm.
Disregarding negligible topography variations and surface clutter, the landmine
internal structure can be retrieved up to 10 cm, beyond which its scattering contribution
becomes hard to recognise. In particular, Fig. 6.10(c) further demonstrates that the
effects of air gaps located within the landmine is beneficial for its detection, as it can
be noticed that the principal contribution detectable is the internal layer, rather than the
top of the landmine. This is in agreement with the numerical results, showing the same
pattern.
From a practical point of view, this represents a valuable advantage, as it means
that the GPR equipment can achieve comparable performance even not in contact with
the surface. For comparison purposes, the Proper Lane Sweep technique (PLS), re-
quires the sensor head height not to exceed 5 cm. Moreover, possible interferences
generated by closely located structures due to the wide pattern of the antennas are re-
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duced due to the limited height of the platform.
However, these results might suggest that a ground based system is nearly the only
feasible solution, as a UAV would need to fly at a very low altitude to allow a proper
radiation performance, feature closely bounded to the environmental factors and that
may impact the scan accuracy and imaging performance. In addition, it should be
taken into account the payload limitations of such platforms employed at low altitude.
A parallel advantage of this solution is that it would be also suitable for vehicle
mounting integration
The last aspect to be considered is the acquisition step. Since landmine clearance
personnel are concerned about not triggering the landmine, the scan pattern is often er-
ratic, lowering the quality of the results and impeding a physical implementation of the
described methodology in a hand-held system. Suitable performance of the currently
employed platforms are obtained only when experienced operators are performing the
survey, and it is well-known that operators skills decay with time, issue that vanishes
when the task is carried out by a mechanical infrastructure. Mechanical infrastructure
does not tire like humans, provided they have enough power, and their performance is
not affected by psychological tension and trauma. In addition, the accidental triggering
of landmines is minimised due to the mechanical capability of the system of adjusting
the sensor head elevation to maintain a constant height above the ground. Finally, the
operator can actually stand in a 100% safe position.
The data acquisition step represents the bottleneck of the problem, as described in
detail in the previous sections, as target characterisation and potentially target identifi-
cation both rely on very dense and accurate data.
The main question is therefore how to define a sufficiently sparse grid to ensure
detection and maintain efficiency at the same time.
To increase the efficiency, the following considerations can be made: it has been
demonstrated that detection of the diffraction hyperbola can be obtained also with a
sparser acquisition grid, therefore the acquisition strategy can be configured so that
most of the resources are concentrated when there is a precise need and evidence, i.e.
when a target is detected and located, saving time and resources from non-contaminated
areas (which represent the predominant situation). In addition, it should be take into
account that the tougher barrier is the spacing between the parallel profiles, i.e. the
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crossline direction (∆y), while the inline one (∆x) could be easily managed, therefore
the data sampling along this dimension does not significantly impact the acquisition
effort.
The acquisition strategy can be analysed considering the antenna radiation pat-
tern and the target size. In particular, most landmines may be classified with a size of
approximately 10 cm, while the majority of GPR equipment, to maintain a practical
size, employs wideband dipole antennas having a wide radiation pattern. As the radia-
tion pattern can only be characterised taking into account the soil dielectric properties,
which may be difficult to exploit, the optimum grid spacing can be estimated consider-
ing the the target size only and the need of having at least one profile located inside the
target.
With a reliable estimation of the parameter and of the wave propagation character-
istics, it would be possible in theory to dynamically adjust the grid spacing to the soil
dielectric properties, further increasing the efficiency of the system.
From these considerations, it is clear that the maximum crossline spacing cannot
exceed 10 cm, otherwise there is the risk of being inadequately sparse, as shown in Fig.
6.11.
Figure 6.11: Optimum sampling mesh analysis, ∆y = 10 cm. (a) Target axis profile. (b) Target
edge profile.
It is clear that ideally a spacing of 10 cm will be sufficient for detecting the diffrac-
tion hyperbola, even in the less favourable condition, as in such case there are two pro-
files crossing the target. However, this choice would require a very accurate acquisition
to ensure that even when the profile is located on the border of the target the target
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would still be detected. The effects of being close to the target edges is depicted in Fig.
6.12.
Figure 6.12: Radar profile collection, effects of profile location. (a) Profile location. (b) Target
edge profile. (c) Target axis profile.
It is implicit that when including the width of the radiation pattern, a profile lo-
cated on the border will include an increased scattering contribution from the target,
reducing the risk of missing it. On the other side, it must be considered that uneven
soil topography and surface obstacles and/or clutter may reduce the profile location
accuracy during the survey.
Reducing the spacing between parallel profiles brings a more conservative situa-
tions, described in Fig.6.13.
Figure 6.13: Optimum sampling mesh analysis, ∆y = 5 cm. (a) Target axis profile. (b) Target
edge profile.
In this case, it can be seen that there is a higher probability of acquiring a profile
crossing the target, therefore this scheme might be capable of better manage smaller
and/or non-symmetrical targets, as well as inclined objects (which have a reduced radar
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signature).
Still, it is reasonable to reduce the total amount of data to be collected, i.e. inline
direction, but it must be taken into account that a highly oversampled acquisition might
not produce a clear hyperbola in the radar profile, therefore the detection step would be
based on a single signal, which clearly yields less information. A comparison between
the two output is shown in Fig. 6.14, in which a conservative spacing of 1 cm is taken
as a proper parameter.
Figure 6.14: Data collection, effects of inline sampling on detection decision. (a) ∆x = 5 cm.
(b) ∆x = 1 cm
As can be seen, even with a sample spacing of 5 cm the resulting image still
shows an hyperbolic pattern, but it is expected that a less cooperative soil will degrade
the results, making the interpretation of the profile of Fig. 6.14(a) less intuitive.
When the system detects an hyperbola in the GPR image, through an automatic
detection scheme or via human supervision, as well as through a combination of sensors
response, the platform should search for the apex of the target in the neighbourhood of
the profile to pick up the optimal geometry. This location can be easily found by ac-
quiring an orthogonal GPR scan from the apex of the individuated hyperbola, obviously
along the orthogonal direction along (the crossline one). This additional effort put in
place for positioning the equipment precisely over the centre of the target is required to
ensure a proper CMP profile collection. Then, the bistatic signatures collection can be
performed, and the detected buried anomaly can be classified according to the collected
results.
Search flow can be described as follows:
• Area reduction through a sparse survey to reduce the impact of non-
contaminated sectors.
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• Target detection from the GPR profile and surrounding regions.
• Target characterisation through a bistatic scheme.
Finally, it was described that the effects of the internal scattering are somehow
independent of the antenna polarisation, in the sense that its contributions is visible
regardless the antenna orientation, hence there are no preferential directions to follow
for the acquisition of the bistatic signatures.
6.4.1 Considerations on dual sensor equipment
Following the considerations of the previous Sections, an efficient way of performing
the survey can be employing a combined GPR platform and a metal detector unit. In
this way the metal detector can operate as a trigger for a GPR acquisition, taking into
account also that there are still many metal mines and just a number of landmines are
completely free of it. Therefore, in case of no alarms, the acquisition can be sparser,
while once something is found by the MD unit, the GPR system will take control of the
process and impose a more dense acquisition. Strictly theoretically, this way of survey-
ing allows both methodology, the 3D imaging and the 2D bistatic, to be accomplished.
The use of an additional sensor as a trigger for the GPR survey could provide at the
same time supplementary features that can be a valuable inclusion for the identification
and recognition step. In addition, electing the MD rather than the GPR as the trigger for
the acquisition also overcome the sampling issue of the radar sensor and the geometrical
constraints for the hyperbola formation. Clearly, in situations in which the MD might
become inefficient, the hierarchy can be inverted, thus promoting the GPR survey as
the principal. In addition, the capability of MD sensors to accurately locate the target
center of mass can bring additional advantage in the detection phase.
The great advantage of including the additional MD unit is however compensated
by the increasing platform complexity, as a supplemental mounting and/or scanning
platform need to be integrated. On a general perspective, there are mainly two possi-
bilities:
• Robotic arm sweeping the terrain, equivalent to the operations carried out by a
human operator.
• Multi-channel array, equivalent to the GPR array commonly mounted on vehi-
cles.
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Clearly, the effort required by the first option is the electro-mechanical structure
that can allow for a precise sweep of the area in front of the platform, while the second
solution forces the inclusion of an additional equipment with relevant physical dimen-
sions (order of metres).
6.5 Summary
Conventional methods for demining operations works, but their efficiency and safety
should be improved taking advantage of the evolving technology. To facilitate machine-
based sensing in place of manual sensing, the intuitive way to ensure a precise area
scanning, continuous operations and to allow efficient operations is to employ an au-
tonomous and/or mechanical platform. Given the framework of application and the de-
manding constraints, the only probable solution is the development of a ground based
equipment, due to the described limitations of aerial platforms.
This solution has the advantages of (1) being flexible, as it can be intended also
for vehicle mounting, (2) maintaining a size and weight suitable for terrain robotic
platforms, and (3) increasing the efficiency in area survey.
In several studies it has been noticed that a large amount of time is spent in sur-
veying non contaminated areas, hence the first addressed feature has been the resources
saving when there is no need of, meaning that the acquisition strategy will follow the
sparsest scheme as possible in order to ensure the detection of the target.
To achieve the desired bistatic characterisation of the target, starting from the ex-
perimental trials experience, an electro-mechanical array is delineated, as the needed
signature density almost preclude the use of a fixed system due to elements spacing
constraints. This implementation substitutes the two single GPR platforms to maintain
a reduced physical size.
The introduction of such a platform in the humanitarian demining market is clearly
dependent from the cost of production and development, but it is clear that on a life-
time scale consideration, these costs can challenge the current expenses.
Even if representing an acceptable compromise, the only parameter that does not
match the current hand-held operations is the sweep velocity, which would be slower
(tens of cm/s maximum) employing the designed platform. The reasons for this are
mainly related to the motion planning in case of rugged topography and obstacle avoid-
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ance.
Finally, the inclusion of an additional sensor, in particular a metal detector unit,
might notably increase the performance of the equipment and improve the productivity,
clearly with the associated costs of inserting an additional sensor in the platform.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and future work
Collectively we have the knowledge,
skill, and resources to achieve it, so let’s
make future generations proud.
Prince Harry of Wales KCVO, 2017,
[268]
This thesis has addressed the challenge of characterising buried targets to enhance the
performance of GPR as a landmine detection methodology. A key to improve perfor-
mance is to identify, understand and extract the features of the landmine radar signature
so that a discriminant plane between the landmine and clutter targets can be identified.
A discriminant properties is expected to be the presence, in the target radar response, of
scattering components that can most likely be attributed to the presence of the detonator
and other internal mine structure. This feature can be ascribed only to man-made ob-
jects, thus, considering the variety of targets commonly found in a minefield scenario,
its presence could be beneficial for removing a number of misleading detections.
A landmine may be characterised by a number of scattering centres, each with
its own angular radiation pattern, in particular when the plastic content of the internal
structure is high. Most landmines may be considered as multiple layered dielectric
cylinders that interact with each other to produce multiple reflections.
The challenge is therefore to be able to effectively sense these internal reflections
to achieve improved discrimination.
The first key aspect is the availability of representative inert landmines for the
experimentation. As landmines are objects that are difficult to replicate, and given
the research scope, it is essential that properly constructed inert landmines are used
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for research and development, otherwise the results could be significantly affected or
misleading. The employed devices were complete with all their external and internal
components and were filled with a high explosive simulant commonly used to train the
UK Ammunition Technical Officers; the substance has the same electrical and chemical
properties of commonly employed explosive materials.
The impact that the internal assemblies of the landmine have on the resulting radar
signature has been evaluated through a series of experimental campaigns, aiming at (1)
confirming the validity of the research question, and (2) evaluating a suitable way to
highlight these contributions and improve the efficiency of GPR.
In particular, the aim of this research has been to establish to what extent GPR
technique is suitable for providing information on the design and composition of a
buried target and the impact that a bistatic strategy may have on the characterisation
and identification process. Considering that when a dielectric target is illuminated by
an electromagnetic wave, energy is partially transmitted through the target, a variation
in the transmitter and receiver separation will illuminate a different internal section
of the target, which will scatter the energy accordingly to the features of that particular
section. Therefore, it is expected to be able to highlight targets with composite structure
and internal assemblies.
The novelty of this work arises from the demonstration of the valuable contribution
that the internal structure yields to the radar results and the potential that a bistatic
approach shows for target discrimination and identification.
7.1 Summary of findings
Investigation of radar signatures in the form of simulations and measurements has in-
creased the understanding of the scattering mechanisms induced by the internal com-
ponents of landmines.
The preliminary numerical analysis has shown that, at least theoretically, the pres-
ence of internal assemblies can be detected and recognise as an additional scatter-
ing contribution. This potential has been investigated considering design parameters
(mainly system bandwidth and frequency) that are common to the majority of GPR
equipment employed in demining operations to maintain a realistic operational con-
figuration. In addition, the reliability of these scattering events has been tested by
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changing both target geometrical properties and soil attenuation characteristics, assess-
ments which have shown that the internal structure information can be retrieved even
for deeper targets and in case of unfavourable propagation conditions.
Off the ground targets investigation showed a relatively strong multiple reflections
that appears beneath the target space, confirming the outcomes of the numerical simu-
lations and additionally highlight the importance of the relative geometry between the
target and the antennas plane not only for the their detection but also for their recog-
nition. This includes the antenna orientation, i.e. polarisation, and target inclination
angle. Even if the experimental set up would hardly be suitable for a proper ground
survey, as the employed frequencies would allow a very limited soil penetration, the
results maintain a certain level of reliability due to a consistent central wavelength to
target size ratio and a realistic bandwidth. The only phenomenon that the results did
not consider, for obvious reasons, is the absorption due to the propagation in free space.
However, for the purpose of this initial investigation the effect could be neglected.
The methodology has been replicated burying the targets in a sharp sand pit and
employing a GPR platform already on the market, and the results confirmed what was
found in the previous experiments. Effects of soil, even if in controlled conditions,
appears as a reduction in the number detectable reflections, as only the prominent one
were able to reach the receiver antenna. However, the scattering contributions can
be easily identified. Despite the different propagation environments, a high degree of
correlation has been achieved.
Analysis of the collected signatures demonstrated that the expected reflections
generated by the detonator and other internal mine structure are detectable, thus pro-
viding a first hint on the significance that this feature can bear. In addition, as the
internal components have their own radiation pattern, a change in the antenna orienta-
tion provides a clearer marking of their presence, as a solid dielectric object will show
no variations.
A single, mono-dimensional scan, unfortunately, has the limitation of being depen-
dent on the target aspect angle. As well, as landmines may not be perfectly symmetric
a bi-dimensional profiles may not be able to properly characterise the internal com-
ponents. Example of this can be found considering the two employed devices: if for
the VS-50 landmine the structure covers the entire target extension, the SB-33 shows
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some assemblies located in a precise sector of the landmine. Hence, their detection but
especially their characterisation can be unreliable.
A logical step ahead can be increasing the dimensionality of the problem, hence
evaluating the imaging performance of a 2D profile. Also in this case the results have
shown some improvements, especially for inclined targets (VS-50 example), but they
still present the critical limitation of not being able to properly delineate the structure
for irregular targets (SB-33 example).
Therefore, a 3D acquisition is needed to extract valuable information on the spatial
extent of the internal design of a landmine.
A set of dense and regular 3D GPR acquisition have been carried out, under the
same set up of the previous experiments to maintain consistency. The produced images
exhibit a very close correlation with the actual design of the investigated targets, con-
firming the ability of GPR to image and to precisely delineate the internal features of a
landmine. In addition, the shortcomings highlighted from the 1D signatures and the 2D
profiles are significantly mitigated. The overlay of the radar slices and the photograph
of the target further demonstrates this capability. The innovative aspect of this section
is that it is possible to produce images closely matched with the physical design of the
landmine. To validate these outcomes, a surrogate of the VS-50 landmine has been
investigated as well. The surrogate is accurately moulded from the actual landmine
but it is substantially a solid explosive, with just a representative metallic inclusion.
Furthermore, in comparison with an air gap, a small metal inclusion has a very weak
effect on the target response. Therefore, the presence of an air gap notably facilitates
the detection of buried plastic cased landmines with GPR.
Although not strictly within the scope of this work, results suggested the use of
inert (otherwise known as neutralised) landmines for releasing the potential of GPR of
detecting the internal structure of a target.
A discussion on the requirements for a proper 3D imaging has been provided as
well, highlighting the demanding constraints on the density, i.e. the maximum afford-
able sample spacing, and the regularity, i.e. the precision in samples positioning, that
the acquisition grid should have. Even if a relaxation is possible, the need for a sub-
wavelength sampling still represents an obstacle for an effective employment of 3D
methodologies.
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This considerations gave birth to the main theme of the thesis, whether a bistatic
approach could provide the same level of information but with a lower acquisition
effort.
The chosen methodologies for the bistatic acquisition were a common receiver,
fixing the receiver and moving the transmitter only, and a common mid point scheme,
in which both the transmitter and receiver antenna move away from a common point in
opposite direction. With the target located in the common point, both strategies allow to
investigate the target internally, layer by layer, with little differences between them. The
resulting bistatic signatures clearly show the potential of the approach, as information
on the presence of internal assemblies can be extracted, and details on the complexity
of such internal design can be easily obtained. Considering the investigated targets
and their design, a consistent pattern has been found in case of regular structure (VS-
50 example), while a more complex reflections pattern was generated by the irregular
device (SB-33 example). This benefit becomes even more important considering that
a demanding 3D volume is no longer needed. As before, the corresponding surrogate
has been exploited as well to validate the outcomes. Bistatic characterisation has been
proposed in the case of an inclined targets, showing robustness and consistency.
Based on the experimental results, a conceptual design of a possible bistatic GPR
platform has been provided, highlighting advantages and limitations compared to the
actually way of area scanning. In particular, two main aspects have been considered:
(1) operator safety, and (2) acquisition efficiency. Clearly, the first aspect is of notable
importance given the application and therefore the equipment must allow the the oper-
ator to stand in a 100% safe position. This can be achieved by designing an unmanned
or a remotely controlled GPR platform, with all the consequences that arise, in terms
of cost and complexity. The latter item has been addressed by considering that the
landmine density per square metre can be very low, thus the system should save time
and resources from non-contaminated areas (which represent the predominant situa-
tion). This can be achieved by following the sparsest grid as possible in order to ensure
detection. The need for a dense bistatic characterisation logically not only precludes
the use of an hand held platform, but also brings the need for electro-mechanical com-
ponents to simultaneously perform the series of periodic motion. Considerations on
a possible MD-GPR sensor combination have been provided as well. The described
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architecture represents a suggestion to increase the efficiency, reliability and safety of
demining operation where such an infrastructure can be employed.
7.2 Future work
This thesis has resulted in some key achievements summarised in the previous section.
However, it has also opened up many possibilities for further work and improvements.
First of all, only three types of landmines have been investigated in this thesis.
Even though it would not be practical to exploit all the devices spread around the world,
a further step could be to increase its number in the light of a common landmine signa-
ture database. A significant advantage for its development might come from the high
degree of correlation found between the numerical solutions and experimental trials,
features which may suggest that the catalogue development can take advantage of the
(ideally) infinite modelling possibilities. It has been found that for a given minefield,
the possible number of different landmine models is limited, therefore this information
can be used to infer a representative list of high priority targets to extend the work made
in this thesis.
Similarly, other variables that strongly influence GPR efficacy are the soil condi-
tions and electromagnetic properties, as GPR detection performance can bounce from
optimal to unacceptably low depending on the propagation characteristics of the soil.
Further validation of the proposed technique should be carried out in less favourable
terrain conditions, in terms of texture homogeneity and absorption coefficients. It has
been shown that the scattering contribution of the internal air layer is robust to the lossy
attributes of the surrounding medium, thanks to a strong impedance contrast, but this
must be verified considering the detection threshold of the system. As indicated for the
landmine models, mine contamination has reached a worldwide scale, therefore also
for this attribute, a prioritisation of the terrain models should be made.
It has been shown that the detection of internal components is somehow indepen-
dent of antenna orientation, i.e. they scatter randomly, but only for co-polar config-
uration, therefore a detailed analysis of the radar signatures in the cross-polarisation
domain could bring further indications of the presence of these components. In addi-
tion, the acquisition of both cross-polar and co-polar data allows for a fully polarimetric
analysis of the target, reducing the number of unknown of the problem and increase the
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accuracy of the results.
In this work, two regular geometries have been examined and evaluated. However,
separating the transmitter and the receiver, and independently managing their opera-
tions can ideally produce an unlimited number of possible combinations. This prac-
tically means that there is plenty of space for investigating more complex acquisition
geometries and survey methodology. Nevertheless, it must be taken into account that
landmines are shallow targets, with a possibly weak RCS and with reduced dimensions.
This means that the maximum separation between the antennas is limited, soil absorp-
tion included, as well the possibility of deploying elaborated acquisition geometries.
The suggested autonomous platform, even if only a conceptual design, is firstly limited
by these factors: close proximity to the ground, methodical area sweeping and regular
relative geometry between the transmitter(s) and the receiver(s). Unleashing the true
potential of a fully independent bistatic and polarimetric GPR system would clearly be
of remarkable importance, even if the trade-off between the achievable results and the
system complexity would then be a critical argument.
The aim of the work has been focused only to demonstrate the feasibility of deter-
mining the nature of a target from its internal structure contribution, therefore, concern-
ing the possible dedicated processing schemes, there are several possible expansion of
the work. The use of information on the internal structure of a target has been restricted
to characterisation only, using the prior information on the buried target, but significant
advantages can be achieved if employed in blind target recognition and identification
scheme.
First of all, the majority of the current recognition algorithms are mostly based on
the extraction of features related to the physical properties, i.e. dielectric characteristics
or geometrical design, without accounting for the contributions from the internal struc-
ture. While there are a large number of useful automatic detection schemes for GPR
data analysis, robust recognition and identification remain a challenge as the scale of
the problem severely impacts the performance of certain features, lowering their dis-
criminant properties. The capability of extracting the scattering contribution generated
by the internal structure of a target, instead, it is theoretically independent of the bound-
ary conditions of the problem, therefore representing a robust and valuable feature to
rely on.
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It has been demonstrated that this landmine feature brings quite a discriminant
information on the nature of the target, hence a processing scheme driven by the pres-
ence of multiple reflection in the target signature need to be developed to fully exploit
this GPR capability. As it has been showed, the potential level of accuracy may lead
to identify the landmine model, as each family of landmines can be thought of being
characterised by a similar structure. The close correspondence with the optical image
further suggests also that a diagram, rather than a number of expensive experimen-
tal campaign, can be employed for finding the proper template match. This aspect is
particularly important, as robustness of automatic recognition/identification schemes
strongly relies on the amount of data available for training and learning, and overcom-
ing the necessity of extensive data acquisition can fasten the development.
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